James L. Morse

In State v. Cleary, a mentally retarded defendant with an IQ between 65 and 70, who had prior criminal convictions and competency evaluations, was charged with attempted sexual assault and lewd and lascivious conduct against his mother. After expert evaluations and a hearing, the district court found him competent to stand trial with appropriate support and accommodations, and he later entered a guilty plea in exchange for a recommended sentence. On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the record supported the competency determination and that any deficiencies in the V.R.Cr.P. 11 plea colloquy did not amount to plain error because the defendant failed to show he did not understand the rights waived or the consequences of the plea. The court rejected arguments that the competency finding was improperly contingent on a cognitive facilitator and that the trial court failed to personally address the defendant or establish a factual basis for the charges.

criminal lawprocedure

In Dillon v. Champion Jogbra, Inc., plaintiff Linda Dillon sued her former employer for wrongful termination after being reassigned to a temporary position and later let go, asserting claims for breach of contract and promissory estoppel. The claims centered on whether the company's employee manual, including its corrective action procedure, and statements made during her job transition modified her at-will employment status. The trial court granted summary judgment to the employer on both claims. On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the promissory estoppel claim but reversed and remanded on the breach of contract claim, holding that the manual's progressive discipline language and company practices could create ambiguity sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact about whether the at-will relationship had been altered. The court applied standard summary judgment review, resolving doubts in favor of the nonmoving party.

labor & employment

Newspaper publishers sued Vermont Governor Howard Dean under the state's Access to Public Records Act to obtain his daily schedules from September 2001 onward, seeking to determine the time spent on nongubernatorial activities such as his presidential campaign. The Governor denied the request, asserting that the schedules were not public records, were protected by common-law executive privilege, and fell under the Act's security exception. The trial court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs, finding no executive privilege applied because the schedules did not reveal policy deliberations or decision-making processes. On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated and remanded in part, holding that the schedules qualified as public records and were not categorically exempt under executive privilege or security provisions, though limited redactions for personal or security-sensitive details could be permitted.

free speechprocedure

This case involves a 1985 consent decree that set procedures for involuntary nonemergency medication of patients at Vermont State Hospital. After the Vermont Legislature enacted Act 114 in 1998, which established new procedures for such treatment and explicitly stated that the J.L. consent judgment is no longer applicable, the defendants moved to vacate the decree. The trial court denied the motion for relief from judgment, but the Vermont Supreme Court reversed, holding that the legislative enactment supersedes the consent decree by operation of law. The court reasoned that the legislature's intent to supplant the decree controls, and there is no basis to require a showing of the new law's constitutionality before it takes effect.

civil rightshealthcareprocedure

The case concerned whether the Vermont Environmental Board had the authority to issue a jurisdictional opinion sua sponte determining that Vermont Verde Antique International, Inc.'s quarrying operation required an Act 250 permit due to a substantial change from its preexisting status. The company appealed the Board's decision upholding the opinion, arguing lack of statutory authority among other issues. The court reversed, holding that Environmental Board Rule 3(c) exceeded the scope of 10 V.S.A. § 6007(c) by allowing district coordinators to initiate jurisdictional opinions without a request from the landowner or a third party, as the statutory scheme separates prosecutorial and adjudicatory functions.

environmentbusiness & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved a dispute over the sale of 423 acres of land in Pomfret, Vermont, where buyer Pomfret Farms Limited Partnership (PFLP) alleged negligent misrepresentation by seller Pomfret Associates (PA) and its partners regarding the availability of electricity on the property. After PFLP defaulted on a promissory note and mortgage, PA obtained a foreclosure judgment and award on the note in 1990; PFLP later raised its misrepresentation claims as a cross-claim in a separate foreclosure action by its lender. The trial court allowed the claims to proceed, finding them not compulsory in the prior in rem foreclosure suit, and a jury awarded damages to PFLP for negligent misrepresentation. On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court reversed, holding that the claims were compulsory counterclaims under V.R.C.P. 13(a) because the prior suit also sought personal liability on the note, satisfying the logical relation test, and were therefore barred by res judicata even though they arose from a default judgment. The court further noted that PFLP was on inquiry notice of the electricity issue by mid-1989 but failed to assert the claims timely.

propertyproceduretorts & liability