Allen R. Sturtevant

This case involves a petition for divorce filed by Ruth D. Sage against Merton W. Sage on the ground of refusal and neglect to support under Vermont statute, along with related contempt proceedings for nonpayment of temporary alimony. The trial court granted the divorce to the wife and found the husband in contempt, committing him to jail. On appeal, the court affirmed, holding that the evidence supported findings of the husband's persistent refusal without cause despite his ability to provide support, that the offense was continuing so as to preclude condonation, that jurisdiction was proper in the county where the petition was filed, and that the contempt adjudication was justified by the arrears and noncompliance with the support order.

family lawprocedure

This case is a tort action in which plaintiff Harold W. Kennedy sought damages from defendant Joseph Laramee for injuries sustained when Kennedy's truck collided at night with Laramee's unlit truck, which had been left parked partially on the traveled portion of U.S. Route 2 after breaking down. The trial court entered judgment for the plaintiff following a jury verdict, but the Vermont Supreme Court reversed on the defendant's exceptions. The court held that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent as a matter of law, because after being temporarily blinded by lights from both an oncoming car and a following car, he continued driving at 35-40 mph without reducing speed or stopping, in violation of the duty to regain control of the vehicle before proceeding. The court reasoned that this failure, rather than any emergency created by the defendant, caused the collision, requiring a directed verdict for the defendant.

torts & liability

The case involved an employee who was hired under a contract in Massachusetts, injured while working there for an employer covered by that state's workers' compensation law, and who later sought to enforce his compensation rights in Vermont after returning to reside there. The employee filed a petition with Vermont's commissioner of industrial relations under a statute allowing out-of-state hires to pursue claims in Vermont if their rights could be reasonably determined locally, but the commissioner dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction. The court affirmed the dismissal, holding that the Massachusetts act creates a purely statutory right to compensation that includes an exclusive enforcement procedure before designated tribunals in that state, so the Vermont statute did not confer authority to entertain the petition. In reaching this result, the court overruled its prior decision in Kelley v. Hoosac Lumber Co. that had treated such compensation rights as akin to common-law rights.

labor & employmentprocedure

The case arose when Hemingway sued Cabot and Holt in a trespass action at law for destroying duck blinds he had built in Charcoal Creek, claiming the location was on public waters of Lake Champlain. Cabot and Holt responded by filing a bill in chancery seeking to establish their property boundary at the low-water mark of the creek, obtain an injunction against the law suit, and have the trespass action transferred to equity for resolution of the overlapping title issue. The lower court granted the transfer and continued the injunction. On appeal, the court held that the transfer was proper because the chancery bill properly invoked equity jurisdiction to determine the boundary and provide injunctive relief unavailable at law, and equity retains jurisdiction once assumed to afford complete relief.

propertyproceduretorts & liability

This case was a criminal prosecution for driving an automobile on a public highway while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, in which the defendant was convicted by a jury. The defendant challenged the jury on the ground that it included both a husband and wife, arguing that under common law they constituted a single legal person and thus the panel was effectively only eleven members, rendering the trial invalid. The Vermont Supreme Court rejected this claim, holding that the 1941 statute made men and women equally eligible to serve as jurors in their own right irrespective of marital status, so the two individuals counted as separate jurors. The court further ruled that allowing both to remain was not an abuse of discretion and that the common-law fiction of spousal unity did not apply to jury service. All exceptions were overruled and the conviction affirmed.

criminal lawprocedure

This case is a divorce action in which the wife alleged intolerable severity and non-support by the husband. The trial court granted the wife a divorce on the ground of intolerable severity along with a property settlement. On appeal by the husband, who claimed prior misconduct had been condoned by continued cohabitation and that the final incident did not rise to intolerable severity, the court affirmed the decree. It reasoned that findings showed repeated physical abuse including broken bones and threats with weapons, plus the husband's recent act of ordering the wife off their jointly owned farm and locking her out, which constituted intolerable severity that negated condonation and distinguished the case from precedent involving non-violent separation.

family law

This case involved a contract dispute in which the plaintiff sought to recover the unpaid balance on a note for the purchase of an automobile and accessories. The defendant filed a plea in set-off claiming $100 for gas and oil supplied to the plaintiff but did not file the required specifications under municipal court rule 7 or an affidavit of defense. The lower court granted the plaintiff's motion for judgment in the full amount of $264.64. The court held that the defendant's failure to comply with the filing rule meant he was not entitled to a hearing on the merits of the set-off claim, making his exception without merit. However, because the record showed no disposition of the set-off and the case had been pending for three years, the judgment was reversed pro forma and the matter remanded for further proceedings to address the set-off claim.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

