James P. Wallace

Farm workers sued the Texas Employment Commission challenging the agricultural exemption in the Texas Unemployment Compensation Act as unconstitutional under the Texas Equal Rights Amendment, which denied them unemployment benefits. The trial court granted declaratory relief finding the exemption unconstitutional and awarded reasonable attorney's fees but held sovereign immunity barred the fees; after the Legislature amended the Act to provide phased-in coverage, the court of appeals deemed the claims moot and upheld the denial of fees. The court held the case was not moot due to the live controversy over attorney's fees and costs, that Chapter 106 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code authorizes fees and costs against the State for violations involving denial of benefits or participation in state programs, and that the injunction was improper because no ripe controversy existed; it therefore awarded $36,810 in fees and assessed all costs against the State.

labor & employmentcivil rights

This case involved a dispute over the termination of a sublease for commercial office space following the failure of the original bank lessor. H.L. Brown subleased space from First National Bank of Midland under agreements that included a Termination Agreement granting him the right to end the lease with 30 days' notice, and a Sublease. After the FDIC transferred assets to RepublicBank, Brown attempted to terminate, but the bank sued for unpaid rent. The Texas Supreme Court reversed the lower courts' judgments in favor of the bank, holding that the Termination Agreement and Sublease should be read together, incorporating the termination right into the sublease based on the parties' intent. The court rendered judgment for Brown without addressing mitigation of damages.

propertybusiness & regulatory

This case involved a personal injury lawsuit brought by Anthony Cropper against Caterpillar Tractor Company after Cropper was injured operating a water wagon that struck metal tracks, leading to a jury verdict awarding damages on negligence and products liability claims while finding no contributory negligence by Cropper. The court of appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial, concluding that the jury's failure to find contributory negligence was against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. The Texas Supreme Court held that courts of appeals have constitutional authority under Article V, Section 6 to review such "failure to find" determinations in the same manner as affirmative jury findings and to remand for new trial when warranted. The Court further concluded that this review power does not violate the right to trial by jury under Article I, Section 15, drawing on the constitution's grant of appellate jurisdiction and historical precedent recognizing appellate review of fact questions. The decision addressed the scope of intermediate appellate courts' fact-review authority without resolving the underlying sufficiency of evidence in this specific case.

proceduretorts & liability

The case concerned whether the Fifth Court of Appeals retained authority to decide a timely second motion for rehearing filed by Doctors Hospital after the opposing party had already filed an application for writ of error in the Texas Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the court of appeals continued to have jurisdiction over the motion and was required to rule on it before the Supreme Court could exercise jurisdiction over the points raised therein. The core reasoning was that Texas appellate rules and precedent require a motion for rehearing to be filed and overruled in the intermediate court before higher-court review is available, and that allowing one party to cut off the other's rehearing right by filing first would arbitrarily deny access to appellate review protected by the Texas Constitution. The Court therefore conditionally granted mandamus relief to compel a ruling and overruled conflicting prior authority.

procedure

This case was a Deceptive Trade Practices Act dispute arising from Kelly Joe Walters' purchase of a pickup truck from W.O. Bankston Nissan, Inc. Walters traded in his vehicle after the dealer represented the truck as a 1982 model, but it was actually a 1981 model, leading to financing issues and mechanical problems; he sued after the dealer refused to unwind the deal and had already sold the trade-in. The trial court entered judgment notwithstanding the verdict for the dealer, the court of appeals reversed and rendered judgment on the jury verdict finding misrepresentation and damages, and the Texas Supreme Court reversed the appeals court to affirm the trial court's take-nothing judgment. The court held that Walters failed to meet his burden of proving actual damages, which under the DTPA must be measured by either the out-of-pocket rule (difference between value parted with and value received) or the benefit-of-the-bargain rule (difference between value as represented and value received), and he had not requested proper jury issues on those measures.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involved a mandamus action by the Public Utility Commission of Texas against a district judge who had ordered the Attorney General to choose between representing the PUC or the State Purchasing and General Services Commission in an appeal from a telephone rate decision, due to a perceived conflict of interest from dual representation. The Texas Supreme Court held that the Attorney General must represent both agencies as required by the Public Utility Regulatory Act and the State Purchasing and General Services Act. The core reasoning was that the statutes unambiguously mandate the Attorney General's representation of each agency in court proceedings, and there was no evidence of collusion or other impropriety that would justify the trial court's exercise of inherent power to bar dual representation. The court concluded that the judge abused his discretion by overriding the legislative directives.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

