This case originated as an action at law by the plaintiff buyer seeking damages for breach of a covenant against incumbrances in a 1945 deed to a farm from the defendant sellers. The defendants sought transfer to equity and reformation of the deed, claiming mutual mistake by the scrivener in omitting a longstanding water-right easement from the conveyance and the covenant. The court found no mutual mistake because one defendant knew of the easement, did not disclose it, and allowed the deed to be executed with the unqualified covenant; it further held that the easement constituted an incumbrance that was not incorporated by reference to prior deeds. The decree dismissing the plaintiff's bill was reversed, the defendants' cross-bill was dismissed, and the matter was remanded for findings on damages measured at the time of the breach.
The case involved a 1947 petition in Franklin Municipal Court, sitting as a juvenile court, alleging that the four McMahon children were dependent under P.L. 5446 and seeking their commitment to the Department of Public Welfare at the joint expense of the state and the Town of Fairfield, with an order for the father to contribute support. In 1948 the Town moved to reopen the case and vacate the orders for lack of jurisdiction, citing failures to follow statutory procedures including notice, investigation, and report by the state probation officer under P.L. 5447, issuance of a summons, and bringing the children before the court. The Vermont Supreme Court held that the juvenile court's record showed noncompliance with these mandatory requirements, so the court lacked jurisdiction, its original judgment was void, and the motion to dismiss the petition should be granted.
This case involved a contract action in municipal court to recover the unpaid balance on a conditional sale note for an automobile, where the defendant asserted a set-off claim for gas and oil supplied to the plaintiff. The defendant did not file a specification detailing the set-off as required by Municipal Court Rule No. 7, and after a prior remand for possible disposition of the claim, admitted at a subsequent hearing that no such specification had been filed. The court determined that the general statement in the defendant's answer did not qualify as a specification because it lacked particulars such as dates, amounts, and prices. The set-off claim was dismissed, and judgment was entered for the plaintiff, which was affirmed on appeal due to the defendant's failure to comply with the procedural rule.
In Davis v. Chittenden County Trust Co., the plaintiff, a co-owner of a joint savings account with her husband at the defendant bank, sued to recover funds paid to the husband without presentation of the passbook or proof of its loss, in violation of the bank's printed rules governing withdrawals. The trial court entered judgment for the plaintiff, and the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed. The court reasoned that the rules printed in the passbook formed part of the deposit contract, which benefited the depositors as well as the bank and could not be waived unilaterally by the bank, particularly in a joint account where both owners are parties to the contract. It noted that the bank had been informed of the plaintiff's concerns and domestic situation, and that she relied on the funds for support.
In this case, plaintiffs purchased land from defendants via a warranty deed that included covenants of title and specified that grantees would have possession on April 3, 1947, though the property was occupied by tenants at the time. Defendants later provided a letter waiving any reserved right to possession, but the tenants refused to vacate, prompting plaintiffs to sue for damages based on an alleged promise to deliver possession. The trial court ruled for plaintiffs, finding a breach of the deed's covenants and awarding $81. On appeal, the court held that the possession provision was not a covenant but a reservation of rights that defendants had waived, and that the judgment improperly relied on covenant issues not presented by the pleadings or trial conduct. The judgment was reversed and the case remanded due to the mismatch between findings and the actual issues litigated.
This case involved a petition for a writ of prohibition seeking to prevent a municipal court judge from sentencing a defendant who had pleaded guilty to careless and negligent driving and operating a vehicle without a license. The petitioner alleged that the judge had improperly pressured him to pay damages to the accident victim by offering probation in exchange for payment and threatening imprisonment otherwise, and had acted as the victim's counsel by drafting a promissory note for the settlement. The judge denied any bias or coercion, explaining that he had merely inquired about restitution arrangements and accommodated a request to draft the note without compensation or expectation of it. The court held that the judge's actions did not constitute an excess of jurisdiction, that considering restitution in determining sentence severity was a proper exercise of discretion, and that no coercion had occurred. The petition was therefore dismissed.
