Charles F. Stafford

The case involved Ivy Gail Kelly's conviction for second degree murder after she shot and killed her husband, which she claimed was in self-defense based on a history of abuse and expert testimony about the battered woman syndrome. The trial court allowed the State to introduce rebuttal evidence of Kelly's prior aggressive acts toward others to counter the expert's descriptions of her isolation and learned helplessness, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Washington Supreme Court reversed, holding that such specific acts were not admissible to rebut the expert testimony on the syndrome under evidence rules governing character and rebuttal. The court also found no abuse of discretion in denying funds to transport a defense medical witness. The decision turned on the limits of rebuttal evidence when the defendant introduces syndrome testimony in a self-defense case.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a products liability suit by Alice Davis, who was injured while cleaning a used glue-spreading machine manufactured by Globe Machine Manufacturing Co. in the 1950s or early 1960s; she sued on theories of strict liability and negligence after her arm was amputated in the machine's rollers at her workplace. The trial court dismissed the negligence claim for lack of evidence and submitted only the strict liability claim to the jury, which returned a verdict for Globe after finding the product was not unreasonably unsafe. The Washington Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in dismissing negligence, in its jury instructions on post-sale duties and assumption of risk, or in admitting evidence of a defense verdict from a similar prior case involving the same machine type, as these rulings were within the court's discretion and supported by the record. The opinion notes the case predated Washington's products liability statute and focused on common-law standards for design defects and warnings.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved Hewson Construction seeking payment for sidewalks it installed in a King County subdivision after developer Reintree defaulted on the contract. Hewson filed liens on the subdivision lots, claimed rights under a performance bond posted by Reintree for plat approval, and sought to remove the sidewalks. The court held that Hewson had no valid liens because Reintree was not acting as an agent of the lot owners when contracting for the work, and Hewson had no claim as a beneficiary of the bond since the County had not accepted the sidewalks or released the bond. However, the court ruled that Hewson could remove the sidewalks after first offering to sell them to the County, as the sidewalks were not yet public property. The reasoning centered on the lack of any obligation by the owners creating agency, the bond's conditions not being met, and application of the removal statute to improvements made on dedicated but unaccepted property.

propertybusiness & regulatory

The case involved two federally recognized Indian tribes in Washington that adopted their own vehicle licensing systems for tribal government vehicles and sought reciprocal exemption from state licensing requirements under RCW 46.85.080. The tribes sued after the state refused to recognize their plates or provide reciprocal treatment, leading a federal district court to enjoin enforcement of state laws against the tribes on the ground that tribes qualified as "jurisdictions." On certification from the Ninth Circuit, the Washington Supreme Court held that Indian tribes are not "jurisdictions" within the meaning of the statute's definition, which covers states, territories, possessions, and similar entities. The court reasoned that tribes are unique sovereigns (sui generis) not expressly included in the reciprocity provisions, and the legislature's practice of naming tribes specifically in other statutes indicated that their omission here was intentional.

federal powercivil rights

The case involved Frederick H. Kevin Coe, who was charged in Spokane County Superior Court with five counts of first degree rape and one count of second degree rape, and convicted of four counts of first degree rape. Coe appealed on multiple grounds, including the improper admission of a prior misdemeanor theft conviction for impeachment, the introduction of evidence about his prior sexual relationship and an uncharged incident, cross-examination on his writings, requiring him to repeat statements in court, limited discovery, the admission of testimony from hypnotized witnesses, and a jury instruction on reasonable doubt. The Washington Supreme Court reversed the convictions and remanded for a new trial. It held that evidence of the prior theft conviction and related letter was inadmissible under ER 609 because theft does not involve dishonesty, that certain other evidentiary rulings and discovery violations were improper, and that an instruction using the term "substantial doubt" was problematic though not independently reversible; the accumulation of errors necessitated reversal.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Bruce Rhoads's conviction for first degree rape, which the Court of Appeals had affirmed. Rhoads challenged the sufficiency of the evidence regarding nonmarriage and sexual intercourse, the trial court's admission of a prior assault conviction for impeachment without recording its reasoning under ER 609(a), and whether he received ineffective assistance of counsel. The Washington Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that circumstantial evidence sufficed for the elements, that the requirement to record reasons for admitting prior convictions was a new non-retroactive rule, and that counsel's actions did not constitute ineffective assistance.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a workers' compensation claim by Edward Sisson, who developed allergic bronchitis and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease from his employment at Blue Chelan, Inc. The Department of Labor and Industries awarded him partial disability compensation, but the Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals found him totally and permanently disabled based on his medical condition, age, and limited work history. A jury in superior court answered special interrogatories inconsistently, finding both that Sisson was not totally and permanently disabled and that he was incapable of obtaining gainful employment on a reasonably continuous basis. The Washington Supreme Court held that the interrogatories formed a special verdict whose answers could not be reconciled under the statutory definition of permanent total disability, requiring reversal of the trial court's judgment and remand for a new trial.