This case involved a dispute over whether a bank could obtain and foreclose an equitable lien on a couple's homestead after an invalid, backdated mechanic's and materialman's lien contract was prepared in connection with a construction loan. The trial court awarded the banks monetary judgments on the promissory notes and imposed an equitable lien on the homestead that the Hruskas were estopped from challenging; the court of appeals affirmed. The Texas Supreme Court reversed the portion of the judgment granting the lien and foreclosure power but affirmed the monetary awards plus attorney's fees. The core reasoning was that Texas Constitution article XVI, section 50 permits homestead liens only when created in the specified manner, and principles of estoppel or waiver cannot create a lien where none validly exists; they can only preserve rights in an already valid lien. The court also held that any error in failing to segregate attorney's fees was waived by lack of objection.

property

This case arose from a wrongful death lawsuit in which a jury awarded over $5 million to the plaintiffs against an architectural firm insured by Continental Casualty Company. After the insured reached a covenant not to execute with the plaintiffs and moved to dismiss its own appeal, Continental sought to continue litigating the appeal in its capacity as the liability insurer. The Texas Supreme Court dismissed the cause as moot, holding that Continental had voluntarily paid the policy limits plus interest to the plaintiffs, thereby waiving any right to appeal under settled precedent that voluntary satisfaction of a judgment renders the controversy moot. The court rejected arguments that the payment was made under duress or protest, noting that the mere threat or filing of a direct action against the insurer does not constitute duress as a matter of law.

proceduretorts & liability

The case involved parents suing a hospital and three physicians on behalf of their premature infant daughter, who became blind after receiving unmonitored supplemental oxygen that caused retrolental fibroplasia. The jury found the defendants negligent and the hospital grossly negligent and in violation of the Deceptive Trade Practices Act for misrepresenting its ability to care for premature infants. The trial court awarded actual damages against all defendants and exemplary damages plus DTPA treble damages against the hospital, but the court of appeals reversed on evidentiary and other grounds. The Texas Supreme Court reversed the appeals court, holding that evidence of the hospital's knowledge of risks and other RLF cases was admissible to show gross negligence, that expert opinions on mixed questions of law and fact were proper, and that the DTPA claim was viable because the child was a consumer and damages were adequately found. It rendered judgment awarding the family actual damages jointly and severally plus additional DTPA damages against the hospital.

torts & liabilityhealthcare

The case involved a workers' compensation claim where the employee Leos suffered total loss of use of both feet for five years, but not permanently. The trial court awarded 250 weeks of compensation plus lifetime benefits, but the court of appeals reduced it to 125 weeks based on prior precedent. The Supreme Court reversed the appeals court, holding that the statute's plain language permits cumulative compensation periods for concurrent specific injuries rather than limiting benefits to the longest single period of incapacity. It modified the judgment to affirm the 250 weeks while reversing the lifetime benefits and overruled earlier decisions that had reached a contrary interpretation.

labor & employment

The case involved whether a double-wide manufactured home with an attached porch violated subdivision deed restrictions that prohibited moving buildings onto lots and banned house trailers or temporary structures for more than 30 days. The trial court found a violation and ordered removal, but the court of appeals reversed; the Texas Supreme Court reversed the appeals court and affirmed the trial court. The court reasoned that restrictive covenants are enforced when clearly worded, and the framers' intent—based on direct testimony defining house trailers as anything with a tongue that is pulled in, plus the evolution of terminology from house trailers to mobile homes to manufactured homes—was to prohibit such structures regardless of name changes or modifications like removing wheels and adding a skirt and porch. Precedents interpreting similar restrictions on trailers or mobile homes supported this conclusion.

property

The case involved a contract dispute in which engineer Coulson sued the Lake L.B.J. Municipal Utility District for unpaid fees after preparing utility plans and specifications; the District defended and counterclaimed on grounds that the work failed to meet an implied standard of good and workmanlike performance or reasonable engineering practice. The trial court placed the burden on the District to prove its affirmative defense of failure of consideration and its negligence counterclaim, and the jury found for Coulson. The court of appeals reversed, holding that compliance with the implied standard was an essential element of Coulson's claim and required him to bear the burden of proof. The Texas Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, holding that once a plaintiff proves compliance with the express contract terms, a presumption arises that the work was performed in a good and workmanlike manner, and the defendant bears the burden of proving breach of the implied standard as an affirmative defense or counterclaim. The court remanded for the court of appeals to address remaining points.

business & regulatoryproceduretorts & liability

This case involved a lawsuit by Douglas O. Henson and International Aero, Inc. against Bruce L. Crow for rental payments due under an oral lease of real property. After Crow's death, the plaintiffs amended their petition to name the Estate of Bruce L. Crow as the defendant. The trial court ruled that the estate was not a legal entity that could be sued and entered judgment that the plaintiffs take nothing, which was affirmed by the court of appeals and the Supreme Court. The core reasoning was that without a personal representative appearing, there was no waiver of the defect in suing a non-entity, and thus the estate could not be held liable in this manner.

