John S. Buttles

This case originated as an action at law by the plaintiff buyer seeking damages for breach of a covenant against incumbrances in a 1945 deed to a farm from the defendant sellers. The defendants sought transfer to equity and reformation of the deed, claiming mutual mistake by the scrivener in omitting a longstanding water-right easement from the conveyance and the covenant. The court found no mutual mistake because one defendant knew of the easement, did not disclose it, and allowed the deed to be executed with the unqualified covenant; it further held that the easement constituted an incumbrance that was not incorporated by reference to prior deeds. The decree dismissing the plaintiff's bill was reversed, the defendants' cross-bill was dismissed, and the matter was remanded for findings on damages measured at the time of the breach.

property

The case involved a 1947 petition in Franklin Municipal Court, sitting as a juvenile court, alleging that the four McMahon children were dependent under P.L. 5446 and seeking their commitment to the Department of Public Welfare at the joint expense of the state and the Town of Fairfield, with an order for the father to contribute support. In 1948 the Town moved to reopen the case and vacate the orders for lack of jurisdiction, citing failures to follow statutory procedures including notice, investigation, and report by the state probation officer under P.L. 5447, issuance of a summons, and bringing the children before the court. The Vermont Supreme Court held that the juvenile court's record showed noncompliance with these mandatory requirements, so the court lacked jurisdiction, its original judgment was void, and the motion to dismiss the petition should be granted.

family lawprocedure

This case involved a contract action in municipal court to recover the unpaid balance on a conditional sale note for an automobile, where the defendant asserted a set-off claim for gas and oil supplied to the plaintiff. The defendant did not file a specification detailing the set-off as required by Municipal Court Rule No. 7, and after a prior remand for possible disposition of the claim, admitted at a subsequent hearing that no such specification had been filed. The court determined that the general statement in the defendant's answer did not qualify as a specification because it lacked particulars such as dates, amounts, and prices. The set-off claim was dismissed, and judgment was entered for the plaintiff, which was affirmed on appeal due to the defendant's failure to comply with the procedural rule.

procedure

In Davis v. Chittenden County Trust Co., the plaintiff, a co-owner of a joint savings account with her husband at the defendant bank, sued to recover funds paid to the husband without presentation of the passbook or proof of its loss, in violation of the bank's printed rules governing withdrawals. The trial court entered judgment for the plaintiff, and the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed. The court reasoned that the rules printed in the passbook formed part of the deposit contract, which benefited the depositors as well as the bank and could not be waived unilaterally by the bank, particularly in a joint account where both owners are parties to the contract. It noted that the bank had been informed of the plaintiff's concerns and domestic situation, and that she relied on the funds for support.

business & regulatoryproperty

In this case, plaintiffs purchased land from defendants via a warranty deed that included covenants of title and specified that grantees would have possession on April 3, 1947, though the property was occupied by tenants at the time. Defendants later provided a letter waiving any reserved right to possession, but the tenants refused to vacate, prompting plaintiffs to sue for damages based on an alleged promise to deliver possession. The trial court ruled for plaintiffs, finding a breach of the deed's covenants and awarding $81. On appeal, the court held that the possession provision was not a covenant but a reservation of rights that defendants had waived, and that the judgment improperly relied on covenant issues not presented by the pleadings or trial conduct. The judgment was reversed and the case remanded due to the mismatch between findings and the actual issues litigated.

propertyprocedure

This case involved a petition for a writ of prohibition seeking to prevent a municipal court judge from sentencing a defendant who had pleaded guilty to careless and negligent driving and operating a vehicle without a license. The petitioner alleged that the judge had improperly pressured him to pay damages to the accident victim by offering probation in exchange for payment and threatening imprisonment otherwise, and had acted as the victim's counsel by drafting a promissory note for the settlement. The judge denied any bias or coercion, explaining that he had merely inquired about restitution arrangements and accommodated a request to draft the note without compensation or expectation of it. The court held that the judge's actions did not constitute an excess of jurisdiction, that considering restitution in determining sentence severity was a proper exercise of discretion, and that no coercion had occurred. The petition was therefore dismissed.

criminal lawprocedure

This case concerns a dispute over accumulated income from a $10,000 spendthrift trust established under the will of Daniel W. Burrows for the benefit of his brother's widow, Annie E. Burrows, during her lifetime, with the principal to pass to the testator's heirs at her death. The trustee had discretion over using the income for her benefit, maintenance, and comfort, and after her admission to a state infirmary in 1930 and death in 1943, the question arose whether the undistributed income in the trustee's hands belonged to her estate (administered by plaintiff Harlacker) or should remain with the trust. The court held that the accumulated income must be paid to the administrator of the beneficiary's estate and that the trustee could not recover income previously paid to her conservator. The reasoning centered on the testator's intent that all income vest in the beneficiary alone, with the trustee's discretion limited to the time and manner of distribution rather than the right to withhold payments entirely, as the will made no provision for redirecting income to principal or others.

