Vernon Robert Pearson

The case concerned consolidated challenges to ordinances in Snohomish and San Juan Counties that required developers to pay fees on new residential subdivisions and housing proposals to offset increased demand for parks, schools, roads, fire protection, and other services caused by population growth. The court held that the payments, though labeled fees, were taxes because their primary purpose was to raise revenue rather than to regulate development, and that the counties lacked authority to impose them. The core reasoning was that counties are limited to powers expressly or impliedly granted by the constitution or Legislature, and RCW 58.17.110 authorizes conditioning plat approval on the availability of facilities or dedication of land but does not permit taxation to fund those services. The ordinances were therefore invalid, and plaintiffs who paid the fees under compulsion were entitled to refunds.

taxespropertybusiness & regulatory

In State v. Leach, the defendant was convicted of second-degree burglary and attempted theft based on evidence seized during a warrantless search of his business office, which was conducted after his girlfriend and business partner provided consent and unlocked the premises while the defendant was present and under arrest. The defendant challenged the search under the Fourth Amendment and the Washington Constitution, arguing that the third-party consent was invalid given his superior control over the office. The Washington Supreme Court held that a warrantless search based on third-party consent is invalid when the person with greater authority over the premises is present and able to object, requiring police to obtain that individual's consent as well; the case was remanded for further factual findings on whether the defendant had objected. The court's reasoning relied on the principle that warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable absent a recognized exception, drawing from U.S. Supreme Court precedent in United States v. Matlock that limits the validity of third-party consent to situations where the cohabitant is absent.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Stewart, the defendant was convicted of six counts of second-degree burglary based in part on confessions he made to police while in custody. After being arraigned on an unrelated robbery charge and requesting counsel, Stewart was questioned by different detectives on the burglary matters, advised of his Miranda rights, waived them, and confessed; the trial court admitted the statements, leading to conviction. The Court of Appeals reversed three convictions but affirmed the others, and the Washington Supreme Court granted review. The court held that Stewart's Fifth Amendment right to counsel was not violated because that right is distinct from the Sixth Amendment right invoked at arraignment, and a valid Miranda waiver permitted the interrogation on unrelated charges. The decision reversed the Court of Appeals in part, allowing all convictions to stand.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved defendant Michael MacMaster's conviction for vehicular homicide after his vehicle struck and killed a pedestrian on a Washington highway in 1985. MacMaster challenged the conviction on the ground that the jury instructions did not require proof of a causal connection between his intoxication and the fatal accident. The Washington Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, holding that the vehicular homicide statute requires the state to prove the defendant's drinking proximately caused the victim's death. The court found the given instructions inadequate because they did not clearly convey this proximate-cause element to the jury.

criminal lawprocedure

Nancy Bulaich sued her former employer AT&T alleging she was terminated or constructively discharged on the basis of gender or age in violation of Washington's law against discrimination and company personnel policies. A jury returned a verdict for AT&T, finding she was neither terminated nor forced to retire. The Washington Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in instructing the jury that an employer must have deliberately created the conditions leading to resignation for constructive discharge liability to attach and did not abuse its discretion by admitting evidence of AT&T's post-termination offers of reinstatement as relevant to the employer's intent. The court did not reach the question of whether evidence of the successor employee's performance was admissible.

labor & employmentcivil rightsprocedure

In this negligence case, Marie Robinson sued Safeway Stores after being injured by a falling display rack in a Seattle grocery store. A jury awarded her $9,278.31 in damages, but the trial court found that the jury foreman had committed misconduct by concealing his prior lawsuit with a California resident and expressing bias against Californians during deliberations, leading to an inadequate verdict; it therefore ordered additur to $27,000 or a new trial on damages. The Court of Appeals reversed and directed reinstatement of the original verdict. The Washington Supreme Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering a new trial due to the proven juror bias and nondisclosure during voir dire, but that additur was improper because the verdict was within the range of credible evidence and thus not unmistakably the product of passion or prejudice on its face. The court therefore reversed in part and remanded for a new trial limited to damages.

proceduretorts & liability

In Lynch v. Deaconess Medical Center, attorney Lynch sued Deaconess Hospital seeking compensation for legal services he provided to his client Ms. Tenney in recovering insurance payments from MSC for her medical bills, which resulted in the hospital receiving funds for an account it had previously written off. The trial court granted summary judgment to Deaconess, and the Washington Supreme Court affirmed on direct review. The court held that no express or implied contract existed between Lynch and Deaconess, and Deaconess was not unjustly enriched because it received only the amount owed for services provided to Tenney. The court further concluded that equitable subrogation and the common fund doctrine did not apply to create liability in this debtor-creditor relationship.