This case is a contract action in which plaintiff Carvage sought damages from defendants George and Della Stowell, a married couple, for their alleged failure to sell and deliver a farm along with livestock and farming tools pursuant to an oral agreement reached in June 1946. At trial the court directed verdicts for both defendants; on appeal the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the directed verdict for Della Stowell, who had no direct involvement in the negotiations or acceptance, but reversed the directed verdict for George Stowell and remanded the case. The court held that the evidence supported findings of a valid lump-sum contract, that George's repudiation of the deal constituted an anticipatory breach, and that Carvage's subsequent letter and conduct did not amount to an irrevocable election to affirm the contract or waive his right to treat the repudiation as a breach under applicable contract principles.

propertybusiness & regulatory

The case involved a plaintiff who was injured when a Coca-Cola bottle exploded shortly after delivery to her workplace store, striking her in the face and causing a permanent scar; she sued the bottling company for negligence in preparing and handling the bottle. The trial court entered judgment for the plaintiff based on a jury verdict, and the defendants appealed on grounds including that res ipsa loquitur did not apply because they no longer controlled the bottle at the time of the explosion. The Supreme Court of Vermont affirmed the judgment, holding that the doctrine applied because the evidence showed the bottle was under the defendants' management until shortly before the accident, that such an explosion would not ordinarily occur without negligence in bottling or inspection, and that the plaintiff had made a sufficient prima facie showing without needing specific proof of fault.

torts & liability

The case was a tort action in which a spectator at a wrestling match organized by the defendant promoter sued for negligence after being injured when one wrestler was thrown through the ropes and landed on him, causing a sprained hand and wrist. The jury returned a $150 verdict for the plaintiff, who moved to set it aside as inadequate while the defendant sought a directed verdict on grounds including assumption of risk and lack of negligence. The court determined that the plaintiff was a business invitee who did not assume the risk of the danger, that the evidence supported potential liability, and that the damages award was grossly inadequate to cover medical bills, lost earnings, pain, and suffering over nine months. It therefore reversed the judgment and granted the plaintiff's motion for a new trial on all issues.

torts & liability

This case concerns the estate of Margaret E. Callahan, who died leaving equal shares to her five children. The executor sought to include as an estate asset a claim against son Francis for board, room, and washing, while Helen T. Fewkes, Francis's ex-wife, sought to intervene to enforce a county court support order lien on his inheritance for their minor children. The trial court allowed the intervention and the lien but the jury rejected the board claim as an asset. The Vermont Supreme Court held that the county court lacked jurisdiction over the non-resident Francis, rendering the support lien void and giving Fewkes no right to intervene as a party. The judgment was reversed and the cause remanded.

family lawpropertyprocedure

This case concerns an appeal from a probate court decree allowing the will of Mabel E. Pynchon, brought by the Connecticut Valley Historical Society as a legatee that had not appeared or contested the will in probate court. The proponent sought to dismiss the appeal on that basis, but the trial court denied the motion, and the Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the exceptions. The court held that under P.L. 3005, any interested person who considers themselves injured by a probate order or decree may appeal to county court within twenty days without having appeared or contested below. The reasoning rests on the statute's plain language granting appeal rights to interested persons, supported by longstanding Vermont precedent such as Cummings v. Hugh, and the absence of any Vermont requirement (unlike in Alabama) to file a contest in probate court first.

procedureproperty

This case involved a landlord's ejectment action against a corporate tenant occupying garage premises in Barre, Vermont, under a lease running from 1940. The plaintiff sought possession on two grounds: a March 1944 letter purporting to give three months' notice to vacate and the defendant's failure to pay December 1944 rent when due. The court held that the letter was ineffective because it was indefinite and did not comply with the lease's requirements for timing and content, and that nonpayment of rent alone does not terminate a lease without a proper common-law demand, with the tenant retaining the statutory right to pay rent, interest, and costs into court to avoid forfeiture. The trial court's judgment for the plaintiff was reversed, and the case was remanded for discontinuance under the applicable statute.

