Elizabeth B. Lacy

In this case, an infant plaintiff through his mother sued two landlords for severe injuries from lead poisoning caused by exposure to deteriorating lead paint on leased residential properties, asserting claims of negligence per se based on building code violations and common law negligence for failure to warn or repair. The circuit court sustained the landlords' demurrers and dismissed the complaint, and the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed that ruling. The court reasoned that no tort duty of care was imposed on the landlords by the common law (which places maintenance responsibility on lessees after possession transfers absent fraud or concealment), the specific leases (which disclosed the potential lead paint hazard), or the Virginia Residential Landlord and Tenant Act (which sets standards of care but does not create a duty). The complaint also failed to allege facts supporting negligent repairs, and the hazard was open and obvious rather than latent.

propertytorts & liability

The case involved a dispute among partners in Russell Realty Associates, a real estate investment partnership, where one partner sought judicial dissolution under Virginia Code § 50-73.117(5). The circuit court granted dissolution, finding that the partnership's economic purpose was likely to be unreasonably frustrated and that the business could no longer operate in conformity with the partnership agreement due to ongoing distrust and disagreements. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed, holding that the record showed sufficient evidence of these issues, including missed business opportunities, increased costs from mediation and legal interventions, and inefficient decision-making that hindered the partnership's ability to acquire, hold, invest in, lease, and sell properties. The court noted the partners' deteriorating relationship, which imposed unnecessary economic burdens despite provisions in the agreement granting one partner decision-making authority, and found no indication of future improvement.

business & regulatoryproperty

In Kelso v. Commonwealth, the defendant was convicted in the Circuit Court of Hanover County on three counts of causing a juvenile to assist in the distribution of marijuana under Code § 18.2-255(A)(ii). The charges stemmed from the defendant selling marijuana to a minor in Henrico County, which the minor then sold to a confidential informant in Hanover County. Kelso challenged the venue, arguing that no part of the offense occurred in Hanover County. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the convictions, holding that venue was proper in Hanover County because the juvenile's distribution of the marijuana to a third party, which is an element of the crime, took place there.

criminal lawprocedure

In this condemnation case, the Commonwealth Transportation Commissioner filed to take land and a Taco Bell restaurant building for a highway project under eminent domain statutes, and the parties disputed the compensation amount because they disagreed on whether 42 pieces of restaurant equipment were fixtures that must be valued as part of the real property or movable personalty that could be excluded. The trial court granted the Commissioner's motion to strike Taco Bell's evidence on the nature of the items and removed the issue from the jury. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia reversed and remanded, holding that evidence was sufficient to create a jury question under the Danville Holding Corp. test because the items were adapted to the restaurant's use and Taco Bell intended them to remain on the property permanently, even though they could be physically removed. The court noted that just compensation in such proceedings is a unitary award considering the property as a whole.

propertyprocedure

This case concerned whether residents opposing a city's application to install a stormwater outfall pipeline on state-owned ocean bottomlands had sufficiently alleged in their petition for appeal that they were "persons aggrieved" by the Virginia Marine Resources Commission's approval of the project, as required for standing under Code § 28.2-1205(F). The circuit court dismissed the petition for lack of standing allegations, but the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the applicable rule did not require such allegations in the initial pleading and remanding for an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the dismissal, reasoning that the statute expressly limits appeals to aggrieved persons and that the petition must contain facts demonstrating particularized harm rather than general opposition or environmental concerns. The Court further held that letters notifying residents of the decision did not confer standing and that other statutory provisions did not override the specific standing requirement.

