Miller v. Commonwealth
Supreme Court of Virginia · 1977-04-22 · cited 43×
The case involved Mark Andrew Miller, who was convicted in 1975 of first-degree murder and armed robbery following a 1972 incident at an Alexandria hardware store. After two mistrials in 1973, the Commonwealth entered a nolle prosequi, releasing Miller for nearly 17 months until his reindictment in 1974 based on new evidence from a co-participant; Miller then moved to dismiss the charges on speedy trial, autrefois acquit, and double jeopardy grounds, but the trial court denied the motions. The Supreme Court of Virginia granted a delayed appeal and affirmed the convictions, applying the Barker v. Wingo balancing test to conclude that the delay did not violate Miller's speedy trial rights because he showed no prejudice, was not in custody during the interval, and the Commonwealth was not solely responsible for the timing, while the prior mistrials and nolle prosequi did not bar retrial under double jeopardy principles.
criminal lawprocedure
Rome v. Kelly Springfield Tire Co.
Supreme Court of Virginia · 1977-04-22 · cited 42×
This case was a products liability action for breach of warranty brought by Rome against Kelly Springfield Tire Company after a tire blowout on a truck caused an accident in which Rome was seriously injured. A jury awarded Rome damages equal to his lost wages and medical expenses, but the trial court set aside the verdict as contrary to the law and evidence and entered judgment for Kelly Springfield. On appeal, the court held that the verdict was inadequate because it failed to account for other elements of damages such as pain, suffering, and future expenses as instructed, and that the issues of liability and damages were intertwined such that the jury's damages award appeared influenced by its view of liability. The court therefore reversed and remanded for a new trial on all issues. The opinion addresses procedural rules regarding preservation of error and the standards for granting new trials.
torts & liabilityprocedure
Legum Furniture Corp. v. Stein
Supreme Court of Virginia · 1977-03-04 · cited 13×
This case involved a dispute among joint venturers who acquired and developed land in Virginia Beach under a 1961 agreement, with Levine holding a 25% interest and the Weisbergs and Stein each holding 37.5%. The Weisbergs and Stein's executor sued Levine to recover excess advances of $73,125 each that they had made toward the $500,000 purchase price plus interest, claiming these must be repaid before any profits could be distributed; Levine counterclaimed for amounts he had already paid, arguing they were conditional gifts and that the contract did not require repayment of contributions. The trial court ruled that the contract contained no express provision for repaying advances by co-venturers and therefore denied recovery to the plaintiffs while addressing the counterclaim. On appeal, the court examined the agreement's language, including provisions on contributions, losses, and distributions, and rejected Levine's claim that excess payments served as compensation for his efforts in locating and developing the property.
business & regulatoryproperty
Shoosmith v. Scott
Supreme Court of Virginia · 1977-03-04 · cited 28×
This case concerned whether 1972 amendments to Virginia Code §§ 20-109 and 20-109.1, which allowed courts to modify or terminate support payments upon remarriage, could be applied to a 1959 divorce decree that approved a private property settlement agreement between spouses. The court reaffirmed its prior holding that the amendments were unconstitutional as applied to the agreement. The core reasoning was that the 1959 decree approved a bilateral contract providing for payments in lieu of alimony rather than awarding alimony itself, and therefore the contract was protected from impairment by subsequent legislation under the Contracts Clause of the U.S. and Virginia Constitutions. The court distinguished this from an alimony decree, noting that the divorce decree confirmed the agreement but did not incorporate it or order performance of its terms.
family lawproperty
Virginia Alcoholic Beverage Control Board v. 1713 Wilson, Inc.
Supreme Court of Virginia · 1977-01-14 · cited 4×
This case involved an appeal by the Virginia Alcoholic Beverage Control Board from a trial court order that reversed the Board's 30-day suspension of a restaurant's beverage license. The Board had found reasonable cause to believe the licensee allowed disorderly conduct on the premises based on two incidents on October 16, 1974: an altercation between the licensee's president and a customer, and the licensee's vice president loudly cursing at arresting officers just outside the door while holding it open so her words could be heard inside by customers. The trial court ruled there was no reasonable cause for the charge under the ABC Act. On appeal, the court held that the Board's findings were supported by credible evidence and entitled to a presumption of correctness, that the second incident occurred on the licensed premises because the statements were audible inside, and that this was sufficient to establish probable cause for a violation. The court reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded with directions to reinstate the suspension order.
criminal lawbusiness & regulatoryprocedure
Lerwill v. Regent Van & Storage, Inc.
Supreme Court of Virginia · 1976-11-24 · cited 4×
This case involved a personal injury lawsuit by plaintiff John Lerwill, Jr., a Navy petty officer, against Regent Van & Storage, Inc. and its driver Langhorn Badgett after Lerwill's car collided with the rear of a furniture van on Shore Drive in Virginia Beach. The van had stopped at an angle in a median crossover while awaiting eastbound traffic, with its rear extending into the westbound lane; Lerwill, who had no memory of the crash, struck the van at highway speed. A jury returned a verdict for the defendants, and Lerwill appealed, primarily challenging the trial court's rulings on jury instructions concerning the defendants' duties and the plaintiff's alleged contributory negligence. The Virginia Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, holding that although one instruction improperly used the phrase 'in any degree' regarding contributory negligence, the instructions read as a whole correctly required the defendants to prove that any negligence by Lerwill was a proximate cause of the accident.
torts & liabilityprocedure