Robert F. Utter

The consolidated cases in Hall v. Niemer involved tort claims against Whatcom County, Yakima County, and the City of Seattle for alleged negligence in road design/maintenance and building code enforcement, where the plaintiffs had not complied with statutory or charter requirements to file claims within 120 days and wait 60 days before suing. The Washington Supreme Court held that the valid portions of these claim-filing statutes (RCW 36.45 and Seattle City Charter art. 4, § 24) could not be severed from the sections previously ruled unconstitutional on equal protection grounds in Hunter v. North Mason High School. As a result, the entire filing requirements were invalidated, the summary judgments against the plaintiffs were reversed, and the cases were remanded to allow the tort claims to proceed. The core reasoning was that the notice and timing provisions were interdependent and could not stand independently without undermining the legislative scheme.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This consolidated case involved three challenges to local government approvals of subdivision plats or planned developments, where trial courts dismissed writs of review for failure to timely join and serve all necessary parties, such as property owners, within the 30-day statutory period under RCW 58.17.180. The Washington Supreme Court reversed the dismissals in each case. The core reasoning centered on interpretations of procedural rules allowing relation-back amendments under CR 15(c), the lack of prejudice to unserved parties who had actual notice, and a practical application of joinder requirements to permit service within a reasonable time after the initial filing.

propertyprocedure

In State v. Kitchen and two consolidated cases, the Washington Supreme Court examined the proper harmless-error standard for appellate review when multiple acts are presented as possible bases for a single criminal charge and it is unclear whether the jury unanimously agreed on the same underlying act. The court clarified that failure to elect a specific incident or to give a unanimity instruction constitutes constitutional error that is harmless only if no rational trier of fact could have entertained a reasonable doubt that each incident proved the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Applying this standard, the court affirmed reversal of the Kitchen and Coburn convictions because the error could not be deemed harmless, but denied Childress's personal restraint petition on the ground that he failed to demonstrate actual and substantial prejudice to his right to a fair trial.

criminal lawprocedure

This consolidated case involved three defendants convicted of nonsexual offenses (first-degree murder and assault, second-degree assault, and attempted murder with malicious harassment) who received exceptional sentences above the standard range under Washington's Sentencing Reform Act of 1981. The trial courts in each case cited the defendants' future dangerousness as an aggravating factor supporting the longer sentences. The Supreme Court held that future dangerousness may not be used as an aggravating factor to justify exceptional sentences in nonsexual offense cases, reversing or remanding where necessary. The court's reasoning was that the SRA already incorporates an offender's criminal history into the presumptive sentence calculation, and unlike sexual offense cases addressed in prior precedent, there is no statutory basis or legislative exception allowing future dangerousness to support a departure from the standard range in other cases.

criminal law

This case consolidated challenges by three defendants convicted in Seattle Municipal Court departments 4, 5, and 7, who argued that those departments were created unconstitutionally or in violation of state statutes and the city charter, depriving the judges of jurisdiction. The Washington Supreme Court held that RCW 35.20.100 is constitutional under article 4, section 12 of the state constitution, that departments 4 and 5 were validly established through the city's legislative process, and that department 7 was not validly created. The court nonetheless upheld all convictions, reasoning that the judge in department 7 possessed de facto authority and that the other departments were legitimate. The core reasoning turned on distinguishing municipal courts as inferior courts rather than justice-of-the-peace courts and on the city's compliance with statutory requirements for creating additional departments.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Howe and two consolidated cases, juvenile defendants were convicted of second-degree burglary after entering their parents' homes to commit thefts, despite prior parental instructions to stay away. The central issue was whether and under what conditions a parent's directive could revoke a child's privilege to enter the family home, thereby satisfying the unlawful-entry element of burglary under former RCW 9A.52.030. The Washington Supreme Court held that such a conviction is sustainable only if the parent both expressly and unequivocally orders the child out and provides an alternative means of fulfilling the statutory duty of care under RCW 26.20.035, such as through foster placement or other arrangements; otherwise, the child's entry remains privileged. This rule builds on State v. Steinbach by clarifying that the parental duty creates a rebuttable privilege, which can be terminated without court proceedings if the conditions are met, and the court applied it to affirm or reverse the convictions accordingly in each case.

criminal lawfamily law