property

This case involves a tort claim for damages to the plaintiff's automobile from a collision allegedly caused by the defendant's negligence. After a jury trial without a stenographic record, resulting in a verdict for the plaintiff, the defendant appealed exceptions to the denial of motions for a directed verdict and to set aside the verdict on grounds of contributory negligence. The court affirmed the judgment, finding that the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff showed no contributory negligence as a matter of law on the issues of speed or failure to sound the horn, and that substantial evidence supported the verdict.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case concerned whether a Vermont probate court could, in its discretion, allow an executor to withdraw a petition to probate a purported will and remove the document from the court's files so it could instead be presented in another jurisdiction where the testator allegedly died and held most of her property. The contestants moved to reverse the lower court's decision that had allowed and probated the document as the decedent's will. The Vermont Supreme Court held that the probate court has discretion to permit such a withdrawal and discontinuance, following the reasoning in In re Binney's Will and similar cases from other states that treat probate as a proceeding in rem but allow discretionary withdrawal even when contested. The court noted that all interested parties here had stipulated in favor of the motion, distinguishing it somewhat from opposed cases. It reversed the county court's judgment pro forma and remanded the matter to the probate court for further proceedings consistent with this ruling.

propertyprocedure

The case involved an insurance company seeking to rescind the reinstatement of a life insurance policy on grounds of alleged fraudulent statements by the insured in his 1942 reinstatement application, and to cancel the policy's double indemnity and disability benefits provisions while enjoining the insured's separate lawsuit for disability benefits. The defendant demurred, arguing that the insurer had an adequate remedy by defending the pending law action and that the double indemnity clause was not properly at issue. The court overruled the demurrer and allowed the equity action to proceed, reasoning that a defense in the law action would not provide sufficiently prompt, certain, or complete relief, particularly because it would not address cancellation of the double indemnity provision (which could involve future disputes with non-party beneficiaries) and because equitable remedies like cancellation were needed to fully resolve the fraud claims.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case concerned Middlebury College's request for an injunction to prevent the Town of Hancock from collecting taxes on land devised by Joseph Battell as a public park, with the college arguing the property was exempt as it was held and used for public and charitable purposes. The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the chancellor's decree granting the injunction, holding the land non-taxable. The core reasoning relied on a prior decision interpreting the Battell will as dedicating the land primarily to public use rather than imposing conditions, found that lumbering operations were incidental to park preservation and public access, and concluded that a public park qualifies for the statutory tax exemption even if some revenue is generated.

taxesproperty

This case involved a dispute between a father-in-law and son-in-law, both farmers, over mutual assistance with farm work, loans of equipment and animals, transportation, and sales of hay, leading to cross-claims in assumpsit after their relationship soured. The defendant had previously sued in municipal court for hay sold, prompting the plaintiff to bring this county court action with specifications for various charges, to which the defendant responded with a declaration in offset. The trial court made findings allowing the defendant a net recovery of $270.05 after offsetting mutual claims. The court affirmed the judgment, reasoning that exchanged work and loans did not require exact balancing or cancellation under the findings and evidence, that specific allowances were supported, and that the prior municipal court action did not bar this suit because the claims were not substantially identical in subject matter or relief sought.

procedureproperty

This case was a contract action brought by a purported New Hampshire corporation whose charter had been revoked by the state legislature in 1939. The defendant filed a plea challenging the plaintiff's corporate existence and capacity to sue after entering a general appearance and general denial, and the trial court treated the plea as one in bar, allowed it despite the prior admission, and dismissed the writ and cause of action. The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed, reasoning that dilatory pleas must be raised promptly but the decision to permit an untimely plea in bar is discretionary when an improvident admission is shown, and that the lower court properly exercised that discretion here.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

The case concerned a dispute over the location of an eight-foot right of way reserved in an 1893 deed for the benefit of land now owned by the plaintiffs, adjacent to property owned by the defendant on River Street in Rutland. The plaintiffs sought to enjoin alleged obstructions, claiming the right of way lay north of the street line, while the defendant maintained it was located within the public highway. The court held that the right of way is situated north of the north line of River Street because the original deed conveyed no land within the highway limits and interpreting the reservation as covering only highway land would render it superfluous given the preexisting public easement. The decree dismissing the complaint was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings to determine whether the right of way had been obstructed.

