The case concerned consolidated challenges to ordinances in Snohomish and San Juan Counties that required developers to pay fees on new residential subdivisions and housing proposals to offset increased demand for parks, schools, roads, fire protection, and other services caused by population growth. The court held that the payments, though labeled fees, were taxes because their primary purpose was to raise revenue rather than to regulate development, and that the counties lacked authority to impose them. The core reasoning was that counties are limited to powers expressly or impliedly granted by the constitution or Legislature, and RCW 58.17.110 authorizes conditioning plat approval on the availability of facilities or dedication of land but does not permit taxation to fund those services. The ordinances were therefore invalid, and plaintiffs who paid the fees under compulsion were entitled to refunds.

taxespropertybusiness & regulatory

In State v. Leach, the defendant was convicted of second-degree burglary and attempted theft based on evidence seized during a warrantless search of his business office, which was conducted after his girlfriend and business partner provided consent and unlocked the premises while the defendant was present and under arrest. The defendant challenged the search under the Fourth Amendment and the Washington Constitution, arguing that the third-party consent was invalid given his superior control over the office. The Washington Supreme Court held that a warrantless search based on third-party consent is invalid when the person with greater authority over the premises is present and able to object, requiring police to obtain that individual's consent as well; the case was remanded for further factual findings on whether the defendant had objected. The court's reasoning relied on the principle that warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable absent a recognized exception, drawing from U.S. Supreme Court precedent in United States v. Matlock that limits the validity of third-party consent to situations where the cohabitant is absent.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Stewart, the defendant was convicted of six counts of second-degree burglary based in part on confessions he made to police while in custody. After being arraigned on an unrelated robbery charge and requesting counsel, Stewart was questioned by different detectives on the burglary matters, advised of his Miranda rights, waived them, and confessed; the trial court admitted the statements, leading to conviction. The Court of Appeals reversed three convictions but affirmed the others, and the Washington Supreme Court granted review. The court held that Stewart's Fifth Amendment right to counsel was not violated because that right is distinct from the Sixth Amendment right invoked at arraignment, and a valid Miranda waiver permitted the interrogation on unrelated charges. The decision reversed the Court of Appeals in part, allowing all convictions to stand.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved defendant Michael MacMaster's conviction for vehicular homicide after his vehicle struck and killed a pedestrian on a Washington highway in 1985. MacMaster challenged the conviction on the ground that the jury instructions did not require proof of a causal connection between his intoxication and the fatal accident. The Washington Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, holding that the vehicular homicide statute requires the state to prove the defendant's drinking proximately caused the victim's death. The court found the given instructions inadequate because they did not clearly convey this proximate-cause element to the jury.

criminal lawprocedure

Nancy Bulaich sued her former employer AT&T alleging she was terminated or constructively discharged on the basis of gender or age in violation of Washington's law against discrimination and company personnel policies. A jury returned a verdict for AT&T, finding she was neither terminated nor forced to retire. The Washington Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in instructing the jury that an employer must have deliberately created the conditions leading to resignation for constructive discharge liability to attach and did not abuse its discretion by admitting evidence of AT&T's post-termination offers of reinstatement as relevant to the employer's intent. The court did not reach the question of whether evidence of the successor employee's performance was admissible.

labor & employmentcivil rightsprocedure

In this negligence case, Marie Robinson sued Safeway Stores after being injured by a falling display rack in a Seattle grocery store. A jury awarded her $9,278.31 in damages, but the trial court found that the jury foreman had committed misconduct by concealing his prior lawsuit with a California resident and expressing bias against Californians during deliberations, leading to an inadequate verdict; it therefore ordered additur to $27,000 or a new trial on damages. The Court of Appeals reversed and directed reinstatement of the original verdict. The Washington Supreme Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering a new trial due to the proven juror bias and nondisclosure during voir dire, but that additur was improper because the verdict was within the range of credible evidence and thus not unmistakably the product of passion or prejudice on its face. The court therefore reversed in part and remanded for a new trial limited to damages.

proceduretorts & liability