Willis D. Miller

The case involved Wallace Thomas Bibb, Jr., who was convicted under Virginia Code § 54-488 for manufacturing, possessing, having under his control, and administering opium after he purchased paregoric and cooked it down to extract the opium residue, which he and others then injected. The jury found him guilty on those charges and imposed a fine and prison sentence, and the trial court denied his motion to set aside the verdict. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction on the possession and administration counts, even if the manufacturing element was debatable. However, the conviction was reversed because the trial court erred in permitting cross-examination of Bibb about a prior misdemeanor conviction for unauthorized use of a motor vehicle that did not involve moral turpitude, and the manner in which the issue was handled before the jury was prejudicial.

criminal law

This case concerned a workers' compensation claim by coal miner Clinton Willard Agee against Pocahontas Fuel Co. for benefits due to second-stage silicosis, an occupational disease he contracted from mine work. The Industrial Commission awarded total incapacity payments under Virginia Code § 65-51 based on his partial physical disability and inability to continue in mining. The court reversed the award, finding insufficient evidence that Agee could not market his remaining work capacity, since he had not applied for other jobs and initial rejections from mines were unrelated to his condition. It held that partial physical disability alone does not establish total incapacity without proof of failed reasonable efforts to obtain alternative employment and remanded the case for further evidence.

labor & employment

Eugene Dickerson was convicted by a jury of operating a vehicle while under the influence of intoxicants, second offense, under a town ordinance, resulting in a fine and jail sentence. The trial court permitted two police officers to testify over objection that, based on their observations, Dickerson was under the influence of intoxicants. On appeal, the court held that this opinion testimony was improperly admitted and prejudicial, requiring reversal of the conviction and remand for a new trial. The court found the evidence otherwise sufficient to support a jury verdict and upheld the denial of a requested jury instruction that singled out reckless driving. The opinion noted a discrepancy between the jury's verdict and the final sentence but focused reversal on the evidentiary error.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a dispute over title to one acre of land in Fairfax County, Virginia, between the Currells, who claimed ownership through adverse possession of a 55-acre tract acquired in 1939, and LaDue, who held superior record title to an overlapping three-acre parcel conveyed in 1926 from a common grantor. The trial court ruled for the Currells after finding they had met the elements of adverse possession under Virginia Code § 8-5. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia reversed, holding that the evidence of sporadic mowing for appearance and cultivation beginning only in 1946 was insufficient to prove the required actual, continuous, hostile, and notorious possession for the full 15-year statutory period. The court reasoned that such intermittent activities did not provide adequate notice to the record owner and that the Currells' actions prior to 1946 lacked the necessary visibility and hostility to establish adverse possession.

property

This case involved an appeal by the Pittston Company from an Industrial Commission award granting Rufus Fulks total disability benefits for occupational pneumoconiosis contracted while working as a coal miner for Pittston and prior employers. The court first denied Fulks's motion to dismiss the appeal, holding that it had acquired jurisdiction under the special statutory provisions for Industrial Commission appeals even though some procedural steps deviated from general equity appeal rules. On the merits, the court found the claim was not barred by the statute of limitations but set aside the award because the Commission had obtained and relied on additional medical evidence (laminographs and an expert report) without following the requirements of Code § 65-87 or its own Rule 3, thereby denying Pittston the opportunity to examine the new evidence or cross-examine the expert. The case was reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with proper procedures.

labor & employmentprocedure

The case involved the construction of Merritt Johnson's 1912 will, which devised the residue of his estate to his daughter Violet with a gift over to the children of his other daughter Ruth if Violet died 'without heir.' Violet, who had no natural children, adopted a son in 1950 and died intestate in 1955; the dispute centered on whether the adopted son inherited the property or whether it passed to Ruth's children, along with whether Violet's husband was entitled to curtesy in the real estate. The court held that Violet received a defeasible fee that terminated at her death without issue of her body, so the property passed to Ruth's children as an executory devise (subject to the husband's curtesy life estate), and that 'heir' in the will's context meant natural heirs only, excluding the adopted child. It further ruled that the husband was entitled to curtesy because the estate was one of inheritance and his interest had not been barred. The core reasoning rested on the testator's intent as expressed in the will's language and overall context, interpreted under then-existing statutes of descent and distribution.

