Floyd V. Hicks

In State v. Speed, the petitioner challenged a trial court judgment finding him the father of a child born out of wedlock and ordering support payments, arguing that RCW 26.26.120—which classifies paternity actions as civil proceedings tried without a jury—violates the state constitution's guarantee that the right to jury trial shall remain inviolate. The Washington Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals and trial court, upholding the statute. The court reasoned that the constitutional jury-trial right preserves only the scope of that right as it existed under valid law at the time of statehood; the territorial bastardy act that had allowed jury trials in such cases was a nullity because it was improperly enacted under a penal-code title, as established in the earlier case of State v. Tieman, and no other historical basis supported a jury right in filiation matters. Therefore, legislation directing that paternity suits be tried to the court does not offend the constitution.

family lawprocedurecivil rights

This case involved Clyde Johnson's convictions for statutory rape in the first degree and indecent liberties arising from two separate acts with a five-year-old girl in a bathroom. The Washington Supreme Court affirmed both convictions, determining that the bathroom incidents provided sufficient evidence to support each charge under RCW 9A.44.070 and RCW 9A.44.100, while the living room exposure did not satisfy the elements of indecent liberties. The court reasoned that legislative intent permitted multiple punishments for distinct acts without double jeopardy concerns, found the child witness competent, and rejected constitutional challenges to the indecent liberties statute as applied.

criminal lawprocedure

In Ridgeview Properties v. Starbuck, buyers of a lot and custom-built home in Spokane County sued the real estate brokerage Ridgeview Properties for violating the Consumer Protection Act through an alleged illegal tying arrangement and for breaching fiduciary duties by failing to disclose a dual agency relationship and cross-ownership between Ridgeview and the construction company Bunge Construction. The trial court dismissed the buyers' counterclaims, ruling that Ridgeview acted only as the seller's agent with no dual agency formed and that the commission was not a separate product but part of an integrated package price. On direct appeal, the Washington Supreme Court affirmed, finding substantial evidence supported the trial court's determinations that no dual agency existed and that buyers were not required to purchase separate real estate services from Ridgeview, as the arrangement simply passed on costs without compelling purchase of a tied product.

propertybusiness & regulatory

In State v. Tharp, the defendant was convicted by a jury of second-degree murder for shooting William Ray Bond in 1978. On appeal, Tharp challenged the trial court's admission of evidence concerning uncharged crimes committed in a series of incidents that night, as well as his prior auto theft conviction and furlough status from prison, which the State introduced to show motive. The Washington Supreme Court held that the uncharged crimes were properly admitted under the res gestae exception to show the full sequence of events, adopted a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard for such collateral acts, and found that any error in admitting the prior conviction and furlough evidence was harmless given the strength of the other proof linking Tharp to the murder. The court therefore affirmed the conviction.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a dispute over a mineral lease for sand and gravel mining on Weyerhaeuser's land, under which Stoneway agreed to pay annual minimum rent regardless of production and to obtain necessary permits, while Weyerhaeuser promised assistance with permitting. After public opposition, litigation, and the enactment of SEPA led to requirements for a costly environmental impact statement with uncertain results, Stoneway abandoned the project in 1975 without extracting minerals. The trial court applied the doctrine of commercial frustration to relieve Stoneway of lease obligations after January 1972, but the Court of Appeals reversed. The Washington Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, holding that the frustration doctrine applied because the lease's core purpose was frustrated by unforeseeable events, though it adjusted the termination date to reflect Stoneway's continued performance beyond the anticipated permitting period.

business & regulatorypropertyenvironment

The case involved two manufacturing companies denied sales and use tax deferral benefits by the Economic Assistance Authority under the Economic Assistance Act of 1972 because they leased factories built and owned by third parties rather than undertaking the projects themselves. The Superior Court overturned the agency's denials, but on direct review the Supreme Court affirmed the EAA and reversed the lower court. The court gave substantial weight to the agency's interpretation of the statute's requirement that a manufacturing firm "undertake" an eligible investment project, concluding this meant the firm must pay for the construction, and viewed a later legislative amendment substituting "paid for" for "undertaken" as a clarification of original intent rather than a change in meaning.

