Richard P. Guy

In consolidated cases, Scott W. Brooks and Rudolph Franklin challenged their civil commitments as sexually violent predators under Washington's chapter 71.09 RCW, arguing that the statute's failure to consider less restrictive alternatives to total confinement at the commitment trial violated equal protection when compared to commitments under the mental illness statute (chapter 71.05 RCW), and that Brooks raised additional due process and perjury-related claims. The Washington Supreme Court held that equal protection requires consideration of less restrictive alternatives at the SVP commitment trials, that the current timing of such consideration only after trial lacks a rational basis tied to public safety, and thus the statute fails rational basis review. The court vacated the commitment orders for both individuals and remanded for new trials under the statute's procedures, while rejecting Brooks' separate constitutional challenges to the evidentiary standard and declining to address the perjury issue after deciding on equal protection grounds.

criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure

The case involved Seattle police officers making warrantless arrests of several nude dancers and a club manager at an adult nightclub for alleged violations of a municipal ordinance regulating conduct standards in such venues. After one dancer was acquitted and charges against the others dismissed, the arrestees sued the city under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming violations of their First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights, including lack of probable cause. The Washington Supreme Court held that the warrantless arrests did not violate the arrestees' constitutional rights and that their state constitution claim did not support a § 1983 action. However, the court reversed the trial court's dismissal and remanded for a new trial because an erroneous jury instruction allowed the jury to find probable cause without considering whether the dancers' conduct fell within the ordinance's exception for protected expression or was obscene under the Miller standard.

free speechcriminal lawcivil rights

This case was a mandamus action brought by developers against the Spokane City Manager and City Attorney to compel them to loan funds from the city's parking meter revenue fund to cover shortfalls in ground lease payments and operating expenses for a downtown parking garage project financed in part by tax-exempt bonds. The trial court granted an alternative writ, finding that Ordinance C31823 required the officials to issue the loan when revenues were deficient. The Washington Supreme Court quashed the writ, holding that the city charter requires an order from the City Council to disburse money from a special fund like the parking meter revenue fund, and that the ordinance did not independently authorize the City Manager and City Attorney to make such payments without council approval. The court also affirmed the denial of a third party's motion to intervene and for change of judge, and denied motions to consider additional evidence.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involves a personal restraint petition filed by Darold J. Stenson, who was convicted of two counts of first-degree aggravated murder and sentenced to death. Stenson sought to reverse his conviction and sentence, primarily claiming that conflicts with his trial counsel over strategy during the guilt phase violated his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington. The Washington Supreme Court denied the petition in full, concluding after reviewing the facts of the murders, the trial record, and relevant precedents that Stenson's counsel was not constitutionally ineffective. The court reasoned that the disagreements, while significant, did not meet the threshold for ineffective assistance or require substitution of counsel, even when considering Ninth Circuit authority on irreconcilable conflicts.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a challenge by the Peninsula Neighborhood Association to the constitutionality of Washington's Public-Private Transportation Initiatives Act (PPI Act), which authorizes private entities to propose and develop public transportation projects such as a second Tacoma Narrows bridge financed partly by tolls, as well as the validity of an advisory election, related administrative rules, and the resulting agreement between the state Department of Transportation and a private developer. The Washington Supreme Court affirmed that the PPI Act is constitutional under state law and ruled that claims attacking the advisory election and implementing rules were barred by laches due to unreasonable delay causing prejudice. The court reversed on the agreement, however, holding it unenforceable because its provisions on the use of toll revenues and operations contracts violated existing statutes, including RCW 47.56.270 and .271, that require toll charges to first satisfy specified costs before other applications.

business & regulatoryelectionsprocedure

This case involved a class action lawsuit by David Wilson, a Medicaid recipient who received state-funded medical care for injuries, against the State of Washington over the state's claim for reimbursement from his settlement with third parties. The Washington Supreme Court held that the state statute allowing liens on third-party recoveries for Medicaid expenses does not conflict with federal law and is not preempted. The court reasoned that federal Medicaid provisions permit states to seek full reimbursement from any third-party recovery for medical assistance provided, rather than limiting recovery only to amounts specifically allocated to medical expenses.

healthcarefederal power