environmentprocedure

The case concerned Ronnie Lee Howard, who was indicted on felony charges of credit card theft and breaking and entering in Virginia circuit court. After the trial court sua sponte continued the initial trial date and a later continuance was granted, Howard moved to dismiss the indictments, arguing violations of his statutory speedy trial rights under Code § 19.2-243 as well as federal and state constitutional protections. The circuit court denied the motion, ruling that the statutory period was tolled during the first continuance because Howard did not object, and it proceeded to convict him following a bench trial. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the tolling provision applied to the court-initiated continuance due to lack of objection and that the constitutional claims were not preserved. The Supreme Court of Virginia upheld this result, concluding no speedy trial violation occurred under the statute and declining to address the constitutional issues under the ends of justice exception.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned whether the Court of Appeals of Virginia should have dismissed an appeal by David Smith, who had been convicted of abduction and forcible sodomy after a conditional guilty plea, because he failed to timely file a transcript of the suppression hearing needed to resolve his challenge to the denial of his motion to suppress evidence. The Court of Appeals declined to dismiss the appeal and instead affirmed the convictions on the ground that the late transcript caused Smith to waive the suppression issue. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed that judgment, holding that the untimely filing did not deprive the appellate court of active jurisdiction over the appeal but instead resulted in waiver of the issue associated with the missing transcript, allowing the court to resolve the case by affirming the convictions based on the issues properly presented.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Rubio Argelio Angel's convictions for malicious wounding, abduction with intent to defile, object sexual penetration, and sexual battery against two victims, for which he received multiple life sentences plus additional imprisonment. Angel appealed numerous trial court rulings, including the denial of motions to suppress his statements, appoint a DNA expert, sever the trials of separate offenses, and dismiss the indictments, as well as the constitutionality of imposing life sentences without parole on a juvenile offender. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the convictions and sentences in full, concluding that the procedural decisions complied with applicable rules and statutes and that Code § 53.1-40.01 satisfies the Eighth Amendment by providing a meaningful opportunity for conditional release after specified ages and terms of service.

criminal lawprocedure

This case concerned whether a snow tubing ride at a Virginia resort qualified as an "amusement device" subject to the Virginia Amusement Device Regulations (VADR). Plaintiff Jeanne Vuich sued the resort operator after sustaining spinal injuries when her tube failed to stop at the end of the run-out area and struck a padded wall; she claimed the ride's design and operation violated VADR standards applicable to gravity rides. The circuit court granted partial summary judgment to the defendants, holding that the ride was not an amusement device because it was not a manufactured structure. On interlocutory appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia reversed, concluding that the extensively modified slope with chute-like lanes and the padded wall constituted a structure, that riders were conveyed passively without control over their path, and that the movement occurred in an unusual manner for diversion, satisfying the VADR definition.

torts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory

In Cordon v. Commonwealth, Hugh Lincoln Cordon, Jr. was convicted of possessing cocaine after police executing a search warrant found the drug in a cooler in a bedroom at his uncle's house, where Cordon had previously claimed the room as his own during a burglary investigation and where personal items and a police business card were also located. Cordon appealed, arguing the evidence failed to prove he constructively possessed the cocaine. The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed the conviction, holding that the evidence was insufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Cordon knew of the cocaine's presence and character or that it was subject to his dominion and control, as the circumstances did not exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. The Court noted Cordon's inconsistent statements about residency but found they did not sufficiently link him to the drugs hidden in the cooler.

criminal law

Mihai Gheorghiu was convicted in Arlington County of one count of identity theft, one count of credit card fraud, and 36 counts of credit card theft based on his use of stolen credit card numbers from victims who did not reside there. He appealed, arguing improper venue for all charges. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the credit card theft convictions because Gheorghiu did not object to venue at trial and the ends of justice exception did not apply. It reversed the identity theft and credit card fraud convictions, however, because the Commonwealth failed to establish a strong presumption that Arlington County was the proper venue under the applicable statutes, which require proof that the offenses or acts in furtherance occurred there.

criminal lawprocedure

Kevin Jamerson sued Coleman-Adams Construction and a subcontractor for negligence after he was injured in 2006 when a steel platform and pole installed in a fire station collapsed. The defendants raised a plea in bar asserting that the suit was barred by the five-year statute of repose in Code § 8.01-250. The trial court dismissed the action, and the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed. The court held that the platform and pole qualified as ordinary building materials rather than equipment or machinery, so the five-year repose period applied and barred the 2006 filing.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case concerned whether a pro se plaintiff could authorize an unlicensed person to sign a complaint on his behalf under Virginia law. Benjamin Aguilera filed a personal injury complaint arising from a car collision but had his neighbor, an attorney licensed only in Washington, D.C., sign his name on the pleading. The trial court dismissed the complaint after finding it failed to meet signature requirements, and the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed. The court held that Code § 8.01-271.1 and Rule 1:4 require a pro se party to sign the pleading personally or have it signed by a Virginia-licensed attorney, rendering any other signature a nullity. Pleadings signed in a representative capacity by an unauthorized person have no legal effect.

