Richard P. Guy

In consolidated cases, Scott W. Brooks and Rudolph Franklin challenged their civil commitments as sexually violent predators under Washington's chapter 71.09 RCW, arguing that the statute's failure to consider less restrictive alternatives to total confinement at the commitment trial violated equal protection when compared to commitments under the mental illness statute (chapter 71.05 RCW), and that Brooks raised additional due process and perjury-related claims. The Washington Supreme Court held that equal protection requires consideration of less restrictive alternatives at the SVP commitment trials, that the current timing of such consideration only after trial lacks a rational basis tied to public safety, and thus the statute fails rational basis review. The court vacated the commitment orders for both individuals and remanded for new trials under the statute's procedures, while rejecting Brooks' separate constitutional challenges to the evidentiary standard and declining to address the perjury issue after deciding on equal protection grounds.

criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure

The case involved Seattle police officers making warrantless arrests of several nude dancers and a club manager at an adult nightclub for alleged violations of a municipal ordinance regulating conduct standards in such venues. After one dancer was acquitted and charges against the others dismissed, the arrestees sued the city under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming violations of their First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights, including lack of probable cause. The Washington Supreme Court held that the warrantless arrests did not violate the arrestees' constitutional rights and that their state constitution claim did not support a § 1983 action. However, the court reversed the trial court's dismissal and remanded for a new trial because an erroneous jury instruction allowed the jury to find probable cause without considering whether the dancers' conduct fell within the ordinance's exception for protected expression or was obscene under the Miller standard.

free speechcriminal lawcivil rights

This case was a mandamus action brought by developers against the Spokane City Manager and City Attorney to compel them to loan funds from the city's parking meter revenue fund to cover shortfalls in ground lease payments and operating expenses for a downtown parking garage project financed in part by tax-exempt bonds. The trial court granted an alternative writ, finding that Ordinance C31823 required the officials to issue the loan when revenues were deficient. The Washington Supreme Court quashed the writ, holding that the city charter requires an order from the City Council to disburse money from a special fund like the parking meter revenue fund, and that the ordinance did not independently authorize the City Manager and City Attorney to make such payments without council approval. The court also affirmed the denial of a third party's motion to intervene and for change of judge, and denied motions to consider additional evidence.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involves a personal restraint petition filed by Darold J. Stenson, who was convicted of two counts of first-degree aggravated murder and sentenced to death. Stenson sought to reverse his conviction and sentence, primarily claiming that conflicts with his trial counsel over strategy during the guilt phase violated his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington. The Washington Supreme Court denied the petition in full, concluding after reviewing the facts of the murders, the trial record, and relevant precedents that Stenson's counsel was not constitutionally ineffective. The court reasoned that the disagreements, while significant, did not meet the threshold for ineffective assistance or require substitution of counsel, even when considering Ninth Circuit authority on irreconcilable conflicts.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a challenge by the Peninsula Neighborhood Association to the constitutionality of Washington's Public-Private Transportation Initiatives Act (PPI Act), which authorizes private entities to propose and develop public transportation projects such as a second Tacoma Narrows bridge financed partly by tolls, as well as the validity of an advisory election, related administrative rules, and the resulting agreement between the state Department of Transportation and a private developer. The Washington Supreme Court affirmed that the PPI Act is constitutional under state law and ruled that claims attacking the advisory election and implementing rules were barred by laches due to unreasonable delay causing prejudice. The court reversed on the agreement, however, holding it unenforceable because its provisions on the use of toll revenues and operations contracts violated existing statutes, including RCW 47.56.270 and .271, that require toll charges to first satisfy specified costs before other applications.

business & regulatoryelectionsprocedure

This case involved a class action lawsuit by David Wilson, a Medicaid recipient who received state-funded medical care for injuries, against the State of Washington over the state's claim for reimbursement from his settlement with third parties. The Washington Supreme Court held that the state statute allowing liens on third-party recoveries for Medicaid expenses does not conflict with federal law and is not preempted. The court reasoned that federal Medicaid provisions permit states to seek full reimbursement from any third-party recovery for medical assistance provided, rather than limiting recovery only to amounts specifically allocated to medical expenses.

