This case involves a petition for divorce filed by Ruth D. Sage against Merton W. Sage on the ground of refusal and neglect to support under Vermont statute, along with related contempt proceedings for nonpayment of temporary alimony. The trial court granted the divorce to the wife and found the husband in contempt, committing him to jail. On appeal, the court affirmed, holding that the evidence supported findings of the husband's persistent refusal without cause despite his ability to provide support, that the offense was continuing so as to preclude condonation, that jurisdiction was proper in the county where the petition was filed, and that the contempt adjudication was justified by the arrears and noncompliance with the support order.
This case is a tort action in which plaintiff Harold W. Kennedy sought damages from defendant Joseph Laramee for injuries sustained when Kennedy's truck collided at night with Laramee's unlit truck, which had been left parked partially on the traveled portion of U.S. Route 2 after breaking down. The trial court entered judgment for the plaintiff following a jury verdict, but the Vermont Supreme Court reversed on the defendant's exceptions. The court held that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent as a matter of law, because after being temporarily blinded by lights from both an oncoming car and a following car, he continued driving at 35-40 mph without reducing speed or stopping, in violation of the duty to regain control of the vehicle before proceeding. The court reasoned that this failure, rather than any emergency created by the defendant, caused the collision, requiring a directed verdict for the defendant.
The case involved an employee who was hired under a contract in Massachusetts, injured while working there for an employer covered by that state's workers' compensation law, and who later sought to enforce his compensation rights in Vermont after returning to reside there. The employee filed a petition with Vermont's commissioner of industrial relations under a statute allowing out-of-state hires to pursue claims in Vermont if their rights could be reasonably determined locally, but the commissioner dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction. The court affirmed the dismissal, holding that the Massachusetts act creates a purely statutory right to compensation that includes an exclusive enforcement procedure before designated tribunals in that state, so the Vermont statute did not confer authority to entertain the petition. In reaching this result, the court overruled its prior decision in Kelley v. Hoosac Lumber Co. that had treated such compensation rights as akin to common-law rights.
The case arose when Hemingway sued Cabot and Holt in a trespass action at law for destroying duck blinds he had built in Charcoal Creek, claiming the location was on public waters of Lake Champlain. Cabot and Holt responded by filing a bill in chancery seeking to establish their property boundary at the low-water mark of the creek, obtain an injunction against the law suit, and have the trespass action transferred to equity for resolution of the overlapping title issue. The lower court granted the transfer and continued the injunction. On appeal, the court held that the transfer was proper because the chancery bill properly invoked equity jurisdiction to determine the boundary and provide injunctive relief unavailable at law, and equity retains jurisdiction once assumed to afford complete relief.
This case was a criminal prosecution for driving an automobile on a public highway while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, in which the defendant was convicted by a jury. The defendant challenged the jury on the ground that it included both a husband and wife, arguing that under common law they constituted a single legal person and thus the panel was effectively only eleven members, rendering the trial invalid. The Vermont Supreme Court rejected this claim, holding that the 1941 statute made men and women equally eligible to serve as jurors in their own right irrespective of marital status, so the two individuals counted as separate jurors. The court further ruled that allowing both to remain was not an abuse of discretion and that the common-law fiction of spousal unity did not apply to jury service. All exceptions were overruled and the conviction affirmed.
This case is a divorce action in which the wife alleged intolerable severity and non-support by the husband. The trial court granted the wife a divorce on the ground of intolerable severity along with a property settlement. On appeal by the husband, who claimed prior misconduct had been condoned by continued cohabitation and that the final incident did not rise to intolerable severity, the court affirmed the decree. It reasoned that findings showed repeated physical abuse including broken bones and threats with weapons, plus the husband's recent act of ordering the wife off their jointly owned farm and locking her out, which constituted intolerable severity that negated condonation and distinguished the case from precedent involving non-violent separation.