proceduretorts & liability

The case involved David Midkiff, who was charged with multiple counts of possessing child pornography based on files found on his computer hard drives after a search. The central issue was whether the trial court properly admitted printed still images and portions of video recordings that were made from forensic copies of the hard drives, which Midkiff argued violated the best evidence rule because they were multiple generations removed from the originals. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision upholding the convictions. The court held that the best evidence rule applies only to written documents and not to digital images or videos, and that the forensic scientist's testimony about creating reliable bit-for-bit copies without degradation or manipulation supported the trial court's admission of the evidence as accurate representations.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a contract dispute between TC MidAtlantic Development, Inc. (TCM) and the Virginia Department of General Services (DGS) over a Comprehensive Agreement for construction work on state buildings in two phases. TCM sued after DGS terminated the agreement for Phase I and declined to proceed with Phase II, asserting multiple claims; DGS responded with a demurrer arguing that TCM failed to adequately plead compliance with Section 47 of the contract, which required timely written notice and submission of formal claims within 60 days. The trial court sustained the demurrer and dismissed the amended complaint with prejudice. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the dismissal of Counts I-IV, holding that the pleadings did not show submission of timely claims as required, but reversed as to Count V because Phase II was not subject to Section 47's procedures under the agreement's terms. The court remanded for further proceedings on that count.

business & regulatoryprocedure

In this case, Judson Jeffrey Harris pled guilty to heroin possession under a plea agreement that deferred sentencing if he successfully completed a drug treatment court program, with termination potentially leading to imposition of the agreed sentence. After Harris was terminated from the program, the trial court imposed the sentence without considering evidence or arguments about the reasons for his termination, which involved internet postings. The Supreme Court of Virginia held that Harris had a liberty interest created by the accepted plea agreement, and the termination decision significantly impacted revocation of that interest, so the trial court erred by refusing to allow Harris an opportunity to be heard on the termination reasons before sentencing. The court reversed the conviction and sentencing order and remanded for further proceedings consistent with due process requirements. The opinion addresses procedures under Virginia's Drug Treatment Court Act but does not mandate specific termination hearing rules.

criminal lawprocedure

In Jones v. Commonwealth, Aubrey Dwight Jones appealed his convictions for statutory burglary while armed with a deadly weapon, conspiracy to commit burglary, and wearing body armor while committing a crime, arguing insufficient evidence supported the findings. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the convictions, concluding the evidence showed Jones entered the apartment intending to assault the victim because he arrived armed, kicked in the bedroom door, and pursued the victim. The court further held that coordinated actions and statements established an agreement to commit a felony, and Jones wore body armor during the burglary, a qualifying crime of violence under the statute. The opinion applied standard principles of appellate review in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth.

criminal lawprocedure

In Commonwealth v. Squire, the Commonwealth petitioned to civilly commit Frankie Lee Squire as a sexually violent predator under the Civil Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators Act after his 1994 rape conviction and subsequent parole violations, relying on expert testimony about his mental abnormality, personality disorder, and actuarial risk assessments. The trial court dismissed the petition following a bench trial, concluding that the Commonwealth had not met its burden of clear and convincing evidence that Squire was likely to engage in future sexually violent acts, citing his six years without sexual reoffending while in the community. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the dismissal on appeal, reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Squire and finding the trial court's judgment was not plainly wrong or unsupported. The court emphasized that a mental abnormality or personality disorder is a distinct statutory element from the likelihood of reoffending and does not automatically satisfy the latter requirement.

criminal law

The case concerned whether Lamont Wright's conviction under Virginia Code § 18.2-308.4(C) for possessing a firearm while possessing cocaine with intent to distribute required proof of actual, simultaneous possession of both items, or if constructive possession sufficed. Wright was stopped with cocaine on his person, admitted to additional drugs and a firearm at his home miles away, and police later recovered both from his residence. The trial court and Court of Appeals upheld the conviction based on constructive possession with a required nexus between the items, and the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed. The court held that the statute's terms allow constructive possession of the firearm and drugs, that no actual simultaneous possession is needed, and that the law imposes no requirement of a nexus or use of the firearm in the drug activity. The judgment of the Court of Appeals was affirmed.

criminal lawguns

This case involved a contract dispute between Norfolk Southern Railway Company and two utility companies (VEPCO and ODEC) regarding the adjustment of coal transportation rates to a power plant under a 1989 Coal Transportation Agreement. The utilities challenged the railway's application of the unadjusted Rail Cost Adjustment Factor (RCAF-U) from ICC Ex Parte No. 290 (Sub. No. 2), arguing for use of the productivity-adjusted RCAF-A and raising affirmative defenses including waiver, estoppel, and judicial estoppel. The Supreme Court of Virginia held that the contract was unambiguous in requiring the RCAF-U index for quarterly rate adjustments, affirmed the circuit court's striking of certain defenses, and upheld a judgment exceeding $77 million plus interest in favor of the railway company based on the plain language of the agreement and the parties' course of dealing.

business & regulatoryprocedure