family lawproperty

The case involved James Newton’s conviction for operating an automobile while under the influence of intoxicants in violation of a Richmond city ordinance, resulting in a $100 fine. Newton appealed, challenging jury instructions and the admission of blood analysis evidence, but most assignments of error were rejected for failing to comply with Rule of Court 1:8, which requires objections to be stated with reasonable certainty. The court considered the objection to the blood test evidence under the “ends of justice” exception and found that the prosecution had not sufficiently identified the blood sample through proper chain of custody or testimony, leaving its connection to Newton unproven beyond a reasonable doubt. Because the blood analysis was prejudicial, the court held that the motion to exclude it should have been granted. The judgment was reversed and the case remanded for a new trial, with an additional note that an expert should not opine on fitness to drive.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a physician who bought a new 1955 Packard sedan from a dealer and later sued in equity to cancel the purchase contract, alleging he was induced by the salesman's false and material representations that the car was in perfect running condition, thoroughly tested, and free of defects. The trial court granted rescission and ordered a refund of the purchase price. On appeal, the court affirmed, holding that the evidence—viewed in the light most favorable to the buyer—showed the salesman knowingly made material misrepresentations about the vehicle's condition and prior testing, which the buyer reasonably relied upon in making the purchase. The car exhibited multiple defects within days of delivery, and the buyer acted promptly to repudiate once repairs failed. The decision rested on established principles allowing rescission of a contract procured by fraud.

business & regulatorytorts & liability

This case involved a dispute over appointments to the School Trustee Electoral Board of Page County, Virginia, made by the circuit court in March 1955 after the statutory deadline had passed, and the validity of that board's subsequent election of a member to the County School Board. The trial court ruled the late appointments invalid under Code § 22-60, leaving the prior holdover members in office and nullifying the election. The appellate court reversed, holding that the statutory thirty-day timing requirement for appointments was directory rather than mandatory, as the provision aimed only to prompt periodic review, the holdover clause in the state constitution protected continuity, and nothing indicated an intent to limit the court's appointment power or invalidate tardy selections. As a result, the new board was deemed lawful and its election upheld.

elections

The case involved a supplier suing two guarantors for $2,403.51 in unpaid goods delivered to Food Kraft, Inc., based on a June 1954 writing in which the defendants promised to pay the company's debts provided the total indebtedness never exceeded $2,500. The defendants admitted signing the guaranty but argued it was conditional and had been breached when credit exceeded the limit; the plaintiff contended it was an absolute guaranty. After a pretrial conference, the trial court entered summary judgment for the defendants under Rule 3:20. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed, construing the guaranty language as imposing a clear condition on the total debt amount, which the supplier violated, and applying strict construction in favor of the guarantors.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case concerned whether the Board of Trustees of the Virginia Supplemental Retirement System could lawfully invest system funds in bonds of public utilities and private corporations rated A or higher, as permitted for domestic life insurance companies under Code §51-111.24(a). The Attorney General sought mandamus against the Comptroller, who questioned the constitutionality of that statute under §185 of the Virginia Constitution, which bars the state from granting credit to or becoming interested in the stock or obligations of corporations. The court held that the funds constitute state property subject to §185 but that the statute is valid and the investments may proceed. Its core reasoning relied on the presumption of constitutionality, historical legislative authorizations for similar state fund investments in corporate bonds (including for retirement systems), and the principle that contemporaneous construction of the constitutional provision supports the statute's validity.

business & regulatorylabor & employment

In Short v. Long, an infant plaintiff sued the defendant for personal injuries from a car-truck collision on Route 340, while the defendant counterclaimed for his own injuries and property damage to his truck, each alleging the other's negligence caused the accident. The jury returned a verdict denying recovery to Short and awarding Long $400 on the counterclaim, and the trial court entered judgment on that verdict. On appeal, Short challenged the quashing of an interrogatory about the defendant's alcohol consumption, argued the evidence showed no negligence by him and sole fault by Long, and claimed the verdict amount was inadequate and indicated improper apportionment of damages. The court affirmed the judgment, holding that the evidence supported the jury's liability finding, that any inadequacy in the award did not warrant disturbing the verdict at Short's request given the circumstances, and that no reversible error occurred in the trial proceedings.

torts & liabilityprocedure

In Reese v. Reese, Thomas W. Reese sued his brother H. R. Reese for partition of two adjoining lots in Newport News, Virginia, inherited from their mother, claiming a two-thirds interest after purchasing their sister's share, while seeking an accounting of rents. H. R. Reese filed a cross-bill asserting full equitable ownership of lot 18 under a 1919 written agreement with their parents and challenged a related judgment lien and denial of reimbursement for repairs. The commissioner found the 1919 instrument had no legal effect based on evidence of the parties' intent and conduct over decades, determined the ownership shares as alleged, concluded the property was not divisible in kind, and recommended sale for partition, while rejecting collateral attack on the judgment and claims for rents or repairs. The trial court adopted the report, and the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed, holding that the evidence supported the commissioner's findings on ownership and that procedural rulings were proper.

