Kennon C. Whittle

The case involved Thomas Carlton Wansley, a 17-year-old charged with rape, who was investigated by a juvenile court, certified for trial as an adult, and convicted by a jury that imposed a death sentence. The Virginia Supreme Court reversed the conviction and remanded the case for a new trial. The court found reversible error in the trial judge's response to a jury inquiry, in which he indicated that a life sentence could be altered by the executive branch of government. This statement improperly influenced the jury's decision on punishment, contrary to prior rulings that juries must impose sentences based only on the evidence and instructions without regard to potential later actions by other officials. Other claims regarding the timing of counsel appointment and mental competency evaluations were rejected as lacking merit or prejudice.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a personal injury lawsuit where Dorothy Clark sued the Presbyterian School of Christian Education and others after she walked into and broke a plate glass panel beside the entrance doors of their building, sustaining cuts and bruises. A jury awarded her damages, but the Virginia Supreme Court reversed the judgment, holding that Clark was contributorily negligent as a matter of law. The court reasoned that the glass panel was an open and obvious condition that she should have noticed with ordinary care, given the distinguishing features of the doors versus the panels, her unimpaired vision, and lack of obstructions or distractions. It cited similar precedents emphasizing that invitees must exercise reasonable care for their own safety on premises.

torts & liability

Jackson sued Prestage for injuries sustained when Prestage's automobile struck him at an intersection, alleging negligence and seeking both compensatory and punitive damages on the ground that Prestage was grossly negligent due to intoxication. The trial court sustained a demurrer to the punitive-damages claim and, after a jury verdict for the defendant, entered final judgment for Prestage. On appeal the court affirmed the dismissal of punitive damages but held that the trial court erred in excluding evidence of Prestage's consumption of four or five beers shortly before the accident and his erratic speech observed by officers, because that evidence was relevant to whether his condition affected his control or lookout. The judgment was therefore reversed and the case remanded for a new trial.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case involved a lawsuit by Sally Bowman against Louis P. Fleming for personal injuries sustained when Fleming's car, in which Bowman was a passenger, collided with another vehicle after failing to stop at a stop sign. The trial court struck the defendant's evidence, ruling that gross negligence had been proven as a matter of law, and allowed the jury to determine only the amount of damages, resulting in an $18,000 verdict for the plaintiff. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia reversed the judgment, holding that whether Fleming's conduct amounted to gross negligence under the circumstances—where visibility was obstructed and he missed the stop sign—was a factual question for the jury to decide rather than a matter of law. The court remanded the case for a new trial consistent with this ruling.

torts & liabilityprocedure

In Lambach v. Bailey, Bailey sued both Lambach, in whose car he was a passenger, and Whitehead for personal injuries from a midnight car collision at an intersection on Laskin Road. The jury returned a $27,500 verdict against both defendants, and the trial court overruled Lambach's motion to set it aside or grant a new trial. Lambach appealed, contending there was insufficient evidence of gross negligence (required under the guest passenger statute) and that evidence of alcohol odor was improperly admitted. The court affirmed the judgment, ruling that Whitehead's testimony about Lambach driving without lights and making a sharp left turn created a jury issue on gross negligence, the evidence was credible, and remaining claims about instructions and procedure lacked merit.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved three defendants jointly tried and convicted of larceny of oysters under Virginia Code § 28-191, which criminalizes taking oysters from assigned grounds without the owner's permission; each received a $50 fine. On appeal, the defendants challenged the trial court's refusal to allow a voir dire question about jurors' ownership of oyster grounds, its rejection of proposed jury instructions based on a civil trespass statute (§ 28-124(6)), and the sufficiency of the evidence due to conflicts over ground staking. The court affirmed the convictions, holding that the voir dire issue was not properly preserved at trial and that such ownership would not disqualify jurors, that the civil statute was inapplicable to this criminal prosecution and would mislead the jury, and that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to determine the oysters were taken from the alleged grounds.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a condemnation proceeding in which the State Highway Commissioner sought to acquire 0.27 acres in fee and a 0.10-acre easement from the Crocketts' farm for highway improvements under Virginia statutes. The trial court appointed a commission including Andrew E. Godsey over the Commissioner's objection that Godsey was biased due to owning adjacent property, holding an interest in another nearby parcel under condemnation, and being approached by the condemnees. The commission awarded $2,300 for the land taken and $8,200 in damages to the residue; the trial court reduced the land award but upheld the rest. The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed, holding that Godsey was not a disinterested or unbiased commissioner and that such appointments must avoid any appearance of improper influence to preserve public confidence in the process, akin to jury standards. The award was set aside and the case remanded.