propertyprocedure

This case was a declaratory judgment suit to interpret Mary Carter agreements arising from multiple lawsuits after a 1981 grain elevator explosion that caused deaths, injuries, and property damage. The Texas Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals in part and reversed in part, holding that attorney fees for personal injury and death claims subject to payback provisions must be calculated on net settlement amounts after reimbursements to the insurer, but fees for the property damage claim without a payback provision could be based on gross amounts. The core reasoning was that the unambiguous agreements expressed an intent for full reimbursement to the insurer, which required deducting the paybacks before computing contingent fees, while the absence of such provisions in the property claim allowed gross calculation; the matter was remanded for disposition of escrow funds.

proceduretorts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory

The case was a post-divorce declaratory judgment action concerning the characterization and division of Edward Grier's military retirement benefits after his 1975 divorce from Elsie Grier, at which time he held the rank of major and was promoted to lieutenant colonel eight months later. The court decided that Elsie's interest is limited to 37.45% of the retirement pay corresponding to the rank of major at the time of divorce and that the Federal Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act does not cap state court divisions at 50% of disposable retired pay. The core reasoning was that, under Berry v. Berry, community retirement benefits must be valued and apportioned based on the circumstances existing at divorce, making post-divorce increases in rank separate property, while the federal statute's 50% limit applies only to garnishment and payment by service secretaries rather than to the underlying division of property.

family lawproperty

This case is an appeal from a summary judgment in a dispute over the scope of an oil and gas lease containing a Mother Hubbard clause. Colle obtained a receivership lease covering 49.54 mineral acres under a described 68.72-acre tract, which included a Mother Hubbard clause purporting to cover adjacent land; Colle argued this clause also conveyed Curry's minerals under an adjoining 49.34-acre tract. Jones later acquired Curry's interests in both tracts and intervened, claiming the clause did not reach the additional tract. The Texas Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and rendered judgment for Jones, holding that Mother Hubbard clauses cover only small, unintended strips or parcels unknown to the parties at execution, not large known tracts like the adjoining acreage here.

property

This case involved a dispute over an irrevocable letter of credit issued by Abilene National Bank to Fina Supply, Inc., to cover imbalances in an oil exchange agreement with Brio Petroleum. Fina sued the bank for breach of contract, fraud, and reformation after its draft was dishonored, claiming the bank’s amendments extended coverage and that misrepresentations occurred. The trial court awarded Fina damages on the fraud claim and reformed the letter of credit, but the court of appeals reversed. The Texas Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the bank officer’s statements about the amendments were non-actionable opinions on legal effect, that reformation was improper without consent from all parties including Brio, and that Fina’s presentment documents failed to strictly comply with the letter of credit’s original terms covering only October through December 1981.

business & regulatorytorts & liability

The case involved Reva Wright seeking exemplary damages from her husband's employer, Gifford-Hill, after his death while repairing equipment, alleging gross negligence in failing to provide a safe workplace under the Texas Workers' Compensation Act. Wright obtained favorable jury findings on gross negligence, proximate cause, and exemplary damages, but the trial court granted judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and the court of appeals affirmed on the basis that she had not secured jury findings on the existence and amount of actual damages. The Supreme Court of Texas reversed and remanded, holding that a plaintiff in such a case need not obtain a jury finding on the amount of actual damages to recover exemplary damages. The court reasoned that the Workers' Compensation Act bars recovery of actual damages, making a finding on their amount unnecessary, and that other factors can be used to assess the reasonableness of exemplary damages without an exact actual damages figure.

labor & employmenttorts & liabilityprocedure

This case involved a dispute over whether a construction contract required Daniel Construction Company to indemnify Ethyl Corporation for Ethyl's own negligence in a workplace accident that injured a Daniel employee. The trial court granted indemnity to Ethyl based on the contract, but the court of appeals reversed and held Daniel not liable. The Texas Supreme Court affirmed, adopting the express negligence doctrine under which indemnity provisions must state in specific terms within the contract's four corners an intent to cover the indemnitee's own negligence, whether sole or concurrent. The court found the contract's language referring to losses caused by the contractor's negligence failed this test, rejected derivative negligence arguments, and confirmed no common-law comparative indemnity right exists in Texas.

torts & liability

This case involved an insurance company's liability to its insureds after a jury found one insured 100% negligent in a truck collision, resulting in damages far exceeding the $10,000/$20,000/$10,000 policy limits; the insureds sued the insurer under the Stowers Doctrine claiming negligence in failing to settle the claims. The trial court entered judgment for the insureds based on a jury finding of negligence, the court of appeals affirmed, and the Texas Supreme Court affirmed that judgment. The court held that an insurer's duty under Stowers extends to the full range of its agency relationship with the insured, including the obligation to exercise ordinary care in considering and negotiating settlements as viewed from the insured's perspective, and that the insurer is responsible for the conduct of attorneys it hires to defend the insured. The court rejected the insurer's argument that liability requires only a refusal to accept an unconditional offer to settle all claims within policy limits.

torts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory