Robert F. Utter

The consolidated cases in Hall v. Niemer involved tort claims against Whatcom County, Yakima County, and the City of Seattle for alleged negligence in road design/maintenance and building code enforcement, where the plaintiffs had not complied with statutory or charter requirements to file claims within 120 days and wait 60 days before suing. The Washington Supreme Court held that the valid portions of these claim-filing statutes (RCW 36.45 and Seattle City Charter art. 4, § 24) could not be severed from the sections previously ruled unconstitutional on equal protection grounds in Hunter v. North Mason High School. As a result, the entire filing requirements were invalidated, the summary judgments against the plaintiffs were reversed, and the cases were remanded to allow the tort claims to proceed. The core reasoning was that the notice and timing provisions were interdependent and could not stand independently without undermining the legislative scheme.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This consolidated case involved three challenges to local government approvals of subdivision plats or planned developments, where trial courts dismissed writs of review for failure to timely join and serve all necessary parties, such as property owners, within the 30-day statutory period under RCW 58.17.180. The Washington Supreme Court reversed the dismissals in each case. The core reasoning centered on interpretations of procedural rules allowing relation-back amendments under CR 15(c), the lack of prejudice to unserved parties who had actual notice, and a practical application of joinder requirements to permit service within a reasonable time after the initial filing.

propertyprocedure

In State v. Kitchen and two consolidated cases, the Washington Supreme Court examined the proper harmless-error standard for appellate review when multiple acts are presented as possible bases for a single criminal charge and it is unclear whether the jury unanimously agreed on the same underlying act. The court clarified that failure to elect a specific incident or to give a unanimity instruction constitutes constitutional error that is harmless only if no rational trier of fact could have entertained a reasonable doubt that each incident proved the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Applying this standard, the court affirmed reversal of the Kitchen and Coburn convictions because the error could not be deemed harmless, but denied Childress's personal restraint petition on the ground that he failed to demonstrate actual and substantial prejudice to his right to a fair trial.

criminal lawprocedure

This consolidated case involved three defendants convicted of nonsexual offenses (first-degree murder and assault, second-degree assault, and attempted murder with malicious harassment) who received exceptional sentences above the standard range under Washington's Sentencing Reform Act of 1981. The trial courts in each case cited the defendants' future dangerousness as an aggravating factor supporting the longer sentences. The Supreme Court held that future dangerousness may not be used as an aggravating factor to justify exceptional sentences in nonsexual offense cases, reversing or remanding where necessary. The court's reasoning was that the SRA already incorporates an offender's criminal history into the presumptive sentence calculation, and unlike sexual offense cases addressed in prior precedent, there is no statutory basis or legislative exception allowing future dangerousness to support a departure from the standard range in other cases.

criminal law

This case consolidated challenges by three defendants convicted in Seattle Municipal Court departments 4, 5, and 7, who argued that those departments were created unconstitutionally or in violation of state statutes and the city charter, depriving the judges of jurisdiction. The Washington Supreme Court held that RCW 35.20.100 is constitutional under article 4, section 12 of the state constitution, that departments 4 and 5 were validly established through the city's legislative process, and that department 7 was not validly created. The court nonetheless upheld all convictions, reasoning that the judge in department 7 possessed de facto authority and that the other departments were legitimate. The core reasoning turned on distinguishing municipal courts as inferior courts rather than justice-of-the-peace courts and on the city's compliance with statutory requirements for creating additional departments.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Howe and two consolidated cases, juvenile defendants were convicted of second-degree burglary after entering their parents' homes to commit thefts, despite prior parental instructions to stay away. The central issue was whether and under what conditions a parent's directive could revoke a child's privilege to enter the family home, thereby satisfying the unlawful-entry element of burglary under former RCW 9A.52.030. The Washington Supreme Court held that such a conviction is sustainable only if the parent both expressly and unequivocally orders the child out and provides an alternative means of fulfilling the statutory duty of care under RCW 26.20.035, such as through foster placement or other arrangements; otherwise, the child's entry remains privileged. This rule builds on State v. Steinbach by clarifying that the parental duty creates a rebuttable privilege, which can be terminated without court proceedings if the conditions are met, and the court applied it to affirm or reverse the convictions accordingly in each case.

criminal lawfamily law

In State v. Luvene, the defendant was convicted by a jury in Pierce County Superior Court of aggravated first degree murder, attempted first degree murder, and first degree robbery while armed with a deadly weapon, and was sentenced to death following a special sentencing proceeding. On direct review, the Washington Supreme Court affirmed the convictions but overturned the death sentence. The court held that the State failed to file its notice of intent to seek the death penalty within the 30-day period mandated by RCW 10.95.040(2), and it did not demonstrate good cause for the delay, which resulted from simple inadvertence rather than an external or unavoidable reason as required by precedent such as State v. Dearbone. The case was remanded for resentencing to life imprisonment without the possibility of release or parole.

criminal lawprocedure

In Savage v. State, the plaintiff sued the State of Washington claiming negligent supervision by parole officers of a parolee with prior convictions for sexual assaults, who raped the plaintiff after release. The trial court barred the State from asserting the officers' qualified personal immunity, refused a proposed jury instruction on the State's funding limitations, and entered a verdict for the plaintiff; the Court of Appeals reversed on the immunity issue. The Washington Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, holding that qualified personal immunity of parole officers does not extend to the State under a respondeat superior theory, while affirming the denial of the funding instruction. The decision rested on agency law principles distinguishing an agent's personal immunity from the principal's liability, prior precedent such as Taggart and Babcock, and the legislative abrogation of sovereign immunity.

torts & liabilitycriminal law

The case involved All-Pure Chemical Co. seeking contribution from retailer Louise White after All-Pure was held liable in a products liability suit for inadequate warnings on swimming pool chemicals that exploded and injured a customer. The Washington Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the contribution claim, holding that the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) expressly preempts state tort claims based on failure to warn when labels comply with EPA requirements. The court reasoned that since FIFRA preempts the underlying tort liability, there was no joint and several liability to support contribution under state law, and both parties must be liable for the injury for the claim to proceed.

torts & liabilityfederal powerenvironmentbusiness & regulatory

The case concerned Bryan Olson, who was charged with marijuana possession after a search warrant was executed at his home; the trial court suppressed the evidence due to issues with the warrant affidavit and then dismissed the charges at the State's request to enable an appeal. The State filed a notice of appeal from the dismissal order and argued the suppression issue on the merits in its brief, but Olson moved to dismiss the appeal, claiming violations of RAP 10.3(a)(3) and 10.3(g) because the State did not specifically assign error to the suppression order or appeal it directly. The Court of Appeals denied the motion and reached the merits, and the Washington Supreme Court affirmed that denial. The court reasoned that RAP 1.2(a) requires liberal interpretation of the appellate rules to facilitate decisions on the merits rather than on technical noncompliance, particularly where the violation is minor, causes no prejudice, and the challenged issues are clear from the record and filings.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned Timothy Warner, who as a 16-year-old juvenile pleaded guilty to one count of first-degree child rape and was ordered into intensive sex offender treatment that required him to disclose all prior victims. While in treatment he revealed additional victims, and after turning 18 he was charged with five counts of first-degree child rape based on those disclosures. The trial court dismissed four of the counts, concluding that using statements made during court-ordered juvenile treatment to prosecute the offender as an adult violated due process. The Washington Supreme Court reversed that dismissal, holding that the use of the disclosures did not violate due process because Warner received warnings that the information could be shared with authorities and had no reasonable expectation of confidentiality, and it remanded the case for further proceedings while rejecting the separate claim of pre-accusatorial delay.

criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure

This case concerned a refund received by Cascade Natural Gas from its interstate supplier Northwest Pipeline after a Federal Energy Regulatory Commission rate proceeding, and how that refund should be distributed to Cascade's customers under oversight by the Washington Utilities and Transportation Commission. The Commission approved formulas that passed the refund to Cascade's current core and noncore customers through prospective rate reductions, excluding former industrial customers who had bypassed the system to connect directly to the interstate pipeline. The trial court reversed the Commission and directed lump-sum payments to the former customers, but the Washington Supreme Court reversed the trial court. The court held that the Commission acted within its statutory authority in approving the distribution method, which reasonably allocated the refund to present customers consistent with standard utility ratemaking practices.

business & regulatory

In State v. Alexander, the defendant was convicted of delivering a controlled substance after selling a very small amount of cocaine to an undercover officer and was sentenced under Washington's Sentencing Reform Act. The trial court imposed an exceptional downward sentence of 18 months instead of the standard 36-month range, citing the minimal quantity of drugs, the defendant's low level of sophistication and involvement, and his peripheral role in the drug hierarchy. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that these factors did not justify departure from the standard range. The Washington Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the exceptional sentence, reasoning that the trial court's factual findings were verities on appeal and that the cited mitigating circumstances constituted substantial and compelling reasons under RCW 9.94A.120(2) for a downward departure.

