Albertis S. Harrison

In Stillwell v. Commonwealth, defendants convicted of selling marijuana challenged Virginia Code §§18.2-248 and 18.2-263 as unconstitutional because they require defendants to prove that sales were made as an accommodation rather than for profit and fail to specify a standard of proof. The court held that the statutes create a two-stage process in which guilt for the unlawful sale is determined first, after which the defendant may prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the sale was an accommodation to reduce the punishment from a felony to a misdemeanor. The court reasoned that this allocation of the burden does not violate due process under Patterson v. New York because accommodation is a mitigating factor affecting punishment rather than an element of the offense itself, and the evidence supported the trial court's finding that the sales were not for accommodation. The judgments were therefore affirmed.

criminal lawprocedure

In Jacobs v. Jacobs, Marjorie Jacobs sued to rescind a February 1974 deed transferring Virginia Beach real property to her husband Charles, alleging it was executed under duress from his threats and abuse amid a long turbulent marriage marked by separations and violence. She also sought to set aside a subsequent June 1974 deed from Charles to Cheryl Sill. The trial court denied relief, finding her testimony lacked corroboration. The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed, holding that while corroboration is not required, the evidence of duress must be clear and convincing, which was satisfied here by the wife's uncontradicted account of threats and the husband's failure to appear or testify, creating a presumption against him; both deeds were ordered set aside.

family lawproperty

Old Dominion University sued Valley Landscape Company and its surety for breaching a construction contract on a campus project. Valley filed a third-party claim against the project architect, Peter Rolland, alleging it was a third-party beneficiary of the separate contract between the university and Rolland. The trial court sustained Rolland's demurrer, and the Virginia Supreme Court affirmed, ruling that the amended motion failed to allege facts showing the owner-architect agreement was clearly and definitely intended to confer a direct benefit on Valley rather than an incidental one. The court further held that the third-party claim did not demonstrate Rolland could be liable for any portion of the university's claims against Valley under Rule 3:10. The decision rested on established third-party beneficiary principles under Code § 55-22 and the requirements for impleader.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case concerned whether Randolph Taylor Brown could be ordered to pay child support for a daughter born to Kathy Joan Custis after their bigamous marriage, which was void because Custis was still married to another man at the time. The trial court found the child legitimate under Code § 64.1-7 and required Brown to pay weekly support, and the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed. The court held that the legitimacy statute applied to children of void marriages and permitted a finding of paternity based on evidence of the parties' relationship and Brown's access during the relevant period, without needing to satisfy the stricter proof requirements of Code § 20-61.1 for children of unwed parents. The opinion reasoned that the legislative intent behind legitimating such children controlled over the more limited evidentiary rules for establishing paternity in non-marital contexts.

family law

The case involved a collision at an intersection in Radford between a city-owned pickup truck driven by a city employee and a sedan driven by Catherine Underwood, with the city seeking damages for harm to its vehicle. The lower court struck Underwood's evidence, granted the city summary judgment on liability after finding the truck driver free of negligence and Underwood negligent, and submitted only damages to the jury. On appeal, the Virginia Supreme Court concluded that Underwood was negligent as a matter of law for failing to stop at the stop sign, but that the evidence raised factual questions about whether the city driver was contributorily negligent by failing to maintain a proper lookout, which precluded summary judgment and required resolution by a jury. The court reversed the judgment and remanded the case for a new trial.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved a dispute over actions taken at the 1973 annual stockholders' meeting of Levisa Oil Corporation after two majority shareholders withdrew, which the lower court held broke the quorum and invalidated all subsequent business including the election of directors and sale of treasury stock. Plaintiff Quigley sought to nullify those actions, claiming they resulted from improper maneuvers by minority shareholder Carlton to shift control of the company. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed, holding that under the corporation's bylaws and Virginia Code provisions on stockholder quorums, a majority of shares must remain present to conduct business and that withdrawal ended the meeting's authority except to adjourn. The decision rested on the mandatory nature of quorum requirements rather than the motives or parliamentary rulings at the meeting.

business & regulatoryprocedure