William G. Callow

This case involved two Wisconsin school districts that sought reimbursement from their insurers for attorney fees and costs incurred in defending and settling an underlying federal discrimination lawsuit brought by the Milwaukee school board and NAACP, which sought only declaratory and injunctive relief regarding interdistrict segregation. The insurers had denied coverage and refused to defend, leading the districts to sue for breach of the duty to defend and indemnify under multiple general liability and umbrella policies. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that the policies provided no coverage because they obligated the insurers to pay only sums the insured became legally obligated to pay as "damages," a term the court interpreted in its technical legal sense as not encompassing equitable relief or attorney fees awarded as costs under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The court further reasoned that the insurers had no duty to defend from the outset, owed nothing for the districts' own defense costs, and had no obligation to cover settlement payments because the insurers neither consented to the settlement nor were bound by contractual liability assumed by the insureds. Additional policy exclusions for intended or directed acts were addressed but did not alter the outcome on the damages issue.

civil rightsbusiness & regulatorytorts & liability

In Elliott v. Donahue, an insured driver sought to recover attorney fees after successfully litigating to establish that his insurer was obligated to defend and indemnify him in an underlying auto accident case, despite the insurer's initial denial of coverage based on a non-permissive use exclusion. The Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and held that the insured could recover reasonable attorney fees incurred in proving coverage. The court reasoned that the insurance contract requires the insurer to provide a defense in exchange for premiums, and when the insurer forces the insured to litigate coverage, equity under the declaratory judgment statute (sec. 806.04(8)) allows recovery of those fees as the benefit of the bargain.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involved parents whose parental rights were terminated in proceedings under Wisconsin's Children's Code after their children had been removed via CHIPS actions. The parents, represented by appointed counsel under sec. 48.23(2)(a), sought post-termination relief claiming ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to raise certain objections. The circuit court and court of appeals denied relief, holding that the statutory right to counsel did not include a right to effective counsel absent a constitutional mandate. The Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the legislature intended the statutory right to appointed counsel in involuntary termination proceedings to encompass effective assistance, and remanded for an evidentiary hearing on the ineffectiveness claims following the Machner procedure.

family lawprocedure

The case involved a challenge to a police no-knock entry into a defendant's home to execute a drug search warrant, where officers knew the resident possessed a firearm and had a prior battery conviction, along with the admissibility of expert testimony on whether seized evidence indicated drug sales. The Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed the defendant's convictions for possession of cocaine and marijuana with intent to deliver. The court reasoned that the officers' knowledge of specific facts creating a risk to their safety established exigent circumstances excusing the knock-and-announce requirement under the Fourth Amendment and the state constitution. It further held that the expert opinion testimony was admissible under state evidence rules even though it addressed an ultimate issue for the jury.

criminal lawgunsprocedure

The case involved Abel Sauceda, who was convicted in Kenosha County Circuit Court of both first-degree sexual assault under Wis. Stat. § 940.225(1)(d) (sexual contact with a child 12 or younger) and second-degree sexual assault under § 940.225(2)(d) (sexual contact with a person the defendant knows is unconscious) for acts against the same nine-year-old victim during a single incident. The court of appeals reversed one conviction, finding a double jeopardy violation, but the Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed that decision and reinstated both convictions. Applying the Blockburger "elements only" test, the court held that the offenses are not the same because each requires proof of an element the other does not—one focuses on the victim's age and the other on unconsciousness—and found no legislative intent to prohibit multiple punishments. The court remanded for resentencing consistent with the two convictions.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved the prosecution of Martin Annala as an adult for a first-degree sexual assault committed in 1984 when he was 15 years old. The district attorney initially declined to charge Annala due to the passage of time, his age at the offense, and prior counseling, but later filed charges after discussions with the victim's family and therapist. Annala challenged the charging decision as an abuse of prosecutorial discretion and argued that the adult court lacked jurisdiction because the offense occurred before the statutory age for juvenile waiver. Following a due process hearing under State v. Becker, the trial court found no manipulative delay to avoid the juvenile system. The Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that the prosecutor did not abuse discretion and that circuit courts have jurisdiction over adults charged with offenses committed as juveniles under the relevant statutes.

criminal lawprocedure