Elizabeth B. Lacy

In this case, an infant plaintiff through his mother sued two landlords for severe injuries from lead poisoning caused by exposure to deteriorating lead paint on leased residential properties, asserting claims of negligence per se based on building code violations and common law negligence for failure to warn or repair. The circuit court sustained the landlords' demurrers and dismissed the complaint, and the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed that ruling. The court reasoned that no tort duty of care was imposed on the landlords by the common law (which places maintenance responsibility on lessees after possession transfers absent fraud or concealment), the specific leases (which disclosed the potential lead paint hazard), or the Virginia Residential Landlord and Tenant Act (which sets standards of care but does not create a duty). The complaint also failed to allege facts supporting negligent repairs, and the hazard was open and obvious rather than latent.

propertytorts & liability

The case involved a dispute among partners in Russell Realty Associates, a real estate investment partnership, where one partner sought judicial dissolution under Virginia Code § 50-73.117(5). The circuit court granted dissolution, finding that the partnership's economic purpose was likely to be unreasonably frustrated and that the business could no longer operate in conformity with the partnership agreement due to ongoing distrust and disagreements. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed, holding that the record showed sufficient evidence of these issues, including missed business opportunities, increased costs from mediation and legal interventions, and inefficient decision-making that hindered the partnership's ability to acquire, hold, invest in, lease, and sell properties. The court noted the partners' deteriorating relationship, which imposed unnecessary economic burdens despite provisions in the agreement granting one partner decision-making authority, and found no indication of future improvement.

business & regulatoryproperty

In Kelso v. Commonwealth, the defendant was convicted in the Circuit Court of Hanover County on three counts of causing a juvenile to assist in the distribution of marijuana under Code § 18.2-255(A)(ii). The charges stemmed from the defendant selling marijuana to a minor in Henrico County, which the minor then sold to a confidential informant in Hanover County. Kelso challenged the venue, arguing that no part of the offense occurred in Hanover County. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the convictions, holding that venue was proper in Hanover County because the juvenile's distribution of the marijuana to a third party, which is an element of the crime, took place there.

criminal lawprocedure

In this condemnation case, the Commonwealth Transportation Commissioner filed to take land and a Taco Bell restaurant building for a highway project under eminent domain statutes, and the parties disputed the compensation amount because they disagreed on whether 42 pieces of restaurant equipment were fixtures that must be valued as part of the real property or movable personalty that could be excluded. The trial court granted the Commissioner's motion to strike Taco Bell's evidence on the nature of the items and removed the issue from the jury. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia reversed and remanded, holding that evidence was sufficient to create a jury question under the Danville Holding Corp. test because the items were adapted to the restaurant's use and Taco Bell intended them to remain on the property permanently, even though they could be physically removed. The court noted that just compensation in such proceedings is a unitary award considering the property as a whole.

propertyprocedure

This case concerned whether residents opposing a city's application to install a stormwater outfall pipeline on state-owned ocean bottomlands had sufficiently alleged in their petition for appeal that they were "persons aggrieved" by the Virginia Marine Resources Commission's approval of the project, as required for standing under Code § 28.2-1205(F). The circuit court dismissed the petition for lack of standing allegations, but the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the applicable rule did not require such allegations in the initial pleading and remanding for an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the dismissal, reasoning that the statute expressly limits appeals to aggrieved persons and that the petition must contain facts demonstrating particularized harm rather than general opposition or environmental concerns. The Court further held that letters notifying residents of the decision did not confer standing and that other statutory provisions did not override the specific standing requirement.

environmentprocedure

The case concerned Ronnie Lee Howard, who was indicted on felony charges of credit card theft and breaking and entering in Virginia circuit court. After the trial court sua sponte continued the initial trial date and a later continuance was granted, Howard moved to dismiss the indictments, arguing violations of his statutory speedy trial rights under Code § 19.2-243 as well as federal and state constitutional protections. The circuit court denied the motion, ruling that the statutory period was tolled during the first continuance because Howard did not object, and it proceeded to convict him following a bench trial. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the tolling provision applied to the court-initiated continuance due to lack of objection and that the constitutional claims were not preserved. The Supreme Court of Virginia upheld this result, concluding no speedy trial violation occurred under the statute and declining to address the constitutional issues under the ends of justice exception.

criminal lawprocedure