criminal law

This case involved nonunionized dairy workers who attempted to negotiate better wages and conditions with their employer, went on strike when negotiations failed, and were subsequently fired and not reinstated. The workers sued under RCW 49.32.020, claiming interference with their concerted activities for mutual aid, and also alleged wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. The Washington Supreme Court reversed the lower courts' dismissal of the claims, holding that the statute protects collective actions by nonunionized employees as well as unionized ones, based on the plain language of the statute and prior interpretations. The court also found that the complaint sufficiently stated a claim under procedural rules for dismissal motions.

labor & employmenttorts & liabilityprocedure

In Price v. Kitsap Transit, a passenger sued the transit authority after a bus's sudden stop, caused when a 4-year-old child activated an emergency switch, aggravated his prior injuries. The trial court apportioned 80 percent of fault to the child (deeming him immune), 10 percent to his father, and 10 percent to Kitsap Transit under Washington's tort reform statute. The Court of Appeals reversed the apportionment to the child, and the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that RCW 4.22.070 does not permit assigning fault to a child under six because such a child is not an "entity" capable of fault. The case was remanded for reapportionment solely between the transit authority and the father. The decision rested on statutory interpretation of the term "entity" in the context of comparative fault rules.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case arose when Snohomish County citizens petitioned to subject a county ordinance adopting a countywide planning policy under Washington's Growth Management Act to a referendum. The County sought and obtained a declaratory judgment that the ordinance was not subject to referendum, while the trial court dismissed most of the citizens' counterclaims on grounds including lack of standing, ripeness, justiciability, and failure to state a claim. The citizens appealed the dismissals and the summary judgment rulings on issues such as alleged unconstitutional delegation of power, violations of civil rights, improper expenditure of public funds, and entitlement to writs of mandamus. The Washington Supreme Court had previously affirmed that the ordinance was not subject to referendum and here affirmed the trial court's disposition of the remaining issues, finding no reversible error in the dismissals or grants of summary judgment to the County.

electionscivil rightsenvironment

Associated General Contractors challenged King County's ordinance permitting the use of county employees for some public works, claiming it violated the county charter and state statutes that require hiring independent contractors for all such projects. The trial court granted summary judgment to the county. On direct review, the Washington Supreme Court affirmed the denial of the contractors' motion but reversed the grant to the county, reasoning that RCW 36.32.240 expressly requires counties with purchasing departments to contract for public works, while other statutes might allow in-house labor, and that whether King County has a purchasing department is an unresolved factual issue requiring remand.

business & regulatorylabor & employment

The case involved Alejandro Ortega-Martinez's conviction for second degree rape of a woman with mental disabilities, where the jury found guilt but did not specify whether it was by forcible compulsion or because the victim was incapable of consent due to mental incapacity. The Washington Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that a defendant is not entitled to jury unanimity on the specific means of committing the crime when sufficient evidence supports both alternative means presented to the jury. The court reasoned that while Washington recognizes a right to unanimous verdicts, this extends to unanimity on means only in cases where evidence is lacking for one alternative, which was not the situation here.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved appeals from the dismissal of petitions seeking involuntary civil commitment of two individuals, R.S. and J.M., under Washington's RCW 71.05, who had developmental disabilities along with mental health conditions and were alleged to be gravely disabled. The commissioner had dismissed the petitions, finding insufficient evidence of grave disability due to a mental disorder. The Washington Supreme Court reversed the dismissals, holding that a developmental disability qualifies as a mental disorder under the statute if it substantially affects cognitive or volitional functions, and that the evidence in both cases supported findings of grave disability requiring supervised care. The court emphasized that the statute's provisions apply to such individuals and that less restrictive alternatives were not available despite efforts to find them.

civil rightshealthcareprocedure

The case involved landlords challenging the City of Seattle's housing code inspections of apartment buildings, including three conducted with tenant consent and one executed under a warrant issued by the municipal court after an exterior inspection showed violations. The court addressed whether tenants could validly consent to searches of their units and common areas, thereby waiving any need for a warrant, and whether the municipal court had authority to issue administrative search warrants supported by probable cause. It held that tenants, not landlords, hold the primary privacy interest in leased premises under both the Fourth Amendment and the state constitution, making their consent sufficient without requiring landlord approval. The opinion further considered the municipal court's power to authorize such warrants when probable cause exists based on observed code violations.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights