Charles F. Stafford

The case involved Ivy Gail Kelly's conviction for second degree murder after she shot and killed her husband, which she claimed was in self-defense based on a history of abuse and expert testimony about the battered woman syndrome. The trial court allowed the State to introduce rebuttal evidence of Kelly's prior aggressive acts toward others to counter the expert's descriptions of her isolation and learned helplessness, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Washington Supreme Court reversed, holding that such specific acts were not admissible to rebut the expert testimony on the syndrome under evidence rules governing character and rebuttal. The court also found no abuse of discretion in denying funds to transport a defense medical witness. The decision turned on the limits of rebuttal evidence when the defendant introduces syndrome testimony in a self-defense case.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a products liability suit by Alice Davis, who was injured while cleaning a used glue-spreading machine manufactured by Globe Machine Manufacturing Co. in the 1950s or early 1960s; she sued on theories of strict liability and negligence after her arm was amputated in the machine's rollers at her workplace. The trial court dismissed the negligence claim for lack of evidence and submitted only the strict liability claim to the jury, which returned a verdict for Globe after finding the product was not unreasonably unsafe. The Washington Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in dismissing negligence, in its jury instructions on post-sale duties and assumption of risk, or in admitting evidence of a defense verdict from a similar prior case involving the same machine type, as these rulings were within the court's discretion and supported by the record. The opinion notes the case predated Washington's products liability statute and focused on common-law standards for design defects and warnings.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved Hewson Construction seeking payment for sidewalks it installed in a King County subdivision after developer Reintree defaulted on the contract. Hewson filed liens on the subdivision lots, claimed rights under a performance bond posted by Reintree for plat approval, and sought to remove the sidewalks. The court held that Hewson had no valid liens because Reintree was not acting as an agent of the lot owners when contracting for the work, and Hewson had no claim as a beneficiary of the bond since the County had not accepted the sidewalks or released the bond. However, the court ruled that Hewson could remove the sidewalks after first offering to sell them to the County, as the sidewalks were not yet public property. The reasoning centered on the lack of any obligation by the owners creating agency, the bond's conditions not being met, and application of the removal statute to improvements made on dedicated but unaccepted property.

propertybusiness & regulatory

The case involved two federally recognized Indian tribes in Washington that adopted their own vehicle licensing systems for tribal government vehicles and sought reciprocal exemption from state licensing requirements under RCW 46.85.080. The tribes sued after the state refused to recognize their plates or provide reciprocal treatment, leading a federal district court to enjoin enforcement of state laws against the tribes on the ground that tribes qualified as "jurisdictions." On certification from the Ninth Circuit, the Washington Supreme Court held that Indian tribes are not "jurisdictions" within the meaning of the statute's definition, which covers states, territories, possessions, and similar entities. The court reasoned that tribes are unique sovereigns (sui generis) not expressly included in the reciprocity provisions, and the legislature's practice of naming tribes specifically in other statutes indicated that their omission here was intentional.

federal powercivil rights

The case involved Frederick H. Kevin Coe, who was charged in Spokane County Superior Court with five counts of first degree rape and one count of second degree rape, and convicted of four counts of first degree rape. Coe appealed on multiple grounds, including the improper admission of a prior misdemeanor theft conviction for impeachment, the introduction of evidence about his prior sexual relationship and an uncharged incident, cross-examination on his writings, requiring him to repeat statements in court, limited discovery, the admission of testimony from hypnotized witnesses, and a jury instruction on reasonable doubt. The Washington Supreme Court reversed the convictions and remanded for a new trial. It held that evidence of the prior theft conviction and related letter was inadmissible under ER 609 because theft does not involve dishonesty, that certain other evidentiary rulings and discovery violations were improper, and that an instruction using the term "substantial doubt" was problematic though not independently reversible; the accumulation of errors necessitated reversal.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Bruce Rhoads's conviction for first degree rape, which the Court of Appeals had affirmed. Rhoads challenged the sufficiency of the evidence regarding nonmarriage and sexual intercourse, the trial court's admission of a prior assault conviction for impeachment without recording its reasoning under ER 609(a), and whether he received ineffective assistance of counsel. The Washington Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that circumstantial evidence sufficed for the elements, that the requirement to record reasons for admitting prior convictions was a new non-retroactive rule, and that counsel's actions did not constitute ineffective assistance.

criminal lawprocedure