William G. Callow

This case involved two Wisconsin school districts that sought reimbursement from their insurers for attorney fees and costs incurred in defending and settling an underlying federal discrimination lawsuit brought by the Milwaukee school board and NAACP, which sought only declaratory and injunctive relief regarding interdistrict segregation. The insurers had denied coverage and refused to defend, leading the districts to sue for breach of the duty to defend and indemnify under multiple general liability and umbrella policies. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that the policies provided no coverage because they obligated the insurers to pay only sums the insured became legally obligated to pay as "damages," a term the court interpreted in its technical legal sense as not encompassing equitable relief or attorney fees awarded as costs under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The court further reasoned that the insurers had no duty to defend from the outset, owed nothing for the districts' own defense costs, and had no obligation to cover settlement payments because the insurers neither consented to the settlement nor were bound by contractual liability assumed by the insureds. Additional policy exclusions for intended or directed acts were addressed but did not alter the outcome on the damages issue.

civil rightsbusiness & regulatorytorts & liability

In Elliott v. Donahue, an insured driver sought to recover attorney fees after successfully litigating to establish that his insurer was obligated to defend and indemnify him in an underlying auto accident case, despite the insurer's initial denial of coverage based on a non-permissive use exclusion. The Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and held that the insured could recover reasonable attorney fees incurred in proving coverage. The court reasoned that the insurance contract requires the insurer to provide a defense in exchange for premiums, and when the insurer forces the insured to litigate coverage, equity under the declaratory judgment statute (sec. 806.04(8)) allows recovery of those fees as the benefit of the bargain.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involved parents whose parental rights were terminated in proceedings under Wisconsin's Children's Code after their children had been removed via CHIPS actions. The parents, represented by appointed counsel under sec. 48.23(2)(a), sought post-termination relief claiming ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to raise certain objections. The circuit court and court of appeals denied relief, holding that the statutory right to counsel did not include a right to effective counsel absent a constitutional mandate. The Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the legislature intended the statutory right to appointed counsel in involuntary termination proceedings to encompass effective assistance, and remanded for an evidentiary hearing on the ineffectiveness claims following the Machner procedure.

family lawprocedure

The case involved a challenge to a police no-knock entry into a defendant's home to execute a drug search warrant, where officers knew the resident possessed a firearm and had a prior battery conviction, along with the admissibility of expert testimony on whether seized evidence indicated drug sales. The Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed the defendant's convictions for possession of cocaine and marijuana with intent to deliver. The court reasoned that the officers' knowledge of specific facts creating a risk to their safety established exigent circumstances excusing the knock-and-announce requirement under the Fourth Amendment and the state constitution. It further held that the expert opinion testimony was admissible under state evidence rules even though it addressed an ultimate issue for the jury.

