James L. Morse

In State v. Cleary, a mentally retarded defendant with an IQ between 65 and 70, who had prior criminal convictions and competency evaluations, was charged with attempted sexual assault and lewd and lascivious conduct against his mother. After expert evaluations and a hearing, the district court found him competent to stand trial with appropriate support and accommodations, and he later entered a guilty plea in exchange for a recommended sentence. On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the record supported the competency determination and that any deficiencies in the V.R.Cr.P. 11 plea colloquy did not amount to plain error because the defendant failed to show he did not understand the rights waived or the consequences of the plea. The court rejected arguments that the competency finding was improperly contingent on a cognitive facilitator and that the trial court failed to personally address the defendant or establish a factual basis for the charges.

criminal lawprocedure

In Dillon v. Champion Jogbra, Inc., plaintiff Linda Dillon sued her former employer for wrongful termination after being reassigned to a temporary position and later let go, asserting claims for breach of contract and promissory estoppel. The claims centered on whether the company's employee manual, including its corrective action procedure, and statements made during her job transition modified her at-will employment status. The trial court granted summary judgment to the employer on both claims. On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the promissory estoppel claim but reversed and remanded on the breach of contract claim, holding that the manual's progressive discipline language and company practices could create ambiguity sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact about whether the at-will relationship had been altered. The court applied standard summary judgment review, resolving doubts in favor of the nonmoving party.

labor & employment

Newspaper publishers sued Vermont Governor Howard Dean under the state's Access to Public Records Act to obtain his daily schedules from September 2001 onward, seeking to determine the time spent on nongubernatorial activities such as his presidential campaign. The Governor denied the request, asserting that the schedules were not public records, were protected by common-law executive privilege, and fell under the Act's security exception. The trial court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs, finding no executive privilege applied because the schedules did not reveal policy deliberations or decision-making processes. On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated and remanded in part, holding that the schedules qualified as public records and were not categorically exempt under executive privilege or security provisions, though limited redactions for personal or security-sensitive details could be permitted.

free speechprocedure

This case involves a 1985 consent decree that set procedures for involuntary nonemergency medication of patients at Vermont State Hospital. After the Vermont Legislature enacted Act 114 in 1998, which established new procedures for such treatment and explicitly stated that the J.L. consent judgment is no longer applicable, the defendants moved to vacate the decree. The trial court denied the motion for relief from judgment, but the Vermont Supreme Court reversed, holding that the legislative enactment supersedes the consent decree by operation of law. The court reasoned that the legislature's intent to supplant the decree controls, and there is no basis to require a showing of the new law's constitutionality before it takes effect.

civil rightshealthcareprocedure

The case concerned whether the Vermont Environmental Board had the authority to issue a jurisdictional opinion sua sponte determining that Vermont Verde Antique International, Inc.'s quarrying operation required an Act 250 permit due to a substantial change from its preexisting status. The company appealed the Board's decision upholding the opinion, arguing lack of statutory authority among other issues. The court reversed, holding that Environmental Board Rule 3(c) exceeded the scope of 10 V.S.A. § 6007(c) by allowing district coordinators to initiate jurisdictional opinions without a request from the landowner or a third party, as the statutory scheme separates prosecutorial and adjudicatory functions.

environmentbusiness & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved a dispute over the sale of 423 acres of land in Pomfret, Vermont, where buyer Pomfret Farms Limited Partnership (PFLP) alleged negligent misrepresentation by seller Pomfret Associates (PA) and its partners regarding the availability of electricity on the property. After PFLP defaulted on a promissory note and mortgage, PA obtained a foreclosure judgment and award on the note in 1990; PFLP later raised its misrepresentation claims as a cross-claim in a separate foreclosure action by its lender. The trial court allowed the claims to proceed, finding them not compulsory in the prior in rem foreclosure suit, and a jury awarded damages to PFLP for negligent misrepresentation. On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court reversed, holding that the claims were compulsory counterclaims under V.R.C.P. 13(a) because the prior suit also sought personal liability on the note, satisfying the logical relation test, and were therefore barred by res judicata even though they arose from a default judgment. The court further noted that PFLP was on inquiry notice of the electricity issue by mid-1989 but failed to assert the claims timely.

propertyproceduretorts & liability

The case involved Joseph and Doreen Siliski suing Allstate Insurance Company and others for malicious prosecution and intentional infliction of emotional distress after a counterclaim was filed against them in a prior personal injury lawsuit stemming from a car accident involving their son. The superior court granted summary judgment to the defendants, and the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed. The court reasoned that the voluntary dismissal of the counterclaim without prejudice did not constitute a termination in the Siliskis' favor, which is required for a malicious prosecution claim. Additionally, the filing of the counterclaim, which was permissive and based on ambiguous facts regarding fault, did not amount to extreme and outrageous conduct necessary to support an IIED claim.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case involved neighbors who intervened in an environmental court appeal challenging a development review board's approval of a final plat for a housing project proposed by Green Mountain Habitat for Humanity on land owned by the Burlington Housing Authority. After the original appellants withdrew their timely appeal, the environmental court dismissed the case and denied the intervenors' request to continue or add new issues. The Vermont Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that intervenors who had properly intervened under 24 V.S.A. § 4471(a) could maintain the appeal once the original parties withdrew, as supported by analogous precedent from other jurisdictions and consistent with the statutory scheme, provided the intervention was timely and not for an improper purpose. However, the court affirmed that the appeal remained limited to the issues raised in the original appellants' statement of questions, as required by V.R.C.P. 76(e)(4)(B), and that new issues could only be raised by filing a separate timely notice of appeal.

environmentprocedureproperty

The case involved defendant Wolf Reiser's appeal from his conviction for leaving the scene of an accident, fatality resulting, in violation of 23 V.S.A. § 1128(c), after his vehicle struck and fatally injured a pedestrian whom he did not report. The district court denied post-verdict motions, and the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed, upholding the supplemental jury instruction on constructive knowledge (that the State could prove knowledge via what a reasonable person would anticipate after a reasonable investigation), the admission of prior DWI convictions, and the ten-to-fifteen-year sentence. The court reasoned that any challenges to the initial or supplemental instructions were either unpreserved or without merit under the statute, the evidence supported the verdict, and the sentence was not grossly disproportionate to other sentences for the same offense. It also found no abuse of discretion in sentencing based on the defendant's knowledge and conduct.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved Omega Optical suing Chroma Technology Corporation, founded by former Omega employees, along with several individual defendants, for trade secret misappropriation, conversion, breach of loyalty, tortious interference, unfair competition, conspiracy, and breach of contract after the employees started a competing business producing thin-film optical filters. Following a lengthy bench trial, the superior court entered judgment for the defendants on all claims. The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed, reasoning that common-law trade secret misappropriation requires both the existence of protectible information and a breach of a duty of confidentiality arising from reasonable employer efforts to maintain secrecy and notify employees, which Omega failed to prove, and that the trial court committed no reversible error on the remaining claims or credibility findings.

business & regulatorytorts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved a medical malpractice claim by the family of Ahmad Sharifian against a radiologist, his practice, and a hospital for failing to detect a small subdural hematoma on a CAT scan performed after a 1994 car accident, which allegedly led to a larger hematoma, brain damage, and death. A jury returned a verdict for the defendants, and the trial court denied the plaintiffs' motions for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence and claims that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion because the new evidence was cumulative, the defense experts' testimony on hematoma appearance was not central to their case, substantial evidence supported the verdict including testimony about the patient's functioning and pathology, and a statement by the patient about the accident was properly admitted with a limiting instruction as probative of cognitive functioning.

torts & liabilityprocedurehealthcare

In Wilk v. Wilk, two brothers each held a one-eighth interest in a Vermont parcel containing a house and commercial buildings; the plaintiff, who operated a paving business on the site and had acquired the other siblings' shares, brought a partition action seeking to obtain the defendant's interest, while the defendant sought a public sale. The superior court appointed commissioners who found the property could not be physically divided and valued it at $125,000, then ordered the defendant to convey his share to the plaintiff for $15,625 after weighing the parties' relative equities. On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court overruled its earlier decision in Billings v. Billings, which had required a public sale when multiple co-tenants sought assignment, and held that 12 V.S.A. §§ 5174-5175 give trial courts discretion to assign the property to one co-tenant rather than order a sale. The court reasoned that the statutory language is permissive, that assignment is preferred over forced sale to avoid unnecessary divestiture of property, and that the equities here favored the plaintiff because of his active business use, improvements, and the defendant's non-compliant junkyard use on adjoining land. The judgment assigning the interest to the plaintiff was affirmed.

propertyfamily law

In Meyer v. Meyer, a father appealed a family court order that modified the parties' divorce decree by granting the mother sole legal and physical parental rights and responsibilities for their two daughters. The court affirmed the modification after finding that the mother had shown a real, substantial, and unanticipated change in circumstances, including a deterioration in cooperation between the parents on issues like religion, education, and communication that was harming the children. It rejected the father's constitutional challenges to the order's restrictions on his efforts to raise the girls as Jehovah's Witnesses, concluding that the provisions merely gave effect to the custodial parent's choice of religious upbringing without preventing the father's own practice and were supported by evidence of harm. The court also held that the family court did not abuse its discretion by declining to appoint a guardian ad litem, as there was no indication that the parents' litigation failed to consider the children's best interests.