propertyprocedure

This case involved a divorce action filed by wife Margaret Plattner against husband Francis Plattner in Fairfax County Circuit Court, where she alleged constructive desertion and sought support and custody of their adopted child, and the husband cross-claimed for annulment and later divorce on grounds of desertion. The trial court, after reviewing a commissioner's report and extensive evidence, ruled that neither party was entitled to a divorce, awarded custody of the child to the wife with visitation for the husband, and ordered the husband to provide support and maintenance. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed, holding that the husband's desertion claim was legally insufficient because the alleged desertion occurred after the wife filed suit, and that the trial court had statutory authority under Code § 20-107 to award maintenance even when denying divorce to both parties based on its assessment of the evidence of marital discord.

family law

This case involved a lawsuit by Edward Louis Haislip, a minor guest passenger, against Elmore Payton Gill, Jr., his host driver, for personal injuries from an automobile accident. The plaintiff alleged multiple acts of gross negligence, including driving at excessive speeds of 60-65 mph, intoxication, and ignoring requests to slow down or stop, which the defendant denied. A jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff in the amount of $9,075, and the trial court entered judgment on it over the defendant's objection. On appeal, the court affirmed, ruling that the evidence viewed favorably to the plaintiff was sufficient to prove gross negligence under the applicable statute and that other assigned errors regarding evidentiary rulings and jury instructions lacked merit.

torts & liability

The case concerned Payne's conviction under Code § 18-47 for unlawfully seizing, taking, and secreting 12-year-old Barbara Ann Loyd from her parents after the two eloped, spent time together, and married in Maryland. A jury found Payne guilty and the trial court entered judgment on the verdict. The Virginia Supreme Court reversed the conviction and dismissed the prosecution, holding that the statute requires an illegal taking with criminal intent and was not intended to apply to a consensual elopement undertaken to consummate a marriage. The court noted that Virginia law treats such a marriage as voidable rather than void and favors upholding marriages, distinguishing the facts from any prior dictum suggesting liability under the statute.

criminal lawfamily law

This case involved a condemnation proceeding in which the State Highway Commissioner of Virginia took portions of land owned by William D. Ryan and Anna T. Ryan in Arlington County for highway construction and improvement under Code § 33-70. Commissioners appointed by the circuit court awarded the owners $15,175 for the land taken in fee, easements, and damages to the remainder, an amount $155 below the commissioner's initial deposit estimate. The owners appealed, raising multiple objections to evidentiary rulings, including the admissibility of expert appraisal methods, evidence of highest and best use of the remaining land, exclusion of business profits and losses, allowance of certain costs, and the adequacy of the award. The Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's order confirming the award, holding that no reversible errors occurred in the admission or exclusion of evidence, that business profits were too speculative to consider, that enhancement to the residue could offset damages under Code § 33-73, and that the award was supported by the evidence and not grossly inadequate absent fraud or misconduct by the commissioners.

propertyprocedure

The case involved Kincaid's conviction for reckless driving as a second offense within twelve months of a prior conviction for the same charge. The Commonwealth introduced evidence of the earlier conviction and the trial court instructed the jury on the enhanced penalties applicable to a second offense, even though the warrant did not allege or charge a prior conviction. The court held that this was error, because a warrant must contain an averment of facts essential to the enhanced punishment to be inflicted, and reversed the judgment, remanding for a new trial. The court rejected the defendant's other assignments of error concerning identification of the driver and the constitutionality of taxing jury costs to the defendant.

criminal lawprocedure

Mrs. Shoulder sued Cook for personal injuries after she was struck by his automobile while crossing U.S. Route 254 as a pedestrian. The trial court found her contributorily negligent as a matter of law but submitted the case to the jury on the last clear chance doctrine, resulting in a verdict for the plaintiff. On appeal, the court reversed the judgment and entered final judgment for the defendant. The core reasoning was that the last clear chance doctrine did not apply because Mrs. Shoulder's negligence continued as a proximate cause of the accident up to the moment of impact, and Cook lacked sufficient time after discovering her peril to take effective action to avoid the collision.

