Harry L. Carrico

In this case, the Commonwealth appealed a circuit court decision granting conditional release to Derek Bell, who had been civilly committed as a sexually violent predator following a 2009 jury finding. The circuit court determined that Bell remained a sexually violent predator under Virginia Code § 37.2-900 but satisfied the criteria for conditional release under § 37.2-912. The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed, holding that the judgment was without evidence to support it. The court reasoned that Bell's poor treatment attendance, repeated behavioral incidents involving aggression and defiance, and failure to improve demonstrated he required continued secure inpatient treatment.

criminal law

This case involved whether a defendant under age 18, previously convicted and sentenced as an adult on an unrelated charge, could be sentenced by a jury rather than a judge on new charges of aggravated malicious wounding, use of a firearm in a felony, and gang-related violence that were transferred from juvenile court. The circuit court allowed jury sentencing, the jury convicted the defendant and imposed a 53-year term, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court of Virginia held that Code § 16.1-271 treats any juvenile tried and convicted as an adult as an adult for subsequent offenses, rendering Code § 16.1-272 (which requires court sentencing for juveniles) inapplicable, so jury sentencing was proper. The court declined to consider an unpreserved argument about jury instructions on youth as mitigation.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved David L. Nelson, who was charged with driving while intoxicated, fourth offense within ten years, after police found him asleep or unconscious in the driver's seat of a parked vehicle with a blood alcohol level of .40. The key issue was whether Nelson was "operating" the vehicle under Code § 18.2-266 when the engine was off, the gearshift in park, but the ignition key was in the "on or accessory" position, activating the radio via the battery. A jury convicted Nelson, the circuit court imposed the sentence, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed, holding that turning the key to the accessory position engaged the machinery of the vehicle in a manner that could, alone or in sequence, activate its motive power, satisfying the statutory definition of operating as distinguished from prior precedent like Stevenson v. City of Falls Church. The court reviewed the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth and found it sufficient to support the conviction.

criminal law

The case involved James Carroll, who entered an Alford plea to a charge of raping his stepdaughter and received a suspended sentence with supervised probation that included mandated sex offender treatment. When Carroll refused to admit guilt during treatment, his probation officer deemed him noncompliant, leading the circuit court to find a probation violation; the Court of Appeals affirmed, and the Supreme Court of Virginia also affirmed. The court reasoned that an Alford plea carries the same legal consequences as a guilty plea, so probation conditions requiring successful participation in treatment applied fully, and Carroll's refusal was a willful failure to comply rather than an inability due to unforeseen circumstances. The court further held that the trial judge did not abuse discretion in requiring Carroll to complete the same treatment program or in declining alternative unsupervised options.

criminal law

In this case, Donna Blanton was convicted by a jury in the Circuit Court of the City of Virginia Beach of first-degree murder and use of a firearm in the commission of a felony for the shooting death of her husband, a Virginia State Trooper. After an earlier reversal by the Court of Appeals on grounds related to peremptory strikes, the retrial proceeded following a change of venue. On appeal, Blanton argued that the prosecutor made improper and prejudicial statements during rebuttal closing argument by referencing her presence in jail shortly after the murder, which she claimed required a mistrial or curative instruction. The Supreme Court of Virginia held that the circuit court did not err in denying the motion for a mistrial, as the comment was innocuous under the circumstances, the jury had been properly instructed that attorney statements are not evidence, and the prosecutor corrected the remark. The court therefore affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals upholding the convictions.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved the fifth annual review hearing for Dwight Keith Smith, who was civilly committed in 2004 as a sexually violent predator under Virginia's Sexually Violent Predator Act. The circuit court ruled that Smith remained a sexually violent predator in need of secure inpatient hospitalization and ordered his continued commitment. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed, finding that the treatment records were properly admitted as business records and that the evidence, including Smith's offense history, narcissistic and antisocial traits, alcohol dependence, and incomplete engagement with treatment, was sufficient to support the determination. The court reasoned that these are civil commitment proceedings, not criminal prosecutions, so the full rules of criminal evidence do not apply.

criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure

This case involved Ronnie Eugene Fullwood, who was charged under Virginia Code § 18.2-255.2 with two separate counts of possessing controlled substances (marijuana and cocaine) with intent to distribute within 1,000 feet of a school while on property open to public use. Fullwood moved to dismiss one count, arguing that the possession of multiple substances in a single incident constituted only one offense and that the location was not open to the public due to no-trespassing signs, and he also raised double jeopardy concerns against multiple punishments. The circuit court denied the motions, convicted him on both counts, and imposed sentences, which the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court of Virginia held that the two transactions involved distinct drugs and supported separate offenses under the statute, which expressly provides that each violation is a separate felony, and that the parking lot qualified as property open to public use, allowing multiple punishments without violating double jeopardy protections.