family lawreligious liberty

The case involved Daniel Griswold's conviction after a jury trial for aggravated sexual assault under Vermont law, stemming from an incident in which the victim was assaulted on a riverbank and sustained injuries including those from foreign matter forced into her mouth. On appeal, the defendant challenged the trial court's exclusion of evidence regarding the victim's prior domestic disputes with her boyfriend (offered to suggest a third-party cause for her injuries) and proposed expert testimony on an allergic reaction explanation for her condition, as well as the sufficiency of the evidence to establish the deadly force element required for aggravated sexual assault. The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, reasoning that the third-party evidence was inadmissible under V.R.E. 404(b) and 405(b) as improper character evidence lacking a direct connection to the crime, the expert testimony was properly limited, and the evidence of choking the victim with dirt and rocks supported a finding that the defendant should have known his conduct created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Lawrence White's appeal of two Environmental Board decisions on Act 250 permits for business activities, including a sawmill and stone processing, on his property in Danby, Vermont. The Board revoked five permits because White failed to notify an adjoining landowner when obtaining them, even though the omission was not willful, and then issued a corrective permit that added restrictions such as banning a portable stone crusher and tightening operating hours. White challenged the revocation on grounds of improper notice handling, due process violations, and exclusion of evidence, and contested the new conditions as unreasonable. The court affirmed the revocation of the original permits, holding that the notice failure justified revocation under precedent, but reversed the Board's ruling on the corrective permit.

environmentprocedurepropertybusiness & regulatory

The case involved defendant Lois Melchior appealing the denial of her motion to suppress evidence from a search warrant for her property, issued after police officers observed plants consistent with marijuana during a helicopter flyover as part of a state eradication program. The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's ruling, holding that the officer's affidavit describing the aerial observations and his training was sufficient by itself to establish probable cause. The court reasoned that probable cause should be assessed through a common-sense reading of the affidavit rather than hypertechnical scrutiny, allowing a magistrate to objectively infer the likelihood of criminal activity from specific details about the plants' appearance without requiring an explicit conclusion that they were marijuana.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a ski shop owner seeking a conditional use permit and variance from the Village of Ludlow for renovations to address parking issues on a nonconforming lot in a residential-commercial district, which were granted by the development review board but appealed by an adjoining landowner. The environmental court conducted a de novo hearing, granted the conditional use permit (except for one dormer), and denied the variance after finding that none of the five statutory criteria were met. The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the board's minutes did not satisfy the Municipal Administrative Procedure Act's recording requirement for on-the-record review, that the renovations reduced overall building size and lot coverage but still required variance approval for new construction, and that credible evidence supported the permit findings including issuance of a certificate of occupancy.

environmentpropertyprocedure

This case involved Ellyn Benson seeking a final relief-from-abuse order against Vincent Muscari after he assaulted her in her home during a violent incident, where the parties' prior five-year sexual relationship made them household members under Vermont's Abuse Prevention Act. The trial court issued an order barring Muscari from coming within 1000 feet of Benson or her child, possessing firearms or dangerous weapons, and lasting five years, based on findings of past abuse and ongoing danger. On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court upheld the buffer-zone restrictions, inclusion of the child, firearms prohibition, and five-year duration as authorized by statute and supported by the evidence of risk, while remanding only the deadly-weapons restriction as vague and overbroad in this context. The court reasoned that such stay-away provisions advance key policy goals of preventing further abuse and providing security, with any incidental limits on travel or association justified by those objectives.

family lawcriminal lawcivil rights

The case involved Vermont Railway's appeal of an environmental court decision upholding most permitting conditions imposed by the City of Burlington on a facility at 207 Flynn Avenue that the railway acquired and used for freight storage, transfers, equipment storage, and repairs, including a salt shed. Vermont Railway argued that the city's zoning ordinances and conditions were entirely preempted by the ICCTA's grant of exclusive federal jurisdiction over rail transportation and facilities. The court affirmed the environmental court's ruling that the ICCTA preempts only state regulation of rail economic activity and safety, not traditional municipal police powers over local matters like traffic, land use, and environmental concerns, so only portions of four conditions were preempted while the rest remained enforceable. The court also rejected preemption claims under the Federal Railroad Safety Act, as the conditions did not regulate railroad safety or conflict with federal rules.

business & regulatoryenvironmentfederal power

The case concerned whether a police officer could lawfully stop a vehicle based solely on an anonymous radio dispatch reporting erratic driving by a specifically described car, without the officer personally observing any incriminating conduct. Defendant Vicki Boyea was stopped, arrested for DUI, and convicted after the trial court denied her motion to suppress evidence from the stop. The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that the stop was supported by reasonable suspicion because an anonymous report of erratic driving must be assessed in light of the imminent public safety risks posed by a potentially intoxicated driver, making immediate action reasonable even absent further corroboration. The Court reasoned that requiring officers to wait for observed violations could expose the public and driver to unacceptable danger.

criminal lawprocedure