Harlan M. Calhoun

The case involved a buyer who sued the seller for breach of the covenant of general warranty of title in a 1960 deed conveying 145 acres of land, after discovering in 1967 that third parties held paramount fee simple title and attempting unsuccessfully to purchase a quitclaim deed from them. The buyer had expended funds preparing the land for timber sales but was never in actual possession or physically ousted, and he later filed a separate action against the paramount title holders to litigate ownership. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the seller on the ground that no eviction, actual or constructive, had occurred to support the breach claim. The supreme court reversed, holding that the assertion of superior title under the circumstances amounted to constructive eviction sufficient to breach the covenant. The core reasoning was that the buyer was not required to wait for actual ouster or a final adverse judgment before pursuing the warranty claim.

property

This case concerns disputes among the heirs of Mary E. McClain (who died intestate in 1959) and her husband C.S. McClain over distribution of assets from their estates, including a funeral home and cemetery business, a 1958 deed purporting to transfer half the cemetery property to daughter Frances McClain Joyce and her husband, and proceeds from eminent domain proceedings on part of the cemetery. The Circuit Court of Cabell County had addressed ownership, accounting for business assets and payments, and distribution of the eminent domain award. On appeal, the court affirmed parts of the judgment but reversed the awards of $1,176.97 to each heir against the Joyces and remanded for further proceedings to determine whether res judicata from the eminent domain case barred re-litigation of the deed's validity, as well as any credits due to Frances McClain Joyce for her payments toward the business assets given incomplete evidence of ownership shares between the estates.

propertyfamily lawprocedure

This case arose from a 1967 multi-vehicle collision on an icy bridge in Fayette County, West Virginia, in which one passenger was killed and others injured; the plaintiffs sued the driver of a following car alleging negligence in following too closely and causing the chain reaction. After the plaintiffs presented their evidence at trial, the circuit court directed a verdict for the defendant, and the plaintiffs appealed. The Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law because the key testimony about a rear-end bump was speculative, inherently incredible, and contradicted by other witnesses who observed the initial collision, leaving only conjecture about the defendant's fault. The court emphasized that juries may not base verdicts on speculation and that the trial judge properly removed the case from the jury.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case involves a civil action by landlord J.E. Wilkinson against tenant Ada Searls to recover unpaid rent under a written lease for two buildings in Hamlin, West Virginia, used as a rest home, with the complaint seeking $350 for January and February 1970 at $175 per month. The trial court granted summary judgment to the plaintiff for $700, and the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed after reviewing the pleadings, lease exhibit, and discovery depositions. The court held there was no genuine issue of material fact under R.C.P. 56 because the lease contained no express warranty of fitness or covenant to repair, West Virginia law imposes no implied warranty of suitability for the tenant's intended use absent fraud or deceit, and the tenant's allegations of prior leases, unfulfilled repair promises, constructive eviction, and unequal bargaining power did not create triable defenses or excuse payment of rent.

propertyprocedure

This case involves a former West Virginia state trooper petitioning for a writ of mandamus to require the superintendent of the Department of Public Safety to authorize payment of overtime compensation for workweeks exceeding 48 hours under the state's Wage and Hour Law. The court denied the writ, ruling that members of the Department are public officers rather than employees and therefore not covered by the minimum wage and maximum hours provisions. The core reasoning was that the troopers exercise sovereign powers such as statewide arrests, take an oath identical to that required for constitutional officers, are subject to distinct removal and retirement rules separate from general employees, and are classified as public officers under established precedents regarding police.

labor & employment

This case involves a civil action by a 17-year-old girl, suing through her mother as next friend, and by the mother individually, against a driver whose car struck the girl on a public highway, seeking damages for personal injuries and medical expenses. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant after reviewing pleadings and interrogatory answers, finding no genuine issue of material fact as to liability. On appeal, the court reversed, holding that the record raised triable factual questions regarding the defendant's primary negligence, the plaintiff's contributory negligence, speed, duty to observe, last clear chance, and proximate cause, which are generally unsuited for summary adjudication. The court further noted that discrepancies in the interrogatory answers presented credibility issues for jury resolution and remanded for further proceedings.

