Floyd V. Hicks

In State v. Speed, the petitioner challenged a trial court judgment finding him the father of a child born out of wedlock and ordering support payments, arguing that RCW 26.26.120—which classifies paternity actions as civil proceedings tried without a jury—violates the state constitution's guarantee that the right to jury trial shall remain inviolate. The Washington Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals and trial court, upholding the statute. The court reasoned that the constitutional jury-trial right preserves only the scope of that right as it existed under valid law at the time of statehood; the territorial bastardy act that had allowed jury trials in such cases was a nullity because it was improperly enacted under a penal-code title, as established in the earlier case of State v. Tieman, and no other historical basis supported a jury right in filiation matters. Therefore, legislation directing that paternity suits be tried to the court does not offend the constitution.

family lawprocedurecivil rights

This case involved Clyde Johnson's convictions for statutory rape in the first degree and indecent liberties arising from two separate acts with a five-year-old girl in a bathroom. The Washington Supreme Court affirmed both convictions, determining that the bathroom incidents provided sufficient evidence to support each charge under RCW 9A.44.070 and RCW 9A.44.100, while the living room exposure did not satisfy the elements of indecent liberties. The court reasoned that legislative intent permitted multiple punishments for distinct acts without double jeopardy concerns, found the child witness competent, and rejected constitutional challenges to the indecent liberties statute as applied.

criminal lawprocedure

In Ridgeview Properties v. Starbuck, buyers of a lot and custom-built home in Spokane County sued the real estate brokerage Ridgeview Properties for violating the Consumer Protection Act through an alleged illegal tying arrangement and for breaching fiduciary duties by failing to disclose a dual agency relationship and cross-ownership between Ridgeview and the construction company Bunge Construction. The trial court dismissed the buyers' counterclaims, ruling that Ridgeview acted only as the seller's agent with no dual agency formed and that the commission was not a separate product but part of an integrated package price. On direct appeal, the Washington Supreme Court affirmed, finding substantial evidence supported the trial court's determinations that no dual agency existed and that buyers were not required to purchase separate real estate services from Ridgeview, as the arrangement simply passed on costs without compelling purchase of a tied product.

propertybusiness & regulatory

In State v. Tharp, the defendant was convicted by a jury of second-degree murder for shooting William Ray Bond in 1978. On appeal, Tharp challenged the trial court's admission of evidence concerning uncharged crimes committed in a series of incidents that night, as well as his prior auto theft conviction and furlough status from prison, which the State introduced to show motive. The Washington Supreme Court held that the uncharged crimes were properly admitted under the res gestae exception to show the full sequence of events, adopted a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard for such collateral acts, and found that any error in admitting the prior conviction and furlough evidence was harmless given the strength of the other proof linking Tharp to the murder. The court therefore affirmed the conviction.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a dispute over a mineral lease for sand and gravel mining on Weyerhaeuser's land, under which Stoneway agreed to pay annual minimum rent regardless of production and to obtain necessary permits, while Weyerhaeuser promised assistance with permitting. After public opposition, litigation, and the enactment of SEPA led to requirements for a costly environmental impact statement with uncertain results, Stoneway abandoned the project in 1975 without extracting minerals. The trial court applied the doctrine of commercial frustration to relieve Stoneway of lease obligations after January 1972, but the Court of Appeals reversed. The Washington Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, holding that the frustration doctrine applied because the lease's core purpose was frustrated by unforeseeable events, though it adjusted the termination date to reflect Stoneway's continued performance beyond the anticipated permitting period.

business & regulatorypropertyenvironment

The case involved two manufacturing companies denied sales and use tax deferral benefits by the Economic Assistance Authority under the Economic Assistance Act of 1972 because they leased factories built and owned by third parties rather than undertaking the projects themselves. The Superior Court overturned the agency's denials, but on direct review the Supreme Court affirmed the EAA and reversed the lower court. The court gave substantial weight to the agency's interpretation of the statute's requirement that a manufacturing firm "undertake" an eligible investment project, concluding this meant the firm must pay for the construction, and viewed a later legislative amendment substituting "paid for" for "undertaken" as a clarification of original intent rather than a change in meaning.

business & regulatorytaxes