Willis D. Miller

The case involved Wallace Thomas Bibb, Jr., who was convicted under Virginia Code § 54-488 for manufacturing, possessing, having under his control, and administering opium after he purchased paregoric and cooked it down to extract the opium residue, which he and others then injected. The jury found him guilty on those charges and imposed a fine and prison sentence, and the trial court denied his motion to set aside the verdict. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction on the possession and administration counts, even if the manufacturing element was debatable. However, the conviction was reversed because the trial court erred in permitting cross-examination of Bibb about a prior misdemeanor conviction for unauthorized use of a motor vehicle that did not involve moral turpitude, and the manner in which the issue was handled before the jury was prejudicial.

criminal law

This case concerned a workers' compensation claim by coal miner Clinton Willard Agee against Pocahontas Fuel Co. for benefits due to second-stage silicosis, an occupational disease he contracted from mine work. The Industrial Commission awarded total incapacity payments under Virginia Code § 65-51 based on his partial physical disability and inability to continue in mining. The court reversed the award, finding insufficient evidence that Agee could not market his remaining work capacity, since he had not applied for other jobs and initial rejections from mines were unrelated to his condition. It held that partial physical disability alone does not establish total incapacity without proof of failed reasonable efforts to obtain alternative employment and remanded the case for further evidence.

labor & employment

Eugene Dickerson was convicted by a jury of operating a vehicle while under the influence of intoxicants, second offense, under a town ordinance, resulting in a fine and jail sentence. The trial court permitted two police officers to testify over objection that, based on their observations, Dickerson was under the influence of intoxicants. On appeal, the court held that this opinion testimony was improperly admitted and prejudicial, requiring reversal of the conviction and remand for a new trial. The court found the evidence otherwise sufficient to support a jury verdict and upheld the denial of a requested jury instruction that singled out reckless driving. The opinion noted a discrepancy between the jury's verdict and the final sentence but focused reversal on the evidentiary error.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a dispute over title to one acre of land in Fairfax County, Virginia, between the Currells, who claimed ownership through adverse possession of a 55-acre tract acquired in 1939, and LaDue, who held superior record title to an overlapping three-acre parcel conveyed in 1926 from a common grantor. The trial court ruled for the Currells after finding they had met the elements of adverse possession under Virginia Code § 8-5. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia reversed, holding that the evidence of sporadic mowing for appearance and cultivation beginning only in 1946 was insufficient to prove the required actual, continuous, hostile, and notorious possession for the full 15-year statutory period. The court reasoned that such intermittent activities did not provide adequate notice to the record owner and that the Currells' actions prior to 1946 lacked the necessary visibility and hostility to establish adverse possession.

property

This case involved an appeal by the Pittston Company from an Industrial Commission award granting Rufus Fulks total disability benefits for occupational pneumoconiosis contracted while working as a coal miner for Pittston and prior employers. The court first denied Fulks's motion to dismiss the appeal, holding that it had acquired jurisdiction under the special statutory provisions for Industrial Commission appeals even though some procedural steps deviated from general equity appeal rules. On the merits, the court found the claim was not barred by the statute of limitations but set aside the award because the Commission had obtained and relied on additional medical evidence (laminographs and an expert report) without following the requirements of Code § 65-87 or its own Rule 3, thereby denying Pittston the opportunity to examine the new evidence or cross-examine the expert. The case was reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with proper procedures.

labor & employmentprocedure

The case involved the construction of Merritt Johnson's 1912 will, which devised the residue of his estate to his daughter Violet with a gift over to the children of his other daughter Ruth if Violet died 'without heir.' Violet, who had no natural children, adopted a son in 1950 and died intestate in 1955; the dispute centered on whether the adopted son inherited the property or whether it passed to Ruth's children, along with whether Violet's husband was entitled to curtesy in the real estate. The court held that Violet received a defeasible fee that terminated at her death without issue of her body, so the property passed to Ruth's children as an executory devise (subject to the husband's curtesy life estate), and that 'heir' in the will's context meant natural heirs only, excluding the adopted child. It further ruled that the husband was entitled to curtesy because the estate was one of inheritance and his interest had not been barred. The core reasoning rested on the testator's intent as expressed in the will's language and overall context, interpreted under then-existing statutes of descent and distribution.

family lawproperty