Harlan M. Calhoun

The case involved a buyer who sued the seller for breach of the covenant of general warranty of title in a 1960 deed conveying 145 acres of land, after discovering in 1967 that third parties held paramount fee simple title and attempting unsuccessfully to purchase a quitclaim deed from them. The buyer had expended funds preparing the land for timber sales but was never in actual possession or physically ousted, and he later filed a separate action against the paramount title holders to litigate ownership. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the seller on the ground that no eviction, actual or constructive, had occurred to support the breach claim. The supreme court reversed, holding that the assertion of superior title under the circumstances amounted to constructive eviction sufficient to breach the covenant. The core reasoning was that the buyer was not required to wait for actual ouster or a final adverse judgment before pursuing the warranty claim.

property

This case concerns disputes among the heirs of Mary E. McClain (who died intestate in 1959) and her husband C.S. McClain over distribution of assets from their estates, including a funeral home and cemetery business, a 1958 deed purporting to transfer half the cemetery property to daughter Frances McClain Joyce and her husband, and proceeds from eminent domain proceedings on part of the cemetery. The Circuit Court of Cabell County had addressed ownership, accounting for business assets and payments, and distribution of the eminent domain award. On appeal, the court affirmed parts of the judgment but reversed the awards of $1,176.97 to each heir against the Joyces and remanded for further proceedings to determine whether res judicata from the eminent domain case barred re-litigation of the deed's validity, as well as any credits due to Frances McClain Joyce for her payments toward the business assets given incomplete evidence of ownership shares between the estates.

propertyfamily lawprocedure

This case arose from a 1967 multi-vehicle collision on an icy bridge in Fayette County, West Virginia, in which one passenger was killed and others injured; the plaintiffs sued the driver of a following car alleging negligence in following too closely and causing the chain reaction. After the plaintiffs presented their evidence at trial, the circuit court directed a verdict for the defendant, and the plaintiffs appealed. The Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law because the key testimony about a rear-end bump was speculative, inherently incredible, and contradicted by other witnesses who observed the initial collision, leaving only conjecture about the defendant's fault. The court emphasized that juries may not base verdicts on speculation and that the trial judge properly removed the case from the jury.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case involves a civil action by landlord J.E. Wilkinson against tenant Ada Searls to recover unpaid rent under a written lease for two buildings in Hamlin, West Virginia, used as a rest home, with the complaint seeking $350 for January and February 1970 at $175 per month. The trial court granted summary judgment to the plaintiff for $700, and the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed after reviewing the pleadings, lease exhibit, and discovery depositions. The court held there was no genuine issue of material fact under R.C.P. 56 because the lease contained no express warranty of fitness or covenant to repair, West Virginia law imposes no implied warranty of suitability for the tenant's intended use absent fraud or deceit, and the tenant's allegations of prior leases, unfulfilled repair promises, constructive eviction, and unequal bargaining power did not create triable defenses or excuse payment of rent.

propertyprocedure

This case involves a former West Virginia state trooper petitioning for a writ of mandamus to require the superintendent of the Department of Public Safety to authorize payment of overtime compensation for workweeks exceeding 48 hours under the state's Wage and Hour Law. The court denied the writ, ruling that members of the Department are public officers rather than employees and therefore not covered by the minimum wage and maximum hours provisions. The core reasoning was that the troopers exercise sovereign powers such as statewide arrests, take an oath identical to that required for constitutional officers, are subject to distinct removal and retirement rules separate from general employees, and are classified as public officers under established precedents regarding police.

labor & employment

This case involves a civil action by a 17-year-old girl, suing through her mother as next friend, and by the mother individually, against a driver whose car struck the girl on a public highway, seeking damages for personal injuries and medical expenses. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant after reviewing pleadings and interrogatory answers, finding no genuine issue of material fact as to liability. On appeal, the court reversed, holding that the record raised triable factual questions regarding the defendant's primary negligence, the plaintiff's contributory negligence, speed, duty to observe, last clear chance, and proximate cause, which are generally unsuited for summary adjudication. The court further noted that discrepancies in the interrogatory answers presented credibility issues for jury resolution and remanded for further proceedings.

proceduretorts & liability