criminal law

In Whitaker v. Commonwealth, defendant Leonard Terrell Whitaker was charged with possession of a firearm while possessing a controlled substance, possession with intent to distribute marijuana, possession of a firearm by a felon, and carrying a concealed weapon after Richmond police approached a group including Whitaker in a high-crime area, he fled on foot, and officers recovered a gun and drugs from him following his fall and admission during detention. The circuit court denied Whitaker's motion to suppress the evidence obtained during the encounter and subsequent search, convicted him on all counts after a bench trial, and revoked his prior probation. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, and the Supreme Court of Virginia held that the officers had reasonable, particularized suspicion justifying Whitaker's detention based on his unprovoked flight in an open-air drug market, and that his spontaneous statement admitting possession of a firearm supplied probable cause for arrest and a search incident to arrest that uncovered the drugs. The court affirmed the judgments of the Court of Appeals.

criminal lawprocedureguns

The case involved James Lester Waller, who was convicted in a bench trial of possessing a firearm after a prior violent felony conviction under Virginia Code § 18.2-308.2(A). The Virginia Supreme Court reversed the conviction on appeal, holding that the prior conviction records from 1975 were improperly admitted because they lacked proper authentication under Code § 17.1-123(A), which requires a judge's signature. The court reasoned that while clerk certification under § 8.01-389(A) applies to other records, circuit court orders need specific judicial authentication, and the two statutes must be reconciled accordingly. However, the defendant's admissions established a prior felony conviction, so the case was remanded for resentencing on the lesser included offense of possession after a non-violent felony.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved Jason William Anderson, who was convicted in a bench trial of conspiracy to commit robbery, robbery with a simulated gun, and use of a firearm in the commission of a felony for his role in staging a robbery at a Dick's Sporting Goods store with a coworker and a juvenile accomplice using an airsoft gun. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conspiracy conviction but reversed the robbery and firearm convictions, finding insufficient evidence that the robbery was committed against the will of a victim by force, threat, or intimidation, and remanded for resentencing. The Commonwealth appealed to the Supreme Court of Virginia, which in a majority opinion affirmed the reversal of the robbery and firearm convictions. The core reasoning was that the defendant, as an insider, was not put in fear, the other employee's reaction amounted only to concern rather than fear, and no threat was directed at an actual victim in a manner satisfying the elements of robbery. A dissent argued that the trial court's factual findings, including inferences from video evidence and common sense, supported the convictions.

criminal law

The case involved Jerry Lynn Cooper's conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, based on evidence from a paid informant who claimed to have purchased drugs from him. Cooper raised an alibi defense, presenting testimony that he was at work in another location during the alleged transaction, and requested a specific jury instruction on alibi drawn from model instructions. The trial court refused the instruction, reasoning that general instructions on presumption of innocence and reasonable doubt were sufficient, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed, holding that alibi must be treated distinctly because it is the only defense (other than insanity) requiring pretrial disclosure under Rule 3A:11, and that such an instruction is required whenever supporting evidence exists to ensure the jury properly considers whether the defendant was present at the time and place of the offense.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved E. Duane Howard's conviction for disorderly conduct under Section 21-9(a)(2) of the Roanoke City Code after he yelled during a city council meeting and refused to leave when directed by police, resulting in his forcible removal and a recess. In a bench trial, the circuit court imposed a suspended fine, which the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court of Virginia also affirmed the conviction, holding that Howard's actions were willful and disrupted the meeting by interfering with its orderly conduct. The court reasoned that the time required for police to remove him peacefully or by force lengthened the recess, satisfying the ordinance's requirements even though the exact duration of the recess was unknown.

criminal law

The case concerned whether the circuit court properly revoked Valerie White's first-offender status under Code § 18.2-251 after she pleaded guilty to cocaine possession and was placed on probation with conditions including good behavior, supervised probation until December 21, 2005, and payment of costs. The circuit court found she had violated the terms based on post-December 2005 drug use and revoked her status, leading to a conviction; the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed, holding that the probation period ended on the specified date with no valid written extension, supervised probation could not form the basis for revocation, and no implied good-behavior condition applied to support the ruling after the term expired. It therefore vacated the conviction and dismissed the indictment.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a dispute over an Option and Ground Lease Agreement for a small parcel of land in Bedford County, Virginia, where the lessors (the Saunders estate) claimed the lease allowed only one telecommunications tower while the lessees (Nextel and its assignee TowerCo) argued it permitted multiple towers. After the county approved a second tower and construction began, the lessors filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a ruling on the permitted number of towers. The circuit court denied summary judgment, found the lease ambiguous, admitted parol evidence of negotiations, and held that only one tower was allowed; the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed. The court reasoned that the final lease language specifying "one (1) tower," combined with uncontradicted evidence of the parties' intent during negotiations for a single tower, controlled over broader references to "towers" elsewhere in the agreement.