healthcarefederal power

In State v. Root, the defendant was convicted of multiple counts of rape of a child and 73 counts of sexual exploitation of a minor after taking sexually explicit photographs of three young children during babysitting sessions. The sole issue before the Washington Supreme Court was determining the proper "unit of prosecution" under RCW 9.68A.040—whether each photograph, each pose, or each photo session constituted a separate offense. The court held that the unit of prosecution is one count per photo session per minor involved, based on the statute's focus on causing a minor to engage in sexually explicit conduct with knowledge that it will be photographed. This interpretation aligned with prior precedent in State v. Knutson, which treated separate occasions rather than individual images as the punishable acts, leading to a reduction in the number of exploitation counts.

criminal law

In this case, Elijah Thompson filed a personal restraint petition more than one year after his 1994 guilty plea and sentence for first-degree child rape, arguing that the offense occurred in 1985-1986 before the 1988 statute creating the crime took effect. The Washington Supreme Court held that the judgment was invalid on its face due to the ex post facto violation, so the one-year time limit under RCW 10.73.090 did not bar review. The court ruled that Thompson's plea did not waive his constitutional claims and was not subject to the invited error doctrine, vacating the conviction and dismissing the count without prejudice. This allowed the state to refile charges under the prior statute or reinstate dismissed counts, returning the parties to their pre-plea positions, provided any refiling was timely.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved Mark Crabtree, who was convicted of sexual offenses against children and sentenced with a term of community placement. After violating the terms of that placement and returning to prison, he filed two personal restraint petitions challenging the community placement on ex post facto grounds, seeking to withdraw his guilty pleas, and raising claims of ineffective assistance and newly discovered evidence. The Court of Appeals dismissed both petitions as time-barred under RCW 10.73.090 and as successive without good cause under RCW 10.73.140. The Washington Supreme Court affirmed the dismissals, holding that an intervening change in the law from State v. Aho did not provide good cause to grant relief and that the petitions were properly barred. The court reviewed the procedural history and concluded that Crabtree's convictions were facially valid, precluding review absent the statutory exceptions.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Jerrod Stoudmire's second personal restraint petition challenging his 1993 convictions for indecent liberties, rape of a child, and related offenses, filed more than one year after his judgment became final. The Washington Supreme Court addressed procedural bars under RCW 10.73.090 and .100 regarding timeliness and mixed petitions but considered claims that rendered the judgment invalid on its face. It vacated the two indecent liberties convictions because the statute of limitations had expired before charges were filed and remanded for resentencing on the second-degree and third-degree rape of a child convictions because the imposed terms exceeded statutory maximums. Other claims, including ineffective assistance of counsel and errors in offender score calculations, were dismissed as untimely or not qualifying for exceptions. The court retained the abuse of the writ doctrine but did not apply it here.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned Chelan County's approval of Stemilt Land Co.'s Highlands residential subdivision project on land rezoned to recreational residential (RR-1) outside the county's interim urban growth area under the Growth Management Act. The trial court had granted the Wenatchee Sportsmen Association's LUPA petition and reversed the approval, finding the project inconsistent with GMA restrictions. The Washington Supreme Court reversed, holding that site-specific rezones are project permits rather than development regulations and thus not subject to GMHB review; any challenge to the rezone's validity had to be raised in a timely LUPA petition, which WSA failed to do, barring collateral attack here. The court concluded the project complied with applicable zoning and remanded for review of the county's SEPA mitigated determination of non-significance.

environmentpropertyprocedure

The case involved a challenge to Kitsap County's approval of a planned unit development application for 106 homes on 123 acres of rural land, specifically determining whether the proposal was governed by preexisting county zoning ordinances or by the Growth Management Act's interim urban growth area designation. The Washington Supreme Court ruled that the former zoning ordinance applied because the interim urban growth area had not been amended within the required remand period from the growth management hearings board, allowing the application to vest to the laws in effect at filing. The court reasoned that without an effective GMA plan or regulation on the application date, decisions on the plat and PUD must rely on pre-GMA zoning, affirmed the vesting principle, reversed a finding of GMA incompatibility, and remanded for review of the county's environmental impact statement determination under the proper standard.

propertyenvironmentbusiness & regulatory

The case involved the Seattle Professional Engineering Employees Association and individual employees suing Boeing over whether certain salaried executive, administrative, or professional employees were entitled to pay for attending orientation sessions and whether non-payment would affect their exempt status under the Washington Minimum Wage Act. The Washington Supreme Court issued an order correcting its earlier opinion to clarify that Boeing's failure to compensate exempt employees for orientation time does not abrogate their salaried exempt status. The court reasoned that federal FLSA regulations, which are persuasive authority for the state law, expressly provide that failure to pay full salary in the initial or terminal week of employment is consistent with the salary basis requirement. It further noted that no contrary Washington authority defines the salary basis element differently and that the MWA exemptions track federal standards.