criminal lawgunsprocedure

The case involved Abel Sauceda, who was convicted in Kenosha County Circuit Court of both first-degree sexual assault under Wis. Stat. § 940.225(1)(d) (sexual contact with a child 12 or younger) and second-degree sexual assault under § 940.225(2)(d) (sexual contact with a person the defendant knows is unconscious) for acts against the same nine-year-old victim during a single incident. The court of appeals reversed one conviction, finding a double jeopardy violation, but the Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed that decision and reinstated both convictions. Applying the Blockburger "elements only" test, the court held that the offenses are not the same because each requires proof of an element the other does not—one focuses on the victim's age and the other on unconsciousness—and found no legislative intent to prohibit multiple punishments. The court remanded for resentencing consistent with the two convictions.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved the prosecution of Martin Annala as an adult for a first-degree sexual assault committed in 1984 when he was 15 years old. The district attorney initially declined to charge Annala due to the passage of time, his age at the offense, and prior counseling, but later filed charges after discussions with the victim's family and therapist. Annala challenged the charging decision as an abuse of prosecutorial discretion and argued that the adult court lacked jurisdiction because the offense occurred before the statutory age for juvenile waiver. Following a due process hearing under State v. Becker, the trial court found no manipulative delay to avoid the juvenile system. The Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that the prosecutor did not abuse discretion and that circuit courts have jurisdiction over adults charged with offenses committed as juveniles under the relevant statutes.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned the constitutionality of Wisconsin Statute sec. 973.014, which authorizes circuit courts to set parole eligibility dates for defendants sentenced to life imprisonment. Two defendants convicted of first-degree murder challenged the statute after receiving life sentences with specific parole dates, arguing it violated separation of powers, due process, effective assistance of counsel, prohibitions on cruel and unusual punishment, and the right to a meaningful appeal. The Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed the circuit courts' rulings, holding the statute constitutional on all grounds because sentencing and parole eligibility determinations involve shared legislative and judicial responsibilities, with no impermissible delegation of policy-making power and no infringement on the cited constitutional protections. The court reviewed the statute independently, applying a strong presumption of validity, and rejected the claims based on the text, history of indeterminate sentencing, and precedents recognizing judicial discretion in such matters.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned the constitutionality of Wisconsin's Milwaukee Parental Choice Program (MPCP), a publicly funded initiative allowing selected low-income students to attend nonsectarian private schools. The Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld the program against challenges under the state constitution. It held that the MPCP was not an improperly enacted private or local bill under Article IV, Section 18, because it addressed a matter of statewide concern through experimental legislation targeted at Milwaukee's specific educational challenges. The court further ruled that the program did not violate Article X, Section 3's uniformity requirement for district schools, as participating private schools were not district schools, and that it satisfied the public purpose doctrine due to legislative safeguards ensuring funds served a public educational goal.

civil rights

This case involved a part-time university survey researcher, Glenn Barnhill, who was terminated after disclosing confidential survey questions about shopping mall demonstrations to a newspaper while the survey was ongoing. Barnhill sued his supervisors under 42 U.S.C. sec. 1983, alleging retaliation for exercising his First Amendment free speech rights. The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the supervisors were entitled to qualified immunity and did not violate Barnhill's constitutional rights, reasoning that the laboratory's strong interest in maintaining confidentiality and professional standards during surveys outweighed Barnhill's interest in disclosure. The court did not address the punitive damages issue due to these holdings.

free speechcivil rightslabor & employment

In State v. Swanson, police stopped the defendant after observing erratic driving, detected alcohol on his breath, conducted a pat-down search that uncovered marijuana, and later arrested him before he escaped from custody, leading to charges of felony escape and drug possession. The circuit court dismissed the charges, and the court of appeals affirmed, finding the search and arrest unlawful. The Wisconsin Supreme Court agreed, holding that Swanson was not under arrest for Fourth Amendment purposes at the time of the search because a reasonable person would not have believed the restraint was equivalent to formal arrest, and the search could not be justified as incident to a later arrest. The court reasoned that probable cause was lacking without field sobriety tests, as the observed factors only supported reasonable suspicion of driving under the influence, and it declined to create a new exception allowing searches based solely on probable cause. The decision affirmed the dismissal of the complaint.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a juvenile, R.W.S., who admitted to one burglary petition and had another read-in and dismissed as part of a plea agreement. The circuit court ordered him to pay restitution including for the read-in offense, part of which went to the victims' insurance company. The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that circuit courts have authority under the Children's Code to order restitution for read-in offenses in juvenile delinquency cases and to direct payments to insurers, as this aligns with the statutory purposes and language of section 48.34 without explicit limitations to adjudicated acts or direct victim payments.

criminal lawfamily lawprocedure

The case involved a man, W.W.W., petitioning to be adjudicated the father of two children born to M.C.S. during her ongoing marriage to R.J.S., seeking custody and visitation rights after a brief relationship with the mother. The circuit court dismissed the petition under Wis. Stat. sec. 767.458(1m), finding that a judicial paternity determination would not serve the children's best interests, and both the court of appeals and Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed. The Supreme Court held that W.W.W. had no constitutionally protected liberty interest in establishing paternity due to the lack of an established relationship with the children in an intact marital family, that the best-interests statute created a valid exception to general statutory paternity rights, and that the record supported the lower courts' application of the best-interests standard. The decision rejected claims of constitutional infringement and statutory violation while upholding the dismissal with prejudice.