labor & employmentprocedure

The case concerned a wrongful death lawsuit filed by a new personal representative on behalf of the four minor children of Jack Bright, who died by suicide in 1976 after receiving medical treatment from Samaritan Hospital and its doctors. The trial court granted summary judgment dismissing the suit as untimely under the three-year statute of limitations, and the Washington Supreme Court affirmed. The court held that the limitations period is not tolled during the minority of the statutory beneficiaries. Its reasoning was that wrongful death actions may be brought only by the personal representative under RCW 4.20.010 and .020, so the tolling statute (RCW 4.16.190) applies solely if that representative is under a disability, not the children who are the beneficiaries.

torts & liabilityprocedurehealthcare

In State v. Russell, the defendant was initially charged with premeditated first degree murder and other offenses, acquitted of the first degree murder charge, and the jury hung on the lesser included intentional second degree murder and related charges involving the victim's wife, leading to a mistrial. On retrial, the State amended the information to charge intentional second degree murder and added second degree felony murder as an alternative means based on an underlying assault. The Washington Supreme Court held that double jeopardy does not bar retrial after a hung jury under established precedent, but the late addition of the related felony murder charge violated CrR 4.3(c) joinder requirements for related offenses, and the non-unanimous verdict form on the alternative means of second degree murder created an insoluble ambiguity requiring reversal. The court remanded for a new trial solely on the intentional second degree murder charge.

criminal lawprocedure

In these consolidated cases, the Washington Supreme Court addressed the admissibility of prior felony convictions to impeach a defendant's credibility under ER 609(a)(1) in two criminal trials. Jones was convicted of second-degree burglary after the trial court allowed evidence of his prior drug and weapon convictions, while Young was convicted of first-degree robbery after admission of his prior larceny, forgery, and escape convictions. The court set out balancing guidelines for trial courts exercising discretion under the rule and applied a constitutional harmless-error standard to assess prejudice. It affirmed Jones's convictions because any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt but reversed Young's conviction and remanded for a new trial, finding the admission of his convictions was not harmless.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Burton, the defendant was convicted of first-degree robbery after the trial court permitted the State to impeach his alibi testimony using prior misdemeanor convictions for petit larceny and shoplifting under Evidence Rule 609(a)(2). The Washington Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, holding that these convictions were inadmissible because the crimes did not involve dishonesty or false statement within the meaning of ER 609(a)(2). The court explained that the rule, adopted from the federal Rules of Evidence, requires a narrow construction limited to offenses entailing deceit, unlike the prior Washington statute that mandated admission of all convictions.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved the State of Washington suing several Spokane real estate brokers for allegedly combining to eliminate price competition in violation of RCW 19.86.030 and engaging in unfair methods of competition under RCW 19.86.020, plus one broker's alleged violation of a 1974 consent decree, all arising from their reactions to a competitor's flat-fee listing program through the multiple listing service. The trial court ruled that the brokers' conduct did not violate the unfair competition statute and awarded attorney's fees to the prevailing defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed the finding of no violation of RCW 19.86.020 and the fee award under RCW 19.86.080, but reversed the ruling on the consent decree, remanding for further determination of that issue and adjustment of fees accordingly, based on the absence of evidence showing a conspiracy or unfair practices in publishing commission rates and splits.

business & regulatoryprocedure

In State v. Cameron, the defendant was charged with the premeditated first-degree murder of his stepmother after stabbing her over 70 times; his primary defense was insanity, based on evidence that he believed she was engaged in sorcery and witchcraft and that his actions were justified or commanded in the eyes of God. The trial court instructed the jury on insanity using language that defined knowledge of right and wrong as awareness that the act was contrary to law, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the guilty verdict. The Washington Supreme Court reversed, holding that the instruction improperly prevented the jury from considering the defendant's theory of insanity under the deific decree exception recognized in State v. Crenshaw. The court reasoned that the added definitional language limited the insanity standard to legal wrongfulness and excluded relevant evidence of moral or religious perceptions of wrongfulness. The court directed that future insanity cases should use the unmodified standard WPIC 20.01 pattern instruction.