proceduretorts & liability

This case was a mandamus action brought by the State Building Commission against the Governor and Secretary of State to compel them to issue and sell state building revenue bonds under a 1971 legislative act, in order to finance construction of state facilities including a science and culture center. The dispute arose after a prior decision (State ex rel. Hall v. Taylor) had invalidated similar 1968 bond provisions as creating an unconstitutional state debt in violation of Article X, Section 4 of the West Virginia Constitution, because repayment was to come from legislative appropriations for rent. The 1971 Act amended the prior law to address those defects, and the court held that the new framework complied with the constitution. The court awarded the writ of mandamus, authorizing the bond issuance and sale, while noting that certain issues regarding specific property acquisition were premature and not decided.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involved a mandamus action by I. Brooks Smith, the former Superintendent of Schools of Mason County, seeking to compel the county board of education to reinstate him, restore his salary, and dismiss the acting superintendent based on an order from the State Superintendent of Schools. The dispute arose after the county board removed Smith by a 3-1 vote on charges of misconduct following a hearing, and Smith appealed the non-unanimous decision to the State Superintendent under W. Va. Code § 18A-2-8, who then ordered reinstatement without hearing from the board. The court decided that the State Superintendent lacked authority to entertain the appeal or issue the order, rendering those actions void, and denied the writ of mandamus. The core reasoning was that the appeal provision in Chapter 18A must be read in pari materia with related statutes in Chapter 18 without creating an irreconcilable conflict, that the ex parte nature of the appeal proceedings was improper, and that no other Code provisions were impliedly repealed.

labor & employmentprocedure

This case was a wrongful death action brought by Agnes Lambert, as administratrix, against A&P and its employee truck driver Jerry Stuthers after a fatal collision at the intersection of two Pennsylvania highways, where the decedent was a passenger in a car driven by his wife Agnes Lambert. Separate consolidated actions by other passengers in the car resulted in verdicts against A&P, but in the wrongful death case the jury returned a $12,000 verdict for the benefit of the Lamberts' two children; the trial court set aside that verdict as inadequate and granted a new trial on all issues. The Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the evidence supported the giving of defense instructions on Pennsylvania stop-sign statutes and the presumption of due care, that objections to instructions were insufficiently specific, and that no reversible error occurred in the handling of verdicts or the new-trial ruling.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case involves two mandamus proceedings brought by petitioners who obtained divorce decrees in the Circuit Court of Tucker County but were refused recordation by the clerk because they had not paid the statutory $10 filing fee. The petitioners had filed affidavits to proceed in forma pauperis under West Virginia Code 59-2-1, which allows poor persons to obtain court services without prepaying fees, and the clerk had initially permitted the suits to proceed on that basis. The court held that the clerk had a nondiscretionary duty to record the final divorce orders, relying on the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Boddie v. Connecticut that due process prohibits denying indigent litigants access to courts for divorce solely because of inability to pay fees when the state monopolizes the means of dissolving marriages. The reasoning emphasized that the affidavits complied with the statute, no finding of false swearing was made, and alternatives exist to deter frivolous litigation without barring access. Writs of mandamus were awarded to compel recordation.

family lawcivil rightsprocedure

This case involves a wrongful death action brought by Velma Irene Mowery against Jimmy Louis Smith and others, alleging that Smith's negligent operation of a vehicle caused the death of her daughter on a sidewalk in Weston, West Virginia. The appeal focused solely on whether the trial court properly dismissed the claims against Smith for lack of proper service of process, after the plaintiff attempted multiple methods including substituted service in Ohio, personal service in Lewis County, and service via the state auditor. The court reversed the dismissal and remanded the case, reasoning that the trial court had not considered or ruled on the validity of the additional service methods before dismissing the action as to Smith.

proceduretorts & liability

The case concerned whether two attorneys could recover fees from Jean Herring Rowe, a trust beneficiary under Caroline C. Hughes's will, for their work in prior litigation construing the will's provisions on remaindermen and vesting dates, even though Rowe had not employed them. The circuit court awarded each attorney $12,000 to be paid from Rowe's distributive share, but the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reversed that order. The court held that no implied contract for payment arose from the mere fact that Rowe benefited from the attorneys' services, as she was not their client, had not acquiesced in their representation, and the law does not impose liability on non-employing parties solely due to incidental benefits in such contests among beneficiaries.

propertyprocedure

The case was an original habeas corpus proceeding in which relator Charles A. Cogar challenged his conviction and indeterminate penitentiary sentence of one to ten years after pleading guilty to an indictment charging him with unlawfully and feloniously destroying real property by throwing rocks and other objects through windows and damaging awnings, causing $690 in damage. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia held that the indictment, which tracked the language of W. Va. Code § 61-3-30, charged only a misdemeanor and that no statute or common-law authority supported treating the offense as a felony. The court reasoned that a conviction and sentence for a nonexistent felony were void and subject to collateral attack, entitling the relator to relief from the penitentiary sentence even though he had already served more than the statutory maximum for the misdemeanor.

criminal lawprocedure

This case was a civil action brought by an infant plaintiff against the defendant truck driver for personal injuries sustained when the plaintiff was struck by the defendant's panel truck on a snowy secondary road in Marion County, West Virginia, on December 31, 1967. Following a jury trial that resulted in a $500 verdict for the plaintiff, the trial court denied motions for a new trial on damages or all issues. On appeal, the court affirmed the judgment on liability, holding that the evidence presented a proper jury question on the defendant's primary negligence, proximate cause, and the plaintiff's contributory negligence. It reversed on damages, however, and remanded for a new trial solely on that issue, concluding that the $500 award was inadequate and unsupported by the evidence of the plaintiff's permanent injuries, prolonged hospitalization, pain, and time out of school. The court found it unnecessary to decide whether the defendant's unsolicited reference to lack of insurance warranted a mistrial.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case concerns a prohibition proceeding brought by property owners and lessees to halt eminent domain actions in circuit court by the State Building Commission, which sought fee simple title to land near the state capitol for public office buildings financed through revenue bonds under Article 6 of Chapter 5 of the West Virginia Code, as amended in 1968. The relators challenged the statute's constitutionality under Section 4 of Article X of the state constitution, which restricts state debt except for specific purposes like casual deficits. The court awarded the writ of prohibition, concluding that the bond issuance and financing mechanism created an unconstitutional state debt by effectively obligating future revenues or appropriations beyond the limits allowed. The reasoning centered on the statutory provisions for bond payments from project rents, the lack of any binding future legislative appropriations, and the overall structure that would violate the constitutional debt restrictions rather than qualifying as permissible revenue bonds.

propertyprocedure

The case involved a dispute over whether the City of Huntington could continue collecting a local gross revenue tax on public utilities like the Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company after the 1967 enactment of Chapter 187, which imposed a state tax on carrier incomes and barred political subdivisions from levying any tax on businesses subject to the new article. The city sued for a declaratory judgment that the statute violated the West Virginia Constitution's single-object rule for legislative titles (Article VI, Section 30) because the title referred only to a state income tax while Section 3(g) also prohibited local taxes; it also raised retroactivity and contract-impairment claims. The trial court granted summary judgment to the city on the title issue. The Supreme Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the prohibition on local taxes was germane and incidental to the stated object of taxing carrier incomes, so the title satisfied the constitutional requirement and the statute was valid.

taxesbusiness & regulatory

In State v. Shawyer, the defendant was convicted of forgery, sentenced to an indeterminate term of one to ten years, and placed on three years' probation; during that period he was convicted of petit larceny, leading to a probation-revocation hearing held without counsel at which his probation was revoked. After the defendant obtained habeas corpus relief releasing him on the ground that the revocation hearing violated his right to counsel, and after the original three-year probation term had expired, the trial court issued a new capias, appointed counsel, and conducted a second revocation hearing, again revoking probation and ordering the defendant returned to prison. The appellate court reversed, holding that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to revoke probation after the probationary period had ended and that the unreversed habeas corpus judgment releasing the defendant was final and binding under principles of res judicata. The court rejected the argument that the second proceeding was merely a continuation of the first, noting that the defendant had been unconditionally discharged by the habeas order.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a workers' compensation claim by a coal miner who suffered a compensable back injury in 1965, diagnosed as a compression fracture, which led to psychiatric symptoms including depression, conversion reaction, and schizophrenia that the claimant and his doctors attributed to the trauma and resulting idleness. The commissioner initially granted a 15% permanent partial disability award, but after protests supported by psychiatric testimony finding the claimant totally and permanently disabled due to an involuntary condition causally linked to the injury with no malingering, the Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board upgraded it to a total permanent disability award. The employer appealed, but the court affirmed the board's factual determination, holding that the evidence justified the award under the principle of liberally construing proof in favor of claimants and that the decision was not clearly wrong.

labor & employment

This case was a civil action by passenger Virginia Edwards against driver Viola Lynch for personal injuries from a 1967 car collision in Maryland. The trial court directed a verdict for the plaintiff on liability, and the jury awarded $75,000 in damages. On appeal, the court affirmed the judgment, holding that under Maryland's boulevard law the defendant was negligent as a matter of law for failing to stop and yield at a stop sign on a non-favored highway, so the directed verdict on liability was proper and no error occurred in the instructions.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case consolidated three mandamus actions brought by former employees of the West Virginia Alcohol Beverage Control Commissioner seeking reinstatement to their positions after being discharged following a 1969 executive order by Governor Moore that attempted to revoke prior civil service coverage. Building on its earlier decision in State ex rel. Karnes v. Dadisman, the court granted the writs and ordered the employees restored with back pay. The majority reasoned that the 30-day administrative appeal deadline under W. Va. Code 29-6-13 and civil service rules did not bar relief because the discharges were not made for cause pursuant to civil service procedures but instead rested on the incorrect assumption that the employees had been removed from coverage. The court held that mandamus was available to enforce the continuing civil service protections without requiring exhaustion of the ordinary appeal process.

labor & employmentprocedure