procedurehealthcare

The case concerned whether Financial Pacific Leasing, Inc. (FPL), a company engaged in purchasing and leasing personal property, qualified as an 'other financial institution' under RCW 82.14A.010, which would entitle it to the lower retail sales rate for business and occupation taxes imposed by the City of Tacoma, consistent with prior precedent treating banks' leasing activities the same as under state law. The trial court ruled that FPL was not a financial institution but held that the differing tax rates violated equal protection. On appeal, the Washington Supreme Court affirmed that FPL did not meet the statutory definitions of a financial institution, which are limited to banks, trust companies, savings and loan associations, and similar entities, and reversed on equal protection, finding that leasing corporations are a distinct class from banks and that the tax distinction has a rational basis in the need for uniform taxation of banks' varied activities. The court therefore held that FPL was not entitled to the lower tax rate or a refund.

taxesbusiness & regulatory

The case involved a dispute over title to approximately half an acre of land in Clallam County, Washington, where ITT Rayonier, the record owner since 1947, sought to quiet title, eject defendant Arthur Bell, and recover damages for trespass. Bell, who moored a houseboat adjacent to the land, claimed ownership through adverse possession for more than the required 10-year statutory period. The trial court granted partial summary judgment quieting title in ITT's favor, which the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Washington Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, holding that Bell failed to establish the element of exclusive possession because others used the land without his exclusion and with his apparent permission. The court also reaffirmed that the hostility element of adverse possession depends only on objective treatment of the land as one's own, without regard to the claimant's subjective belief or good faith intent.

property

This case consolidated two disputes involving claims for uninsured motorist (UIM) benefits under automobile insurance policies issued by Safeco. The primary issue was whether the 3-year tort statute of limitations or the 6-year contract statute of limitations applies to such claims. The Washington Supreme Court held that the 6-year contract statute applies because the insurer's obligation arises from the insurance contract, and the limitation period begins upon breach of that contract. In Barcom, the Court of Appeals' decision applying the contract statute was affirmed, while in Bowers, the decision applying the tort statute was reversed.

proceduretorts & liability

The case involved an inmate at the Washington State Penitentiary challenging a disciplinary finding that he possessed a knife discovered in his shared cell, resulting in sanctions including loss of good time credits under the prison's "cell tag" regulation, which presumes all cell occupants' involvement unless they prove otherwise. The court affirmed the disciplinary board's decision, holding that the regulation did not violate the inmate's substantive due process rights. It reasoned that prison disciplinary proceedings require only "some evidence" to satisfy due process under federal standards, that constructive possession provided the necessary connection between the inmate and the contraband, and that the policy served important penological interests in prison safety by encouraging inmates to prevent contraband in shared spaces.

criminal lawcivil rights

The case involved Dennis Herzog, convicted of first-degree rape in Washington state court. At sentencing, the trial court declined to use a prior West German rape conviction in calculating the offender score because it was obtained through an unconstitutional two-juror process, but it considered the underlying facts of that offense (detailed in the presentence report) to impose the maximum sentence within the recalculated standard range. The Washington Supreme Court affirmed, ruling that RCW 9.94A.210(1) generally bars appeals of sentences within the standard range, that the invalid conviction could not affect scoring, but that the court could rely on undisputed facts from the foreign case in exercising its discretion within the range without violating due process under RCW 9.94A.370(2).

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a dispute among the partners of Campus Park Associates Limited Partnership, in which approximately 50 limited partners sued their general partner, ERADCO, alleging breaches of the partnership agreement and fiduciary duties such as failing to provide audited financials, pay taxes, maintain reserves, keep accurate records, and improperly using partnership funds as collateral. After 74.4 percent of the limited partners voted by proxy to remove ERADCO and install a successor, ERADCO challenged the removal as invalid, sought reinstatement or dissolution, and requested specific performance of a clause entitling it to a 25 percent interest in partnership profits. The court decided that the removal was valid under the agreement even without a meeting or notice to all partners, that ERADCO was not entitled to the 25 percent share because of its fiduciary breaches, and that the partnership should not be dissolved, while also holding that parties could properly rely on the trial court ruling until the appellate mandate issued. The core reasoning rested on the plain language of the partnership agreement permitting proxy voting without a meeting and on the principle that a breaching fiduciary is not entitled to equitable relief like specific performance.

business & regulatory

This case concerns whether an assignee of a commercial lease remains liable for unlawful detainer after defaulting on rent payments for office space. The trial court dismissed claims against assignee Martin Selig, finding the assignment ineffective due to lack of written landlord consent or that a later suspension agreement terminated any landlord-tenant relationship, and the Court of Appeals affirmed on alternative grounds. The Washington Supreme Court reversed, holding that Selig assumed all rights and duties under the lease and remained in privity of estate with the landlord despite any sublease or suspension agreement, so he could still be liable as a tenant in possession after the rent default. The court remanded for a factual determination on whether possession was ever tendered to extinguish that privity and reversed the attorney fee awards to Selig, directing fees to the prevailing party on remand under the lease terms.