business & regulatorytaxes

The case consolidated appeals from the convictions of Gerald Cleppe and Velma Sykes for possession of controlled substances under RCW 69.50.401(c), now (d), based on constructive possession found during searches of premises they were connected to. The Court of Appeals had reversed Cleppe's conviction and remanded Sykes' for findings, holding that guilty knowledge was a required element of the offense as a crime mala in se. The Washington Supreme Court reversed, ruling that neither intent nor guilty knowledge is an element of simple possession because the statute does not specify it as such, and substantial evidence supported the findings of constructive possession. In Cleppe's case, the court also remanded for an in camera hearing on disclosure of an unnamed informant whose testimony might relate to ownership and constructive possession. The trial court judgments were reinstated, subject to the outcome of that hearing for two of Cleppe's counts.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a lessor suing a lessee for the cost of rebuilding two leased greenhouses destroyed by fire, based on a general maintenance and delivery clause in the lease requiring the premises to be kept in good condition and surrendered as received, except for ordinary wear and tear. The trial court granted summary judgment on liability to the lessor without considering fault or intent, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, but the Supreme Court reversed. The court held that such a clause does not automatically obligate the lessee to rebuild structures destroyed without fault absent an express stipulation to that effect, as the plain meaning of maintain or repair does not include rebuilding, and ambiguities in a lessor-drafted lease must be resolved against the lessor. The matter was remanded for trial to determine the parties' intent at the time of the lease.

propertybusiness & regulatory

The case involved petitioner Barnes, who had received excess public assistance and sought a writ of prohibition to prevent the Department of Social and Health Services (DSHS) from holding an administrative hearing to determine repayment of the overpayment. The trial court and Court of Appeals denied the writ, and the Washington Supreme Court affirmed. The court reasoned that a writ of prohibition requires a clear and total lack of jurisdiction, which was not present here, and that petitioner had an adequate remedy by appeal under the administrative procedure act. It further held that DSHS possessed statutory authority under RCW 74.04.300 and RCW 74.08.070 to establish overpayments as debts and conduct hearings, interpreting the term "recipient" to include those who had previously received assistance.

procedure

The case concerned a challenge by the Westside Hilltop Survival Committee to King County Ordinance No. 3812, which amended the Highline Community Plan to permit Boeing's construction of an office building and heliport on 30 acres of Port of Seattle land previously designated as open space west of Sea-Tac Airport. The Washington Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's decision upholding the ordinance. The court held that the council's amendment was a legislative act revising a comprehensive land-use plan rather than a quasi-judicial rezone, so it was not required to show mistake or changed circumstances and was reviewable only for arbitrary or capricious action; the council's process, including environmental review and public hearings, satisfied that standard. The court further ruled that the appearance-of-fairness doctrine did not apply because the proceeding was legislative, not adjudicative.

environmentbusiness & regulatoryprocedure

This case involved a dispute between nursing care facility providers and the Secretary of the Department of Social and Health Services over reimbursement rates for property costs, such as rent, incurred in caring for Medicaid patients. The providers challenged section 58(5) of the 1979-81 general appropriation act, which DSHS interpreted as imposing a lower cap on such reimbursements than under existing statutes (RCW 74.09.120, .580, and .590), along with implementing regulations. The trial court ruled that the section violated the state constitution's requirements that bills contain one subject expressed in the title (art. 2, § 19) and that amendments set forth the full text of the laws being revised (art. 2, § 37), and it voided the regulations as exceeding DSHS authority. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the appropriation provision effectively amended the prior statutes without complying with constitutional procedures for amendments, and that DSHS lacked independent authority to promulgate the regulations limiting reimbursements. The court ordered DSHS to make payments consistent with the existing statutes.

healthcarebusiness & regulatoryprocedure

This case involves a second personal restraint petition filed by a defendant convicted in 1975 of second-degree murder and second-degree assault. The petitioner sought relief based on jury instructions containing presumptions that allegedly shifted the burden of proof, citing Mullaney v. Wilbur, but had not raised this issue at trial, on direct appeal, in a petition for review, or in his prior personal restraint petition, despite the Mullaney decision predating those proceedings. The court denied the petition, holding that under RAP 16.4(d) and precedents such as In re Myers and In re Lee, constitutional claims that were available but not raised in prior proceedings cannot be asserted for the first time in a collateral attack. The decision emphasized the state's interest in finality of judgments and the procedural bars applicable to successive petitions, distinguishing this from direct appeals where manifest constitutional error might be reviewed.

criminal lawprocedure

In Aungst v. Roberts Construction Co., purchasers of camping club memberships brought claims against the non-Indian developer Roberts under Washington's Consumer Protection Act and Securities Act, alleging misrepresentations in sales; Roberts had transferred land to the Tulalip Tribe and structured the club through a tribal corporation, claiming to act as the Tribe's agent to avoid state taxes and jurisdiction. The trial court dismissed the suit, finding Roberts was an agent for a disclosed principal and that the Tribe was an indispensable party not subject to state court jurisdiction. The Washington Supreme Court reversed, holding that the statutory causes of action could proceed directly against Roberts regardless of its agency status, and that the Tribe was not indispensable because a judgment limited to remedies against Roberts, such as damages, could avoid prejudicing the Tribe's or club's contractual rights under CR 19(b).

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case concerned whether a defendant's 1975 conviction for second-degree rape could be admitted to impeach his credibility if he testified at his retrial for first-degree rape, under Washington Rule of Evidence 609. The court held that admissibility falls within the trial court's discretion, subject to ER 609's requirements, and remanded for a proper balancing analysis rather than applying any per se rule. The reasoning centered on ER 609(a)(1), which permits admission of convictions punishable by over one year only if probative value for credibility outweighs prejudice to the defendant, unlike automatic admission for crimes of dishonesty under (a)(2); the trial court must weigh factors including the nature of the prior crime, remoteness, centrality of credibility, and the defendant's need to testify, without presuming admissibility based solely on the similarity of the offenses.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Theroff, a farmer was charged with first-degree murder after fatally shooting a trespasser during a confrontation on posted land and was convicted by a jury of second-degree felony murder based on second-degree assault, with a special finding that he was armed with a deadly weapon. The trial court imposed an enhanced sentence under firearm and deadly weapon statutes, but the Washington Supreme Court affirmed the conviction while reversing the enhancement. The court held that due process requires the state to allege intent to seek enhanced penalties specifically in the information to provide notice to the defendant, and failure to do so in either the original or amended information precluded application of the enhancement statutes, citing prior precedent in State v. Cosner. The case was remanded for resentencing without the mandatory minimum term.

criminal lawprocedure

This case consolidated personal restraint petitions from five individuals convicted as habitual criminals under Washington law, each seeking to challenge the use of prior convictions obtained through guilty pleas that allegedly failed to inform them of their rights, as permitted by the recent decision in State v. Holsworth. The Supreme Court of Washington addressed whether such petitions could raise these constitutional challenges for the first time after the convictions had been affirmed on direct appeal. The court held that four of the petitioners (Lee, Hemphill, Greene, and Thompson) could not use this collateral attack because they had not objected to the prior convictions during their habitual criminal proceedings or appeals, effectively waiving the issue, and denied their petitions. For the fifth petitioner (Malone), who had timely raised the objection at trial, the court granted the petition and remanded for further factual review of the plea validity under Holsworth standards. The core reasoning centered on principles of waiver and the limited scope of personal restraint petitions for issues not preserved earlier in the criminal process.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a divorced couple's disputes over child custody modifications, visitation rights, and payment of accrued child support for their minor children after two sons began living with their father instead of returning to their mother. The trial court changed custody of one son to the father, increased support payments for the daughter, modified the father's visitation schedule, and ordered payment of back support without credit for direct expenditures by the father; the Court of Appeals affirmed most of these rulings but remanded the back-support credit issue. The Washington Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals in full, holding that child support installments vest as judgments under RCW 26.09.170 and generally cannot be retrospectively modified, though equitable special circumstances may allow limited credits for direct payments to or on behalf of a child if they cause no injustice to the custodial parent. The court endorsed consideration of specific factors for the credit determination and noted that any visitation reduction must align with statutory best-interests and endangerment findings under RCW 26.09.240.

family law

The case concerned whether a recorded agreement granting a first right of refusal to purchase real property violated the rule against perpetuities or rules against restraints on alienation. The Washington Supreme Court reversed the trial court and Court of Appeals, holding that the preemptive right did not invalidate the agreement. The court reasoned that unlike an option, a right of first refusal does not compel a sale and thus does not create the same indirect restraint on alienation or remote vesting issues addressed by the rules.

property

This case concerns whether newly created superior court judicial positions in Washington counties, set to become effective on January 1, 1981, could be filled through elections in 1980. The plaintiffs sought writs of mandate to compel county auditors to accept candidate filings for these positions. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial courts' denial of the writs, holding that vacancies in the new positions do not arise until the legislation takes effect on January 1, 1981, pursuant to constitutional and statutory provisions requiring gubernatorial appointment followed by election at the next general election after the vacancy occurs. The court reasoned that the effective date specified in the legislation controls when the positions are created and vacancies arise, and the veto of a section attempting to mandate 1980 elections did not alter this outcome.

electionsprocedure

This case concerned whether five new King County Superior Court judicial positions, created by Laws of 1980, ch. 183 and effective January 1, 1981, after county council approval, could be filled via the 1980 election. Petitioner Thomas Fain brought an original action to block declarations of candidacy and the election for these positions. The Washington Supreme Court held that the Governor's veto of the bill's language requiring 1980 elections was valid under Const. art. 3, § 12 (amendment 62), as it excised an entire independent section. As a result, the positions could not be filled through the elective process in 1980, consistent with precedent in Hallin v. Trent. The ruling turned on the separability of the vetoed subject matter from the core creation of the new judicial positions.

electionsprocedure