labor & employment

This case concerns the enforcement of a hospital lien under Washington law after a veteran received medical care at a VA facility following an incident involving Deaconess Medical Center. The United States sought to recover a portion of a $75,000 settlement Deaconess paid to some family members, even though a jury later found Deaconess not negligent in a related suit by another family member over the same facts. The Washington Supreme Court, answering a certified question from federal district court, held that a party may be held responsible for the lien if the lien-enforcement court determines it is a tortfeasor under RCW 60.44.060. The court reasoned that the statute permits liens to attach to settlements as well as judgments, making a prior settlement prima facie evidence of negligence that can be rebutted, while a non-negligence judgment does not automatically bar liability and collateral estoppel may or may not apply depending on the facts.

healthcareproceduretorts & liability

Michael Tyrrell sued Farmers Insurance for a declaratory judgment that his injuries from tripping on a detached wooden step while exiting a camper attached to his parked pickup truck qualified as a covered 'motor vehicle accident' under the personal injury protection provisions of his auto policy. The trial court granted partial summary judgment to Tyrrell, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, but the Washington Supreme Court reversed. The Court held that the claim was not covered, reasoning that the plain meaning of 'motor vehicle accident' requires the vehicle to be operated as a motor vehicle, such as when driving or temporarily stopped while driving, rather than when parked for overnight camping. The case was remanded for entry of summary judgment in favor of Farmers on the coverage issue.

business & regulatory

This case involved an appeal from orders modifying the residential provisions of a parenting plan to accommodate the mother's proposed relocation with the children outside the father's area. The Washington Supreme Court held that under RCW 26.09.260(5), a parent may seek a minor modification to facilitate geographic relocation without changing the child's primary residential parent. The moving parent must show a bona fide reason for the move, while the opposing parent then has the opportunity to demonstrate either that no such reason exists or that the relocation would cause detriment to the child beyond normal adjustment hardships from travel or reduced contact. The court clarified that prior decisions like Littlefield do not govern these modification actions and specified the applicable proof requirements and burden allocations.

family lawprocedure

In Shorewood West Condominium Ass'n v. Sadri, condominium unit owners Asghar Sadri and Dorothy Grazul challenged the validity of a bylaw amendment by their condominium association that prohibited leasing of units, which was adopted after they purchased their property and was not included in the original declaration. The Washington Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and held that the bylaw was invalid and unenforceable against the owners. The court reasoned that under the Horizontal Property Regimes Act, restrictions on the use of condominium units, including leasing, must appear in the declaration rather than solely in the bylaws, and that owners are only bound by bylaws that are consistent with the statute. The court awarded attorney fees to the owners.

property

The case involved Dwight Dahl, who pleaded guilty to first-degree rape of a child and received a suspended sentence under Washington's Special Sex Offender Sentencing Alternative (SSOSA) with conditions including progress in sexual deviancy treatment and no contact with minors. After reports from his treatment provider noted concerns about a note Dahl sent to a bank teller and an alleged exposure incident, the State petitioned to revoke the SSOSA, and the trial court did so following a hearing. The Washington Supreme Court held that the revocation hearing violated Dahl's due process rights because the trial court relied on inadmissible hearsay evidence about the exposure incident without proper foundation and failed to enter findings of fact supporting its decision. The court therefore remanded the matter for a new hearing limited to admissible evidence.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Humphrey, the Washington Supreme Court considered whether a 1996 amendment to RCW 7.68.035(1)(a) increasing the victim penalty assessment from $100 to $500 applied to defendants whose offenses occurred before the amendment's effective date of June 6, 1996, but who were convicted afterward. The court held that the amendment applies only prospectively to offenses committed on or after that date, so the defendants Humphrey and Munden were liable only for the $100 assessment. The decision rested on the presumption that criminal statutes apply prospectively absent clear legislative intent to the contrary, and on the finding that the substantial increase created a new liability rather than a merely remedial change that could be applied retroactively.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Key Design Inc.'s attempt to enforce a real estate purchase and sale agreement for Vince's Fitness Center against the Mosers, who had sold the property to another buyer. The agreement, signed in December 1996, described the property only by its street address and left the legal description blank. The Washington Supreme Court reaffirmed its rule that contracts for the sale of platted real property must include a correct legal description to satisfy the statute of frauds. It declined to adopt a judicial admissions exception even though the parties referenced the property description in court filings, and it found insufficient evidence of mutual mistake to support contract reformation. The court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the enforcement action.

property