propertyprocedurebusiness & regulatory

The case concerned a subpoena issued by a Washington State Senate committee, through the Lieutenant Governor, seeking all confidential records from the Commission on Judicial Conduct regarding Judge Gary Little to investigate possible improvements to the commission's structure. The court held that the subpoena must be quashed. The core reasoning was that the state constitution (article 4, section 31) and implementing statute (RCW 2.64.110) require the commission to adopt and follow rules protecting the confidentiality of its proceedings, and a legislative subpoena cannot be used to compel disclosure in violation of those rules. The opinion emphasized that the commission's confidentiality obligations, enacted pursuant to both constitutional and legislative directives, take precedence over the committee's investigative demands in this context.

procedure

In Martin v. City of Seattle, successors to the original grantor sued the City to enforce conditions subsequent in a 1908 deed conveying land for a boulevard, which required the City to permit a private boathouse on adjacent shorelands and to acquire and retain those shorelands for that purpose. The City had obtained title to the shorelands from the state in 1913 subject to public park and boulevard restrictions, and refused permission for the boathouse in 1983, prompting the plaintiffs to declare a reentry and seek damages. The trial court and Court of Appeals ruled for the plaintiffs, finding a breach and an unconstitutional taking, but the Washington Supreme Court reversed. The court held that any power of termination had to be exercised within a reasonable time after a breach to prevent indefinite clouding of titles, and the 75-year delay here barred enforcement.

property

The case concerned whether Safeco Insurance violated its duty of good faith under Washington law when it nonrenewed the Armstrongs' automobile insurance policy after citing claims frequency and an old speeding citation. The Armstrongs argued that nonrenewal was improper because their claims arose from third-party fault, comprehensive coverage incidents, or events predating prior renewals. The Washington Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the trial court's grant of summary judgment to Safeco. The court reasoned that RCW 48.18.292 permits nonrenewal upon timely notice stating the actual reason, imposes no requirement of culpable conduct or actuarial risk by the insured, excludes only comprehensive claims as a basis, and does not treat prior renewals as a waiver of the right to consider qualifying past claims.

business & regulatory

This case concerns an eminent domain action in which the State of Washington acquired 190 acres for highway construction and deposited $575,000 into court as its offer of just compensation under a stipulated order for immediate possession. Lien creditors received disbursements from that deposit pursuant to stipulations, but a jury later determined the fair market value to be only $391,000. The trial court entered judgment requiring the State to be repaid the $184,000 difference and ordering the creditors to return portions of the funds they had withdrawn. The court reasoned that RCW 8.04.092 expressly entitles the State to such repayment when respondents have accepted and withdrawn the tendered amount, and that the creditors' participation in the disbursement order placed them on notice of potential liability regardless of whether they themselves demanded a valuation trial.

propertyprocedure

This case was a declaratory judgment action brought by Transcontinental Insurance Company and Columbia Casualty Company against the Washington Public Utility Districts' Utility System (WPUDUS) to determine whether two excess liability insurance policies provided coverage for WPUDUS members' potential liability in numerous lawsuits arising from the Washington Public Power Supply System's $2.25 billion bond default. The complaints in those underlying suits alleged securities violations, fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of contract. The Washington Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's ruling that the 1982-83 policy afforded coverage and reversed its ruling that the 1981-82 policy did not, holding that the complaints alleged facts that, if proved, would constitute an "occurrence" resulting in "property damage" during both policy periods under the policies' definitions. The court further held that Transcontinental's denial of coverage was not unreasonable and therefore did not violate the Consumer Protection Act.

business & regulatorytorts & liability

In Johnson v. Schafer, the case involved a 1983 accident in which 14-year-old Michael Russell, riding a motorcycle without a license on a private gravel road owned by defendants Harry and Troyce Schafer, struck a steel cable strung across the road and killed his passenger Briann Gattenby. Russell's guardian ad litem sued the Schafers for wanton misconduct after the trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants; the Court of Appeals reversed, but the Washington Supreme Court reversed again and reinstated judgment for the Schafers. The court held that landowners owe trespassers (as Russell was found to be) no duty except to avoid willful or wanton injury, and the evidence showed the Schafers had posted "Private Property" and "No Trespassing" signs plus yellow ribbons on the cable, with no proof they knew or should have known their actions created a high probability of substantial harm. The majority reasoned that any deterioration in the warnings amounted only to negligence or inadvertence, not the intentional reckless disregard required for wanton misconduct, and that the guardian failed to present facts creating a genuine issue for trial under CR 56(c).

torts & liabilitypropertyprocedure