Alexander Harman

The case involved Mark Andrew Miller, who was convicted in 1975 of first-degree murder and armed robbery following a 1972 incident at an Alexandria hardware store. After two mistrials in 1973, the Commonwealth entered a nolle prosequi, releasing Miller for nearly 17 months until his reindictment in 1974 based on new evidence from a co-participant; Miller then moved to dismiss the charges on speedy trial, autrefois acquit, and double jeopardy grounds, but the trial court denied the motions. The Supreme Court of Virginia granted a delayed appeal and affirmed the convictions, applying the Barker v. Wingo balancing test to conclude that the delay did not violate Miller's speedy trial rights because he showed no prejudice, was not in custody during the interval, and the Commonwealth was not solely responsible for the timing, while the prior mistrials and nolle prosequi did not bar retrial under double jeopardy principles.

criminal lawprocedure

This case was a products liability action for breach of warranty brought by Rome against Kelly Springfield Tire Company after a tire blowout on a truck caused an accident in which Rome was seriously injured. A jury awarded Rome damages equal to his lost wages and medical expenses, but the trial court set aside the verdict as contrary to the law and evidence and entered judgment for Kelly Springfield. On appeal, the court held that the verdict was inadequate because it failed to account for other elements of damages such as pain, suffering, and future expenses as instructed, and that the issues of liability and damages were intertwined such that the jury's damages award appeared influenced by its view of liability. The court therefore reversed and remanded for a new trial on all issues. The opinion addresses procedural rules regarding preservation of error and the standards for granting new trials.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case involved a dispute among joint venturers who acquired and developed land in Virginia Beach under a 1961 agreement, with Levine holding a 25% interest and the Weisbergs and Stein each holding 37.5%. The Weisbergs and Stein's executor sued Levine to recover excess advances of $73,125 each that they had made toward the $500,000 purchase price plus interest, claiming these must be repaid before any profits could be distributed; Levine counterclaimed for amounts he had already paid, arguing they were conditional gifts and that the contract did not require repayment of contributions. The trial court ruled that the contract contained no express provision for repaying advances by co-venturers and therefore denied recovery to the plaintiffs while addressing the counterclaim. On appeal, the court examined the agreement's language, including provisions on contributions, losses, and distributions, and rejected Levine's claim that excess payments served as compensation for his efforts in locating and developing the property.

business & regulatoryproperty

This case concerned whether 1972 amendments to Virginia Code §§ 20-109 and 20-109.1, which allowed courts to modify or terminate support payments upon remarriage, could be applied to a 1959 divorce decree that approved a private property settlement agreement between spouses. The court reaffirmed its prior holding that the amendments were unconstitutional as applied to the agreement. The core reasoning was that the 1959 decree approved a bilateral contract providing for payments in lieu of alimony rather than awarding alimony itself, and therefore the contract was protected from impairment by subsequent legislation under the Contracts Clause of the U.S. and Virginia Constitutions. The court distinguished this from an alimony decree, noting that the divorce decree confirmed the agreement but did not incorporate it or order performance of its terms.

family lawproperty

This case involved an appeal by the Virginia Alcoholic Beverage Control Board from a trial court order that reversed the Board's 30-day suspension of a restaurant's beverage license. The Board had found reasonable cause to believe the licensee allowed disorderly conduct on the premises based on two incidents on October 16, 1974: an altercation between the licensee's president and a customer, and the licensee's vice president loudly cursing at arresting officers just outside the door while holding it open so her words could be heard inside by customers. The trial court ruled there was no reasonable cause for the charge under the ABC Act. On appeal, the court held that the Board's findings were supported by credible evidence and entitled to a presumption of correctness, that the second incident occurred on the licensed premises because the statements were audible inside, and that this was sufficient to establish probable cause for a violation. The court reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded with directions to reinstate the suspension order.

criminal lawbusiness & regulatoryprocedure

This case involved a personal injury lawsuit by plaintiff John Lerwill, Jr., a Navy petty officer, against Regent Van & Storage, Inc. and its driver Langhorn Badgett after Lerwill's car collided with the rear of a furniture van on Shore Drive in Virginia Beach. The van had stopped at an angle in a median crossover while awaiting eastbound traffic, with its rear extending into the westbound lane; Lerwill, who had no memory of the crash, struck the van at highway speed. A jury returned a verdict for the defendants, and Lerwill appealed, primarily challenging the trial court's rulings on jury instructions concerning the defendants' duties and the plaintiff's alleged contributory negligence. The Virginia Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, holding that although one instruction improperly used the phrase 'in any degree' regarding contributory negligence, the instructions read as a whole correctly required the defendants to prove that any negligence by Lerwill was a proximate cause of the accident.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved a divorce granted to Shirley Strickler Thomas from Paul DeWitt Thomas on the ground of living separate and apart for more than one year, with the trial court awarding the wife $200 per month in support for two years and denying her request for counsel fees. The wife appealed, challenging the amount and duration of support as well as the denial of fees. The court affirmed the support amount because the trial court's findings, based on evidence of the parties' incomes, expenses, ages, health, education, and marriage duration under Code § 20-107, were not plainly wrong. It reversed the two-year limit on support, as the record showed no evidence that the wife's need or the husband's ability to pay would change, and reversed the denial of counsel fees as an abuse of discretion where need and ability were established. The case was remanded for an award of ongoing support modifiable under Code § 20-109 and for determination of reasonable counsel fees.

