Kennon C. Whittle

The case involved Thomas Carlton Wansley, a 17-year-old charged with rape, who was investigated by a juvenile court, certified for trial as an adult, and convicted by a jury that imposed a death sentence. The Virginia Supreme Court reversed the conviction and remanded the case for a new trial. The court found reversible error in the trial judge's response to a jury inquiry, in which he indicated that a life sentence could be altered by the executive branch of government. This statement improperly influenced the jury's decision on punishment, contrary to prior rulings that juries must impose sentences based only on the evidence and instructions without regard to potential later actions by other officials. Other claims regarding the timing of counsel appointment and mental competency evaluations were rejected as lacking merit or prejudice.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a personal injury lawsuit where Dorothy Clark sued the Presbyterian School of Christian Education and others after she walked into and broke a plate glass panel beside the entrance doors of their building, sustaining cuts and bruises. A jury awarded her damages, but the Virginia Supreme Court reversed the judgment, holding that Clark was contributorily negligent as a matter of law. The court reasoned that the glass panel was an open and obvious condition that she should have noticed with ordinary care, given the distinguishing features of the doors versus the panels, her unimpaired vision, and lack of obstructions or distractions. It cited similar precedents emphasizing that invitees must exercise reasonable care for their own safety on premises.

torts & liability

Jackson sued Prestage for injuries sustained when Prestage's automobile struck him at an intersection, alleging negligence and seeking both compensatory and punitive damages on the ground that Prestage was grossly negligent due to intoxication. The trial court sustained a demurrer to the punitive-damages claim and, after a jury verdict for the defendant, entered final judgment for Prestage. On appeal the court affirmed the dismissal of punitive damages but held that the trial court erred in excluding evidence of Prestage's consumption of four or five beers shortly before the accident and his erratic speech observed by officers, because that evidence was relevant to whether his condition affected his control or lookout. The judgment was therefore reversed and the case remanded for a new trial.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case involved a lawsuit by Sally Bowman against Louis P. Fleming for personal injuries sustained when Fleming's car, in which Bowman was a passenger, collided with another vehicle after failing to stop at a stop sign. The trial court struck the defendant's evidence, ruling that gross negligence had been proven as a matter of law, and allowed the jury to determine only the amount of damages, resulting in an $18,000 verdict for the plaintiff. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia reversed the judgment, holding that whether Fleming's conduct amounted to gross negligence under the circumstances—where visibility was obstructed and he missed the stop sign—was a factual question for the jury to decide rather than a matter of law. The court remanded the case for a new trial consistent with this ruling.

torts & liabilityprocedure

In Lambach v. Bailey, Bailey sued both Lambach, in whose car he was a passenger, and Whitehead for personal injuries from a midnight car collision at an intersection on Laskin Road. The jury returned a $27,500 verdict against both defendants, and the trial court overruled Lambach's motion to set it aside or grant a new trial. Lambach appealed, contending there was insufficient evidence of gross negligence (required under the guest passenger statute) and that evidence of alcohol odor was improperly admitted. The court affirmed the judgment, ruling that Whitehead's testimony about Lambach driving without lights and making a sharp left turn created a jury issue on gross negligence, the evidence was credible, and remaining claims about instructions and procedure lacked merit.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved three defendants jointly tried and convicted of larceny of oysters under Virginia Code § 28-191, which criminalizes taking oysters from assigned grounds without the owner's permission; each received a $50 fine. On appeal, the defendants challenged the trial court's refusal to allow a voir dire question about jurors' ownership of oyster grounds, its rejection of proposed jury instructions based on a civil trespass statute (§ 28-124(6)), and the sufficiency of the evidence due to conflicts over ground staking. The court affirmed the convictions, holding that the voir dire issue was not properly preserved at trial and that such ownership would not disqualify jurors, that the civil statute was inapplicable to this criminal prosecution and would mislead the jury, and that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to determine the oysters were taken from the alleged grounds.

criminal lawprocedure