Albertis S. Harrison

In Stillwell v. Commonwealth, defendants convicted of selling marijuana challenged Virginia Code §§18.2-248 and 18.2-263 as unconstitutional because they require defendants to prove that sales were made as an accommodation rather than for profit and fail to specify a standard of proof. The court held that the statutes create a two-stage process in which guilt for the unlawful sale is determined first, after which the defendant may prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the sale was an accommodation to reduce the punishment from a felony to a misdemeanor. The court reasoned that this allocation of the burden does not violate due process under Patterson v. New York because accommodation is a mitigating factor affecting punishment rather than an element of the offense itself, and the evidence supported the trial court's finding that the sales were not for accommodation. The judgments were therefore affirmed.

criminal lawprocedure

In Jacobs v. Jacobs, Marjorie Jacobs sued to rescind a February 1974 deed transferring Virginia Beach real property to her husband Charles, alleging it was executed under duress from his threats and abuse amid a long turbulent marriage marked by separations and violence. She also sought to set aside a subsequent June 1974 deed from Charles to Cheryl Sill. The trial court denied relief, finding her testimony lacked corroboration. The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed, holding that while corroboration is not required, the evidence of duress must be clear and convincing, which was satisfied here by the wife's uncontradicted account of threats and the husband's failure to appear or testify, creating a presumption against him; both deeds were ordered set aside.

family lawproperty

Old Dominion University sued Valley Landscape Company and its surety for breaching a construction contract on a campus project. Valley filed a third-party claim against the project architect, Peter Rolland, alleging it was a third-party beneficiary of the separate contract between the university and Rolland. The trial court sustained Rolland's demurrer, and the Virginia Supreme Court affirmed, ruling that the amended motion failed to allege facts showing the owner-architect agreement was clearly and definitely intended to confer a direct benefit on Valley rather than an incidental one. The court further held that the third-party claim did not demonstrate Rolland could be liable for any portion of the university's claims against Valley under Rule 3:10. The decision rested on established third-party beneficiary principles under Code § 55-22 and the requirements for impleader.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case concerned whether Randolph Taylor Brown could be ordered to pay child support for a daughter born to Kathy Joan Custis after their bigamous marriage, which was void because Custis was still married to another man at the time. The trial court found the child legitimate under Code § 64.1-7 and required Brown to pay weekly support, and the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed. The court held that the legitimacy statute applied to children of void marriages and permitted a finding of paternity based on evidence of the parties' relationship and Brown's access during the relevant period, without needing to satisfy the stricter proof requirements of Code § 20-61.1 for children of unwed parents. The opinion reasoned that the legislative intent behind legitimating such children controlled over the more limited evidentiary rules for establishing paternity in non-marital contexts.

family law

The case involved a collision at an intersection in Radford between a city-owned pickup truck driven by a city employee and a sedan driven by Catherine Underwood, with the city seeking damages for harm to its vehicle. The lower court struck Underwood's evidence, granted the city summary judgment on liability after finding the truck driver free of negligence and Underwood negligent, and submitted only damages to the jury. On appeal, the Virginia Supreme Court concluded that Underwood was negligent as a matter of law for failing to stop at the stop sign, but that the evidence raised factual questions about whether the city driver was contributorily negligent by failing to maintain a proper lookout, which precluded summary judgment and required resolution by a jury. The court reversed the judgment and remanded the case for a new trial.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved a dispute over actions taken at the 1973 annual stockholders' meeting of Levisa Oil Corporation after two majority shareholders withdrew, which the lower court held broke the quorum and invalidated all subsequent business including the election of directors and sale of treasury stock. Plaintiff Quigley sought to nullify those actions, claiming they resulted from improper maneuvers by minority shareholder Carlton to shift control of the company. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed, holding that under the corporation's bylaws and Virginia Code provisions on stockholder quorums, a majority of shares must remain present to conduct business and that withdrawal ended the meeting's authority except to adjourn. The decision rested on the mandatory nature of quorum requirements rather than the motives or parliamentary rulings at the meeting.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved Solite Masonry Units Corporation, a supplier, seeking payment from general contractor Piland Construction Co. and its surety on a public works bond for masonry blocks delivered to a subcontractor for use in constructing a city garage, after the subcontractor defaulted on payment. The trial court awarded Solite only the value of blocks actually incorporated into the building, but the Supreme Court of Virginia reversed and entered judgment for the full amount of $5,311.65. The court held that under Code § 11-23, which requires payment bonds on public contracts and provides a direct action for suppliers to subcontractors, a materialman who in good faith furnishes materials for the prosecution of the work is entitled to recover regardless of whether all materials are actually used in the project. This interpretation followed the 1962 statutory amendment broadening coverage to materials supplied in contemplation of use on the bonded job, distinguishing prior precedent that had required proof of actual incorporation.