criminal law

The case involved a wrongful death action brought by Arlene Scott, as personal representative of her husband's estate, against Cascade Structures and other parties after Paul Scott fell from a building under construction. Prior to trial, Scott settled with most defendants for $60,000, which the court found reasonable, and the jury later awarded $570,000 in total damages while finding Cascade negligent and attributing 66-2/3% contributory negligence to the decedent. The trial court subtracted the contributory negligence percentage from the verdict first, then deducted the settlement amount, resulting in a $130,000 judgment against Cascade. The Supreme Court of Washington affirmed this computation method under RCW 4.22.060(2) and rejected challenges to the constitutionality of the tort and products liability reform act, RCW 4.22 and 7.72, based on statutory interpretation and legislative history.

torts & liabilityprocedure

In State v. Baeza, the petitioner was convicted of theft of livestock after a calf was found butchered on a farmstead, with witnesses observing two pickup trucks near stray cattle earlier that evening. The petitioner challenged the conviction on appeal, arguing insufficient evidence to support it. The court reviewed the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and determined that no rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the petitioner willfully took, slaughtered, or appropriated the animal with intent to deprive the owner. The only connection to the petitioner was his ownership of one of the trucks seen later near the scene, without any identification of him at the time of the theft or proof of his involvement. As a result, the court reversed the conviction and dismissed the case.

criminal law

The case involved J&B Development Company, which received a building permit from King County for a single-family residence but later had the permit suspended because the construction violated setback requirements due to an error in permit issuance by county employees. The trial court held the county owed no duty of care to J&B and was not liable for damages, but the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the county does owe a duty to exercise reasonable care when issuing building permits. The core reasoning was that the public duty doctrine does not bar such claims, as the permit issuance constitutes a representation that the construction complies with regulations, creating a duty under standard tort principles similar to those applied to private entities under the Restatement (Second) of Torts. The court remanded for further findings on causation, damages, and comparative negligence.

torts & liabilitypropertybusiness & regulatory

The case involved a couple assaulted in Woodinville who made multiple emergency calls to King County police reporting the ongoing incident and assailants' location, but received delayed or no response despite operators' statements that officers were en route. The plaintiffs sued the county, police department, and sheriff, alleging negligent infliction of emotional distress, outrage from extreme conduct, and loss of their potential claims against the assailants due to the one-hour-plus delay. The trial court dismissed all claims under CR 12(b)(6) on grounds that no duty was owed, but the Washington Supreme Court reversed in part, allowing the emotional distress claims while affirming dismissal of the lost-cause-of-action claim. The court reasoned that although the public duty doctrine generally shields police from liability to individuals, a special relationship or actionable duty can arise from specific assurances by operators that induce reliance or under the rescue doctrine.

torts & liabilitycriminal law

This case concerned a divorce proceeding in which the husband died after a trial court issued an oral ruling dissolving the marriage but before written findings, conclusions, and a final decree could be signed and entered. The trial court granted a motion to enter the dissolution decree nunc pro tunc effective before the husband's death, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, but the Washington Supreme Court reversed. The court held that a dissolution decree is not final until signed and entered, that the proceeding abates upon the death of a spouse, and that the inherent common-law power to enter a decree nunc pro tunc exists only to correct clerical or ministerial errors or when required by specific public policy considerations such as validating a subsequent marriage. Because the statutory requirements were not met and no qualifying public policy applied, the nunc pro tunc decree was unauthorized.

family lawprocedure

The case concerned Luis Lavaris, charged with first-degree murder, who challenged the admissibility of his confession made after receiving Miranda warnings. The Washington Supreme Court held that the post-Miranda confession was inadmissible because it followed an unwarned pre-Miranda confession without any insulating factor to separate the two. The court reasoned that once a defendant has disclosed incriminating information, subsequent Miranda warnings alone cannot cure the taint, particularly where the defendant was not informed that prior statements could not be used against him and given his limited English proficiency and illiteracy. The court reversed the Court of Appeals decision upholding the confession and remanded for a new trial.

criminal lawprocedure

This case concerned the City of Kennewick's subcontracting of janitorial work previously covered by a collective bargaining agreement without notifying or bargaining with the union, which led the Public Employment Relations Commission (PERC) to find an unfair labor practice under RCW 41.56.140(4) and issue a remedial order. PERC sought court enforcement of the order under RCW 41.56.190 after the City refused to comply and had not appealed the decision under the Administrative Procedure Act. The City challenged the statute's constitutionality under Const. art. 8, § 5, arguing it authorized improper expenditure of public funds benefiting a private union, and contended the trial court should have reviewed the merits of the unfair labor practice finding. The court held that RCW 41.56.190 is constitutional because it advances a valid public purpose of improving public employer-employee relations, but the trial court erred by enforcing the order without first reviewing the underlying decision on the merits. The reasoning rested on the presumption of statutory validity, acceptance of the legislature's stated purpose unless arbitrary, and the requirement that enforcement proceedings permit merits review absent a prior APA appeal.

labor & employmentprocedure