propertyprocedurefamily law

The case involved an administrator suing a driver for the negligent death of a pedestrian struck by a car at a street intersection crosswalk. After a jury verdict for the defendant, the plaintiff appealed, arguing errors in jury instructions and evidence rulings. The court reversed the judgment, holding that the trial court erred in refusing the plaintiff's instruction on the pedestrian's right of way, which extends across the entire crosswalk, and that this error was prejudicial requiring a new trial. It found no error in other instructions given or refused.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved Estelle Irene Strock seeking to void a 1944 deed conveying her real estate to her sister Nancy E. MacNicholl, alleging incapacity, fraud, or breach of the covenant requiring the grantee to support and maintain the grantor. The trial court upheld the deed's validity and resolved ownership of personal property on the premises. On appeal, the court determined that the grantee had breached the support covenant by failing to provide adequate care and by requiring the grantor to perform services, leading to reversal of the decree refusing to cancel the deed and remand for cancellation, while affirming the personal property decree.

propertyfamily law

The case concerned a public utility company's petition to condemn easements across two parcels of land in Fairfax County for an electric transmission line, including both fixed rights-of-way and unlocated rights of ingress and egress, as well as disputes over an additional adjacent parcel and the assessment of damages to the residue. The trial court struck the unlocated easements from the petitions, required the company to describe the additional parcel, and issued instructions to the condemnation commissioners on how to determine compensation and damages. The Virginia Supreme Court reversed and remanded, ruling that the unlocated easements could not be eliminated absent evidence of arbitrary action, that the additional parcel need not be included in the original petitions, and that certain instructions improperly assumed facts about damage or invited item-by-item calculations rather than an overall valuation of the residue.

propertyprocedurebusiness & regulatory

The case concerned the revocation of drivers' licenses by the Commissioner of the Division of Motor Vehicles after each of three individuals received two speeding convictions within a twelve-month period under Virginia statutes. Each driver challenged the validity of one conviction from the Richmond Traffic Court, claiming it was void because they had not appeared or pleaded but instead deposited money covering the fine and costs, which was later forfeited. The court determined that such deposits, accepted and appropriated by the court without the defendants' appearance, qualified as convictions under the statutory definition that includes forfeiture of collateral to secure appearance. Relying on prior decisions involving similar procedures, the court concluded the revocations were proper and reversed the trial court's injunctions restoring the licenses.

criminal lawprocedure

The case arose from a car collision involving Edna Petrus, who was driving her husband's vehicle, and Charles Robbins. Robbins sued Petrus in Civil and Police Court for damage to his car, and she counterclaimed for damage to the car she drove; after hearing evidence, the court found both negligent and denied recovery to each. Petrus and her husband then filed suit in Corporation Court seeking damages for her personal injuries and property loss from the same accident. The Supreme Court of Virginia ruled that the prior judgment barred the later personal injury action under principles of estoppel by judgment, because the issue of Petrus's contributory negligence had been necessarily decided in the earlier proceeding where, as a gratuitous bailee in possession, she was entitled to sue for damage to the bailed property.

proceduretorts & liability

The case involved a challenge by H. Ashton Tavenner, a local business lessee, to a 1952 ordinance enacted by the Town of Leesburg that regulated parking on Market Street near its intersection with King Street by reserving specific zones for common carriers like buses to load and unload passengers, removing parking meters in the area, and imposing parallel parking requirements, with violations punishable as misdemeanors. Tavenner argued the ordinance exceeded municipal authority and was unreasonable and discriminatory, seeking an injunction against its enforcement. The trial court overruled the town's motion to dismiss (treated as a demurrer) and declared the ordinance null and void. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia reversed, holding that the town's charter and Code § 46-259 granted express authority to regulate parking and vehicular traffic under delegated police powers for the public welfare, that the ordinance was reasonable and nondiscriminatory within the class of common carriers, and that any abutter's property rights were subordinate to such valid regulation.

business & regulatoryproperty

In Ladd v. Lamb, the Acting Commissioner of Motor Vehicles revoked Robert Anderson Ladd's operator’s and chauffeur’s licenses for sixty days after two convictions for speeding within a twelve-month period under section 46-416.1 of the Virginia Code. Ladd filed a bill in equity seeking to block enforcement, alleging that one conviction was invalid because the summons and abstract used only the term “speeding,” the abstract was forwarded late by the clerk, and the revocation statute was unconstitutional. The trial court sustained the Commissioner’s demurrer, and the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed, ruling that the charge of “speeding” was sufficient to notify the defendant, the clerk’s delay did not invalidate the conviction or abstract because the statute imposes penalties only on the clerk, and the statute’s constitutionality had already been upheld in a companion case.

criminal lawprocedure