business & regulatory

In Crawford v. Commonwealth, the defendant was convicted of robbery under an indictment that originally charged him with robbing The Southland Corporation of currency and was later amended during trial to specify robbing an employee of the corporation. The defendant appealed, contending that the original indictment was fatally defective for failing to allege that property was taken from the person of another, rendering the amendment invalid and the conviction void. The court affirmed the conviction, reasoning that robbery is a common-law crime against the person that can be committed against a corporation acting through its agents or employees, that the original indictment adequately identified the offense and referenced the relevant robbery statute, and that the amendment did not change the nature of the charge.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved John A. Schwab, Jr., and Alcova Realty Corporation suing Joseph T. Norris on a $17,450 promissory note given in lieu of a real estate commission from a 1971 property transaction tied to their joint venture, with Norris filing a counterclaim for other amounts owed by Schwab. The trial court entered judgment for the principal amount plus reduced interest and attorney's fees while granting Norris a setoff. On appeal, the court reversed the portions limiting interest and fees, holding that the note was a valid negotiable instrument entitling the holders to interest from the maturity date under applicable statutes and the full 18% attorney's fee stipulated for collection after default, as such provisions are enforceable contracts in Virginia when incurred due to nonpayment and litigation. The matter was remanded for further proceedings consistent with that ruling.

business & regulatoryproperty

The case involved a dispute over priority between First Virginia Bank's recorded security lien on a Pontiac automobile, financed for buyer Warren Preston under Code § 46.1-73, and towing/storage charges claimed by William Sutherland after police impounded the vehicle following an accident. The trial court held Sutherland's charges superior, but the Supreme Court of Virginia reversed, ruling that the bank's lien takes priority except for a statutory $75 storage amount under the 1970 amendment to Code § 43-32. The core reasoning rested on statutory text, the limited scope of Code §§ 46.1-2 and 46.1-3 (which authorize removal of abandoned vehicles but do not expressly create superior liens), and precedent from Checkered Flag Motor Car Co. v. Griggs, which subordinated storage liens to recorded security interests; the court also rejected arguments that the bank qualified as an "owner" or that any authorized sale had occurred.

propertybusiness & regulatory

The case concerned whether Code § 56-457.9, the grandfather clause in Virginia's Sight-seeing Carriers by Boat Act, exempted a company operating boat tours since 1965 from needing a certificate of public convenience and necessity when expanding service to a new origin point in Norfolk. The State Corporation Commission ruled that the exemption applied only to the carrier's pre-1968 operations and enjoined the new service. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia reversed, holding that the statute's plain language fully exempts any carrier in operation before January 1, 1968, without restricting the exemption to prior routes or points of origin, and that the Commission could not add limiting language by interpretation. The court dissolved the injunction and dismissed the proceeding.

business & regulatory

The case concerned whether James Jordan could recover medical expenses under his father's automobile insurance policy after swerving to avoid another vehicle and colliding with a tree, with no physical contact between the vehicles. The trial court awarded Jordan judgment against Early Settlers Insurance for $1,391 plus interest, but the Supreme Court of Virginia reversed and entered judgment for the insurer. The court held that coverage under the policy's "struck by an automobile" provision was not activated because neither Jordan nor his vehicle was struck by another automobile, distinguishing the facts from a prior case involving actual impact and concluding that a broader reading would render other policy clauses superfluous.

business & regulatorytorts & liability

In Lawson v. Commonwealth, Clarence Lawson was convicted of heroin possession after a police officer searched the car in which he was a passenger and then searched his person, seizing drugs from both locations. The court affirmed the conviction, ruling that the officer had probable cause for the warrantless search and arrest. The core reasoning was that an informant's tip about the defendants selling or possessing heroin in the specific vehicle, combined with the officer's direct observations of furtive movements and the passing and discarding of a small envelope resembling a marijuana bag, established probable cause under the totality of the circumstances. This justified seizing the envelope, arresting Lawson for marijuana possession, and conducting a search of his person incident to arrest, which yielded the heroin. The opinion followed and applied the precedent from Hollis v. Commonwealth.