propertyprocedure

This case involves landowners downstream from a hydroelectric dam on the Connecticut River who petitioned the Windham County Court for damages under an 1792 legislative charter, alleging that the Bellows Falls Hydro-Electric Corporation's 1928 dam replacement and operations caused erosion, fluctuating water levels, and ice jams harming their property. The corporation demurred, arguing the old charter's damage-assessment provisions no longer applied due to later amendments and laws. The trial court overruled the demurrer, but on appeal the Vermont Supreme Court reversed, holding that a 1912 charter amendment made the company subject to general state laws and subsequent legislation rather than the 1792 act's special procedures. As a result, the court sustained the demurrer and dismissed the petition, finding the petitioners could not rely on the outdated charter provisions for their claims.

propertyprocedurebusiness & regulatory

This case was a petition for absolute divorce by Helen M. Wacker against Theodore A. Wacker on grounds of adultery, with the sole issue on appeal concerning the lower court's disposition of property the parties held as tenants by the entirety. The trial court granted the divorce to the petitioner, awarded her all the real and personal property, and ordered her to pay the petitionee $3,000 as recompense for his interest and contributions. The petitioner appealed, claiming the property settlement was not just and equitable under the relevant statute. The court noted that the trial court had wide discretion in such matters and that the statute requires considering the parties' respective merits, their post-divorce conditions, and the source of the property; it concluded that the award did not reflect an abuse of that discretion given the petitionee's management services over nearly three years and the property's acquisition cost of about $60,000. The decree was affirmed.

family lawproperty

This case involves the probate of the last will and testament of Mary H. Hays Collins, which was initially allowed by the probate court but appealed by several cousins on grounds including undue influence by one of the residuary legatees, Williston J. Farrington. The contestants abandoned claims regarding execution and mental capacity, focusing instead on whether the will was the product of undue influence. At the close of evidence in county court, the proponent's motion for a directed verdict was granted, establishing the will as valid. On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed, reasoning that the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the contestants did not show undue influence, as the will's provisions were not plainly inconsistent with the testatrix's duties to her family, and any evidentiary error regarding bank regulations was harmless.

family lawproperty

This case concerns an appeal from a Vermont Public Service Commission order authorizing the Bellows Falls Hydro-Electric Corporation to erect a dam on the Connecticut River between Vermont and New Hampshire for hydroelectric power development. The court took judicial notice of the Federal Power Act, which requires a federal license for any dam on navigable U.S. waters like the Connecticut River, and examined whether the state statute (P.L. 6122 as amended) conferred jurisdiction on the Commission in light of federal preemption. It referenced a recent U.S. Supreme Court decision addressing similar state-federal licensing conflicts and noted that lack of jurisdiction would deprive the court of authority to review the merits. Separately, the court denied a motion to award costs to petitionees, holding that the proceeding was an investigation regarding public convenience under state law and thus exempt from cost-recovery rules applicable in other cases.

federal powerenvironmentbusiness & regulatoryprocedure

This case under Vermont's Workmen's Compensation Act involved a widow's claim for benefits after her husband, a machinist employed by Central Vermont Railway, was struck and killed by a car while crossing a public street during his night shift. The trial court upheld an award by the commissioner of industrial relations, inferring from the location and timing that the employee was on a work-related errand. On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court annulled the award, holding that the claimant failed to meet her burden of proving the accident arose out of and in the course of employment. The court reasoned that the findings provided no evidence of any work purpose for leaving the shop and that the inference drawn was mere speculation rather than supported fact. Other exceptions were not reached, and a motion for reargument was denied.

labor & employmentprocedure

This case concerned the construction of the residuary clause in Edith M. Hall's will, which left the balance of her estate in equal shares to 'the rest of my own nephews and nieces' living at her death. The probate court had distributed the residue among both whole-blood and half-blood nieces and nephews (except those receiving specific bequests). The Vermont Supreme Court reversed that decree in part, ruling that only the eleven surviving whole-blood nieces and nephews (excluding one already provided for by name) were entitled to the residue. The court reached this result by examining the will as a whole, noting the testatrix's consistent use of 'my niece' or 'my nephew' for whole-blood relatives, her specific underscoring of 'my own,' and the ordinary meaning of that phrase as distinguishing whole-blood from half-blood kin.

family lawproperty

This case involves a dispute over title to real estate in Hardwick, Vermont, where the administrator of George W. Raymond's estate sought to remove a cloud on the title caused by a 1938 tax sale to Guy V. Hall. The defendant argued that laches barred the claim due to delay in probating the estate. The court affirmed the lower court's decision in favor of the plaintiff, holding that the chancellor could properly consider the five-year statutory period for validating tax deeds in assessing laches and that the findings supported the decree. The case was remanded only to set a new deadline for the defendant to convey his interest in the property.

propertytaxesprocedure