property

This case arose from a 1942 automobile accident in which the plaintiff sought damages from the defendant. After motions addressing irregularities in the writ's dates and service, the trial court ruled that the action was barred by the three-year statute of limitations and entered judgment for the defendant. The key issue on appeal was when the suit commenced for limitations purposes. The court held that service of the writ generally starts the action, but taking out the writ interrupts the limitations period if delivered for service in time; here, evidence including a judicial admission showed the writ was signed and issued on December 13, 1945, more than three years after the accident, so the claim was untimely. The judgment was affirmed.

proceduretorts & liability

This case involves a wrongful death lawsuit brought by the parents of a 10-year-old boy who was electrocuted in their milk house after a decayed tree limb fell and caused a high-voltage power line to contact lower-voltage wires owned by the defendant utility company. The jury awarded the plaintiffs $6,500, and the defendant appealed, arguing that the parents were contributorily negligent for not removing the tree themselves and that the verdict was excessive. The court affirmed the judgment, holding that the evidence did not establish contributory negligence as a matter of law because the parents had notified the company multiple times, permitted its employees to attempt removal, and lacked expertise to handle the wires safely themselves, while the company had superior knowledge of the risks. It further reasoned that the damages were not excessive, as they could reasonably reflect anticipated pecuniary benefits from the child to his parents both before and after his majority based on the evidence presented.

torts & liability

This case involves a petition for partition of real estate held in equal shares by former spouses as tenants in common, where the property cannot be physically divided. After prior proceedings, commissioners reported that both parties were willing to take assignment of the other's interest for $4000, and the lower court accepted the reports, found facts favoring the petitioner, and ordered assignment of the petitionee's share to the petitioner. The Vermont Supreme Court reversed, holding that the governing statutes (P.L. 1977 and 1978) provide no explicit procedure for conflicting elections by both co-owners, and that the principle of equality requires the property to be sold at public or private sale if both remain willing to take an assignment. The court directed recommitment to the commissioners to determine anew the parties' willingness and equitable terms, after which a sale order should issue under the statute if both elect to take assignment.

propertyprocedurefamily law

This case is a criminal prosecution in which the respondent was charged under P.L. 8500 with unnecessarily failing to provide certain cattle with proper food and drink on March 1, 1945. After conviction in municipal court, the respondent appealed on exceptions claiming the information was insufficient to inform him of the charge or satisfy due process, that certain witness testimony was improperly admitted, and that the evidence was insufficient to support a guilty verdict. The court overruled the exceptions and affirmed the judgment, holding that the information adequately charged the offense in the statute's language with sufficient particularity, that the challenged testimony fell within recognized exceptions to the opinion rule or was within the trial court's discretion on remoteness, and that circumstantial evidence of the animals' poor condition permitted the jury to infer lack of proper food. The court further found no error in evidentiary rulings on cross-examination or exclusion of irrelevant questions about veterinary practices.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a dispute over a small parcel of land and school building in Charlotte, Vermont, originally conveyed in 1895 by quitclaim deed to the Town for school purposes only, with a reversion clause to the grantor, his heirs, or assigns if that use ended, and the Town retaining the right to remove buildings. The plaintiff, who acquired the surrounding farm through a chain of warranty deeds, sued for an injunction against interference or sale of the building and to quiet title after the Town stopped using the property for schools in 1936 and sold the building in 1944. The chancellor granted the requested relief, and the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed on the defendants' exceptions. The court held that the pleadings admitted the plaintiff's fee ownership of the land and the reversion upon cessation of school use, and further reasoned that a possibility of reverter following a determinable fee is alienable under Vermont law, which adopts only applicable common law, so title reverted to the plaintiff upon the qualifying event.

propertyprocedure

In Guibord v. Guibord, the husband sought and obtained a divorce under a 1941 Vermont statute allowing dissolution after three years of living apart without fault on the petitioner's part and where reconciliation was not reasonably probable. The wife appealed, challenging the trial court's findings that her neglect in preparing meals and other household duties contributed to the husband's departure in 1931 and that the separation continued without his fault. The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the decree, holding that the findings were supported by the husband's testimony and limited corroboration from other witnesses, that credibility determinations were for the trial court, and that any prior breaches of the marriage covenant could be presumed condoned or irrelevant to the later separation. The court also rejected arguments that the husband was required to periodically attempt reconciliation during the three-year period.

family law