criminal law

The case concerned Orange County landowners who were denied a conditional use permit under the county zoning ordinance to operate a mobile home park on property zoned agricultural. The landowners argued that the Board of Supervisors lacked authority to deny the permit and that the ordinance provided insufficient standards to guide such decisions, rendering it invalid. The court held that Virginia statutes and the local ordinance authorized the Board to grant or deny conditional use permits as a legislative function tied to its police powers. It further ruled that the ordinance's guidelines, which direct the Board to consider factors like noise, traffic, buffers, and community character, were adequate given the impracticability of more specific rules in a rural area experiencing growth. The court affirmed the denial, emphasizing that zoning decisions enjoy a presumption of validity if reasonableness is fairly debatable.

propertybusiness & regulatory

The case concerned whether Bluefield Sanitarium, a for-profit hospital, qualified for a tax exemption under Virginia Code § 58-441.6(s) for use taxes on bulk purchases of drugs that its pharmacy later dispensed to inpatients pursuant to physician prescriptions or work orders. The lower court ruled in favor of the hospital, but the Supreme Court of Virginia reversed, holding that the hospital was not entitled to the exemption. The court reasoned that the hospital operates primarily as a service provider and is treated under the Retail Sales and Use Tax Act as the consumer of all tangible personal property it acquires for hospital operations, rather than as a retailer making sales for resale. It distinguished a prior case involving a separate retail pharmacy and concluded that the exemption applies only at the level of retail sales to patients, not to the hospital's initial bulk purchases from wholesalers or manufacturers.

taxeshealthcarebusiness & regulatory

This case involved a dispute over the custody of a seven-year-old boy following the divorce of his parents, Sharon Lynn Burnside and William Malden Burnside. The trial court awarded custody to the father, who remained in Virginia, and the mother, now living in Arizona, appealed. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the decision, emphasizing that the primary consideration in custody matters is the welfare of the child, with no legal presumption favoring either parent. The court found that the evidence, including testimony from a child psychiatrist and the stability of the child's current environment, supported keeping custody with the father to avoid emotional disruption from a change.

family law

The case concerned a personal injury lawsuit brought by Kathleen L. Nance against two trucking companies after her car, while pulling a camper trailer, lost control and was struck by one of the trucks on a Virginia highway. Nance had recovered a judgment at trial, but the trucking companies appealed, challenging whether any negligence by their drivers was a proximate cause of the accident. The Supreme Court of Virginia held that the evidence did not establish a causal link between the first truck's high-speed pass (and resulting air displacement) and the loss of control, that the second truck driver took reasonable evasive action after the vehicles overturned in front of him, and that the statute prohibiting following too closely did not apply. The court therefore reversed the judgment against the companies.

torts & liability

In Logan v. Montgomery Ward & Co., plaintiff Dorothy Logan sued the retailer for personal injuries and property damage after a gas stove she purchased exploded following installation, claiming breach of implied warranty of merchantability and negligence. The lower court struck her evidence and granted summary judgment for the defendant, which the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed. The court held that recovery required proof of a defect in the stove existing when it left the seller's control, but the evidence only showed an unexplained explosion after proper transport, installation, and initial use, with no direct or circumstantial proof of any pre-existing defect or leak. The court reasoned that an accident alone does not permit an inference of defect at the time of sale under either warranty or negligence theories.

torts & liability

The case involved a workers' compensation claim by Karver Shawley, an employee of Shea-Ball Construction Company, who was injured in a 1973 ladder fall during subway construction and initially received benefits for a left ankle injury under an agreement and Industrial Commission award. Appellees later sought review based on a change in condition, but Shawley sought to add claims for back and right leg injuries that surfaced more than a year after the accident. The court affirmed the Commission's rulings, holding that the additional claims were barred by the one-year filing deadline in Code § 65.1-87 because no timely written claim or medical reference to those injuries appeared in the record within the statutory period. The court also upheld the 20% permanent partial disability rating for the left leg based on the medical evidence presented. The decision emphasized that findings on the absence of timely complaints were binding and that later assertions did not relate back to the original accident or treatment.

labor & employmentprocedure

This case concerns a former husband's petition to reduce his weekly alimony payments of $200 to his ex-wife following their divorce on grounds of adultery. The lower court had ordered the payments continue despite the husband's claims of reduced ability to pay due to corporate changes and the wife's receipt of property and potential employment. The court decided to affirm the trial court's order maintaining the $200 weekly alimony. The reasoning was that the trial court has broad discretion in setting alimony amounts and did not abuse it, as the husband retained the ability to pay and the wife had ongoing need, even after considering property transfers and business arrangements.

family lawproperty