torts & liability

This case involved a condemnation proceeding by the City of Norfolk to acquire fee simple title to several parcels of property, including land owned or leased by Stanpark Realty Corporation, for the dual purposes of widening College Place by 20 feet and creating off-street parking facilities. The trial court confirmed the city's title and possession after commissioners awarded compensation, but Stanpark appealed on grounds including the validity of the authorizing ordinance, the sufficiency of the petition alleging public use, and the lack of proof of necessity for the taking. The Virginia Supreme Court held that the ordinance was valid under the city charter and state statutes, which expressly authorize off-street parking as a public use, and that the petition was sufficient, but it remanded the case for the city to prove the necessity of acquiring the property specifically for parking facilities (while affirming the necessity for the street widening, which Stanpark had conceded). The court further ruled that the commissioners' award of compensation and damages should stand if necessity is established on remand, with the leasehold interest valued separately from the overall property value, and that the trial court's failure to require such proof was the sole reversible error.

propertyprocedure

Glover sued the City of Winchester after his application for a permit to build a gasoline service station was denied under Chapter 10, section 16 of the City Code, which allowed the council to refuse permits if it determined public safety would be endangered. The chancellor ruled the ordinance unconstitutional for failing to provide any rules, standards, or guides, thereby granting the council unchecked discretion to approve or deny permits arbitrarily. On appeal, the court affirmed, reasoning that operating a gas station is not an inherently dangerous business but a normal commercial activity entitled to constitutional protections, so the ordinance must impose uniform standards rather than permit discretionary grants or denials. The court rejected the city's argument that such businesses involve only a privilege subject to police power whims without fixed criteria.

business & regulatoryproperty

This case involved a challenge by Hampton Catlett to a 1955 nunc pro tunc order that amended a 1953 conviction order in his rape prosecution to reflect the required concurrence of the Commonwealth’s Attorney and the court in his waiver of a jury trial. The trial court had found Catlett guilty after he waived a jury, but the original order omitted explicit mention of that concurrence as mandated by Section 8 of the Virginia Constitution. The Supreme Court of Virginia held that while the court’s concurrence could be inferred from the order’s language stating that it proceeded to hear the evidence, no such inference could be drawn regarding the Commonwealth’s Attorney’s concurrence, and extrinsic evidence could not supply the omission. The court therefore annulled the nunc pro tunc order because the constitutional requirement that the concurrence be “entered of record” had not been satisfied in the original proceedings.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved the Bostics suing Whited and Reedy for damages from the wrongful mining and removal of 810 tons of coal from their land. After two juries awarded the plaintiffs damages and the trial court set both verdicts aside, a third trial ended with judgment for the defendants when the plaintiffs offered no evidence. The appellate court reinstated the first jury's $1,500 verdict, ruling that the trial court had erred in setting it aside because the evidence supported a finding of gross negligence under the unchallenged jury instructions, which became the law of the case and required damages measured by the coal's selling price at the mine entrance rather than its in-ground value.

propertyproceduretorts & liability

The case involved a driver convicted of speeding at 62 mph in a 55 mph zone based on radar evidence from a state trooper. The defendant challenged the conviction on grounds that radar warning signs were not properly posted under the statute and that the law allowing radar results as prima facie evidence of speed violated the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause. The court affirmed the conviction, noting the parties' stipulation that signs met statutory requirements, and held that the statute created a reasonable and rebuttable evidentiary presumption with a rational connection to the fact of speed, without shifting the burden of proof or violating due process. The ruling emphasized that defendants could introduce evidence to rebut the presumption, such as by questioning the equipment's accuracy in a given case.

criminal lawprocedure

Emma Sue Saleeby sued Free Press, Inc. and its owner for common law libel and violation of the insulting words statute after the newspaper published an article stating that she operated the Pioneer Club, which was running with illegal liquor and gambling. The jury returned a verdict for the defendants, finding the statements substantially true. On appeal, the court reversed the judgment, holding that two of the jury instructions were improper because they were too broad or allowed the jury to defer to the defendant's belief rather than making its own determination about whether the plaintiff appeared involved in the club's operation. The case was remanded for a new trial.

torts & liabilityfree speech

In Mooreland v. Young, a landowner sought to develop a 97-acre property into a private club offering paid recreational activities including swimming, boating, and sports, and requested an interpretation of the local zoning ordinance to confirm these uses were permitted without a special permit. The Board of Zoning Appeals ruled that the proposed quasi-commercial use did not qualify under paragraphs 9 and 10 of the ordinance and instead required approval under paragraph 15-c, which applies to clubs and grounds for games or sports only if not primarily for gain. The trial court reversed the Board's decision, holding that the uses were covered by the permitted categories in paragraphs 9 and 10 and that profitability was irrelevant. On appeal, the court affirmed, reasoning that the facilities constituted a private park and recreational area with accessory structures under paragraph 10, and that paragraph 15-c was inapplicable because it targeted different types of gain-oriented events.

propertybusiness & regulatory