family law

In Lincoln v. Commonwealth, the defendant was convicted by a jury of armed robbery and appealed, claiming the trial court erred by allowing the prosecutor to comment during closing argument on the defendant's failure to testify and by refusing a jury instruction on assessing the credibility of convicted felons. The court affirmed the conviction, holding that the prosecutor's remarks were a permissible response under the invited error doctrine because defense counsel had opened the topic by discussing the defendant's decision not to testify and emphasizing the lack of direct denial of the evidence. The court further reasoned that while an instruction on credibility could have been given, it was not required because other instructions adequately addressed how the jury should weigh witness testimony, including that of accomplices and interested parties.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned whether amendments to Virginia Code §§ 20-109 and 20-109.1, effective in 1972, could relieve a former husband of ongoing monthly support payments required by a 1959 property settlement agreement that had been confirmed in the parties' final divorce decree. The trial court awarded the former wife the accrued payments, holding that the amendments violated the contracts clauses of the U.S. and Virginia Constitutions. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed, explaining that the agreement created vested property rights through judicial approval that could not be altered by subsequent legislation, distinguishing this situation from cases involving only court-ordered alimony without a contract.

family lawproperty

The case involved a client who sued her attorney for failing to discover and report a recorded judgment lien during a title examination of her real property, which led to her incurring damages when she later conveyed the property and her grantees sued her on the deed warranty. The attorney raised a statute of limitations defense, arguing for a one-year period applicable to personal actions, while the client contended a longer period applied due to the written title certificate. The trial court applied a one-year limit but found the claim timely based on when damages were fixed. The Virginia Supreme Court affirmed the judgment for the client on different grounds, holding that an attorney's negligence in performing professional services under an oral contract constitutes a breach of contract action governed by the three-year limitations period for such contracts, and the suit filed within three years was timely.

proceduretorts & liabilityproperty

The case was a declaratory judgment action by lessees Pruner and Rees against lessor Brown to determine whether a 1971 commercial lease granted the lessees an absolute option to purchase the property at the end of the term for $65,000 on specified terms or only a conditional right of first refusal if the lessor chose to sell. The trial court ruled that the lease language created only a right of first refusal. On appeal, the court reversed and entered final judgment for the lessees, holding that the lease created an absolute option. The court reasoned that the lease's detailed specifications of purchase price, down payment, financing terms, and payment schedule were consistent with an absolute option, that the parties referred to the right as an "option" within the lease itself, and that these features outweighed the effect of the word "first" in creating only a conditional right.

propertybusiness & regulatory

This case was a declaratory judgment action between adjoining property owners in which Brenner sought to establish that the Haynies had no right to use a driveway and retaining wall on her lot. The Haynies counterclaimed, asserting an implied easement appurtenant based on pre-existing use and reasonable necessity. The trial court ruled for Brenner after reviewing stipulations, exhibits, and viewing the premises, and the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed. The court held that an implied easement from former use requires the use to have been continuous, apparent, and reasonably necessary at the time of conveyance, but found the Haynies' alternative access from West Ridge Road meant the claimed easement was only convenient, not necessary.

property

In Waters v. Holloman, Edward Holloman sued Vernon Waters for personal injuries from a 1972 multi-vehicle crash on U.S. Route 460 in which Holloman's eastbound car collided with Waters' vehicle. The jury awarded Holloman $35,000, but the appellate court reviewed whether the evidence proved Waters' negligence was the proximate cause of the injuries. The court reversed and entered judgment for Waters, reasoning that negligence cannot be presumed from the accident alone and that the evidence showed only possibilities rather than facts establishing why and how the crash occurred, including any link from Waters' alcohol consumption or driving actions.

torts & liability

This case involved a boundary dispute between adjoining landowners in Albemarle County, Virginia, where the Waltons claimed fee simple ownership of a 49-acre parcel (tax parcel 6-32) based on a 1953 conveyance, while the Rossons asserted ownership of the disputed land through adverse possession. The trial court ruled in favor of the Rossons after a bench trial, finding they had met the requirements for adverse possession, and the appellate court affirmed that decision. The court reasoned that the Rossons and their predecessor had exercised continuous, actual, exclusive, hostile, open, and notorious possession of the property for over fifteen years under a claim of right, as shown by acts such as enclosing the land with fences in 1947, grazing cattle, cutting timber, drawing water from a spring, and maintaining structures on the property, with the Waltons receiving clear notice of the adverse claim as early as 1956. The opinion applied established Virginia precedents on the elements of adverse possession and the sufficiency of evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party.