propertybusiness & regulatory

In Maxwell v. Commonwealth, the defendant was convicted by a jury of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute as a third or subsequent offense and possession of marijuana. The Virginia Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, agreeing with the en banc Court of Appeals that the evidence was sufficient. The court explained that the jury could reasonably infer guilt from the defendant's refusal to remove his hands from his pants, his flight upon mention of a pat-down search, his presence near freshly placed lumber stacks where the drugs were later found, the absence of others in the area, and his change in demeanor after the drugs were discovered.

criminal law

The case involved Malcolm Parker, who was convicted as a principal in the second degree of the felony of obtaining money over $200 by false pretenses under Virginia Code § 18.2-178 for supplying his girlfriend with fake ecstasy pills to sell to an undercover detective for $2,350. The trial court imposed a sentence of four months in jail, a $2,500 fine, and a suspended two-year term, and the Court of Appeals initially reversed but later affirmed en banc. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the conviction, holding that the girlfriend's statements to the detective—such as 'these are the pills' and that they were 'real'—constituted false representations of existing facts, which the jury could reasonably find induced the detective to hand over the money despite his doubts, rather than solely on past experience. The court emphasized that whether the false pretenses caused the transfer of funds was a question for the jury, and the verdict was supported by the evidence.

criminal law

This case involved a dispute over a $50,000 deposit in a contract for the sale of a Denny's Restaurant from Boots, Inc. to Prempal Singh for $1.5 million. The contract made the deposit non-refundable if Singh failed to terminate the agreement in writing within 40 days (plus extension) after failing to secure financing. After Singh did not obtain financing or terminate in time and Boots later sold the property to another buyer, the closing attorneys filed an interpleader action. The circuit court ruled the non-refundable provision was an invalid penalty or forfeiture and ordered the deposit refunded, but the Supreme Court of Virginia reversed, holding it was a valid liquidated damages clause. The court reasoned that at the time of contracting the actual damages from breach were uncertain and difficult to measure, the deposit amount (3.3% of the purchase price) was not disproportionate to probable loss, and Singh presented no evidence to show otherwise under established precedent.

propertybusiness & regulatory

The case involved Lawrence McDowell, who was convicted in a bench trial of grand larceny and grand larceny with intent to sell after shoplifting merchandise from a Rite-Aid store, with the stolen items never recovered. The sole issue on appeal was whether a "Box-List Sheets Report" generated by a store inventory device (the Telethon gun) after the theft was properly admitted into evidence to prove the value of the goods under the business records exception to the hearsay rule. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed both convictions, ruling that the report qualified as a business record under the modern Shopbook Rule. The court reasoned that the report was prepared and relied upon in the regular course of business with sufficient circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, based on the detective's testimony about the inventory process and his familiarity with the system, even though an outside contractor performed the pre-theft inventory.

criminal lawprocedure

In this medical malpractice case, John R. Doherty sued podiatrist Debra J. Aleck and her practice after surgeries to treat a callous on his toe allegedly caused an infection that led to amputation of his great toe. A jury awarded Doherty $850,000, but the trial court set aside the verdict, finding that Doherty's expert had not sufficiently established a breach of the standard of care or proximate causation to a reasonable degree of medical probability. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia reversed, holding that the expert testimony, combined with admissions from the defendants' own witnesses, provided credible evidence that the surgery breached the standard of care and caused the amputation. The court therefore reinstated the jury verdict and entered final judgment for the plaintiff.

healthcaretorts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved an infant severely injured by a third party's negligence, after which Virginia's Medicaid agency (DMAS) paid over $419,000 for treatment and later asserted a full lien on the proceeds of a court-approved settlement with the third party. The plaintiff filed a motion for declaratory judgment seeking to reduce the lien by a proportionate share of his attorney's fees and costs under Code § 8.01-66.9. The trial court dismissed the motion, and on appeal the Supreme Court of Virginia held that sovereign immunity barred the declaratory judgment action because the statute did not contain an explicit waiver of immunity for that type of proceeding (although it did authorize a different mechanism for lien reduction in the underlying tort suit). The court therefore concluded it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal with final judgment for the Commonwealth.

healthcareproceduretorts & liability