property

This case concerned a dispute among the heirs of Wade Hampton Harris over whether to probate a copy of his 1957 will, which had been executed alongside his wife's but could not be located after his 1973 death. The proponents (two sons and one daughter) sought to establish the will under Virginia Code provisions, claiming they would be principal beneficiaries, while the opponents (remaining heirs) contested it. The trial court ruled in favor of probating the copy, but the Supreme Court of Virginia reversed that decision on appeal. The court held that a rebuttable presumption of revocation by the testator applied because the will had been in his possession or accessible to him and could not be found, and the proponents failed to rebut it with clear and convincing evidence of another cause for its disappearance or non-revocation. The opinion emphasized that mere possibilities of loss or unauthorized destruction were insufficient to overcome the presumption.

family lawpropertyprocedure

This case involved appeals by competing bus carriers from a State Corporation Commission order granting Jones Bus Company a "B" certificate to operate special or charter party bus service from several Virginia cities including Portsmouth, Norfolk, Chesapeake, Suffolk, Virginia Beach, Newport News, and Hampton. The court affirmed the award for Portsmouth and Norfolk but reversed it for the other cities, holding that the evidence failed to establish public convenience and necessity for those additional origin points. The core reasoning applied Code § 56-338.54, which requires the Commission to consider existing public need, the applicant's ability to provide economical and convenient service, and the economic impact on existing carriers, while presuming Commission decisions correct unless contrary to the evidence; here, testimony showed existing carriers adequately met demand in the reversed segments.

business & regulatory

This case was a wrongful death action under Virginia law brought by the administratrix of a passenger killed in an airplane crash against the estate of the student pilot who owned and operated the single-engine aircraft. The trial court granted the defendant's motion to strike the plaintiff's evidence at the close of her case-in-chief, but the Supreme Court of Virginia reversed and remanded for a new trial. The court held that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, created a jury question on negligence and proximate cause because the inexperienced student pilot knowingly undertook a night cross-country flight over mountainous terrain in extremely adverse weather conditions that qualified pilots had declined to attempt. The court reasoned that the pilot's actions violated FAA regulations limiting student pilots and demonstrated simple negligence (and possibly wanton conduct) sufficient to support liability, without applying res ipsa loquitur or requiring a showing of gross negligence for aircraft passengers. A dissent argued that proximate cause remained unproven.

torts & liabilityprocedure

In this personal injury case, plaintiff Gail Yeatts Murphy sued defendant Virginia Carolina Freight Lines after suffering neck and back injuries in a rear-end car crash on U.S. Route 58; the defendant conceded liability. A first jury awarded $25,000 in damages, but the trial court set aside the verdict as excessive; a second trial limited to damages produced a $10,000 verdict on which judgment was entered. The Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed the record showing the plaintiff's medical treatment, ongoing pain with strenuous activity more than 18 months post-injury, $1,249 in out-of-pocket expenses, and lack of permanent disability, and held that the amount of damages was within the jury's discretion with no fixed standard for measuring pain and suffering. The court also rejected the defendant's cross-error claim regarding an alleged improper juror communication, finding the trial judge did not abuse discretion in denying a mistrial. Accordingly, the court reinstated the first verdict and entered final judgment for the plaintiff in the amount of $25,000.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case concerned a Virginia quarry company's challenge to state sales tax assessments on sales of crushed stone to out-of-state highway contractors and agricultural lime to a spreading service, after the company paid the taxes under protest following an audit. The taxpayer claimed exemptions based on out-of-state dealer certificates and resale to farmers, seeking repayment of over $38,000 in taxes and interest. The court reversed the trial court's exoneration of taxes on the stone sales, ruling that the certificates were invalid on their face and did not relieve the taxpayer of liability under the strict statutory requirements for proving exemptions. It affirmed the taxation of the lime sales, holding that the purchaser was not a farmer and was engaged in a service business, so the transactions did not qualify as exempt agricultural sales or resales under the Retail Sales and Use Tax Act. The core reasoning applied the principle that taxation is the rule, exemptions must be strictly construed, and the seller bears the burden of establishing exempt status through proper documentation.

taxesbusiness & regulatory

In Schaum v. Commonwealth, the defendant was convicted of burglary after police stopped a vehicle matching a witness description near the scene, arrested the occupants including Schaum, and recovered stolen items from the car trunk via inventory as well as from a known fence who testified that Schaum had sold him other stolen goods from the home. The court affirmed the conviction, rejecting claims of an illegal search and insufficient evidence. It held that the police had probable cause for the arrest and a warrantless search of the vehicle because the facts known to officers at the time of the stop—including the car's description, the suspect's known criminal history, and the stop at a fence's residence—made it reasonable to believe the car was used in the burglary and contained its fruits. The court further ruled that the inventory search after lawful arrest was a valid police practice and that unexplained possession of recently stolen goods, combined with other circumstances, provided sufficient evidence to support the burglary conviction.

criminal lawprocedure