family lawcivil rights

This case concerned a burglary conviction based on evidence obtained during a warrantless police search of a duplex, which the defendant sought to suppress on Fourth Amendment grounds. The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the defendant had not waived his privacy argument but nonetheless affirmed the conviction because he lacked a legitimate expectation of privacy in the duplex or the stolen stereo equipment. The court reasoned that the defendant's status as a frequent overnight guest did not match the overnight guest scenario recognized in Minnesota v. Olson, and that no privacy interest exists in stolen property. It further noted the landlord's consent to the search after eviction proceedings against the occupants.

criminal lawprocedureproperty

This case concerned a creditor's challenge to the denial of its claim against a decedent's estate. Sears, Roebuck & Company sought to recover $6,522.73 from the estate of Regina Barthel but filed its claim after the December 13, 1988 deadline set by the probate court, which had provided notice only by publication in a newspaper. The circuit court rejected the claim as untimely under Wisconsin's nonclaim statutes, secs. 859.01 and .07, Stats. 1987-88. On certification from the court of appeals, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that those statutes violated the creditor's Fourteenth Amendment due process rights because, as a known or reasonably ascertainable creditor, Sears was entitled to actual notice rather than mere publication notice, consistent with the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Tulsa Professional Collection Services v. Estate of Pope.

procedureproperty

This case involved a dispute over the amount of compensation owed to the Milwaukee Rescue Mission after the Redevelopment Authority of the City of Milwaukee exercised eminent domain to acquire the organization's property in 1986. The Authority initially paid $1,091,000 based on its appraisal, but the Rescue Mission appealed, and a jury determined the fair market value to be $2,100,000 using a cost approach that accounted for the building's concrete frame and special-use characteristics. The circuit court entered judgment on the verdict and awarded litigation expenses including contingent attorney fees. The Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion because credible evidence supported the jury's valuation, exclusion of an additional defense expert was justified to avoid prejudice, and the fee award was reasonable under the circumstances. The court of appeals had previously reversed on the ground that the verdict lacked credible support.

propertyprocedure

This case involved a firefighter injured by an exploding acetylene tank while responding to a garage fire started by a woodburning furnace. The firefighter sued the tank's manufacturer, Union Carbide, on negligence and strict liability product defect claims, while Union Carbide sought to apply the firefighter's rule for immunity and to introduce evidence of the property occupier's negligence for contribution purposes; the insurer was also impleaded for reimbursement of worker's compensation benefits. The court held that the firefighter's rule does not immunize manufacturers of defective products that injure firefighters (as opposed to landowners whose negligence causes or spreads a fire), that evidence of the occupier's negligence was properly excluded, and that the insurer was entitled to statutory interest on its reimbursement award. The reasoning distinguished public policy rationales supporting the rule for property owners from those applicable to product manufacturers, and interpreted the relevant worker's compensation statute and interest provisions to permit the award. The court affirmed the judgment in favor of the firefighter.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved a buyer who purchased a mobile home with numerous defects, attempted repairs by the seller and manufacturer failed, and she then revoked her acceptance of the home under Wisconsin's Uniform Commercial Code. After prevailing on revocation at trial, the buyer sought attorney fees, which the circuit court and court of appeals denied. The Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed, holding that attorney fees are not recoverable because they are not incidental or consequential damages under UCC sections 402.714 and 402.715, the revocation statute (402.608) does not authorize them, and the facts did not establish a violation of the mobile home warranty statute (218.14) that would trigger fees under 218.17(3). The decision rested on statutory interpretation of available remedies in sales of goods and the limits of warranty enforcement provisions.

business & regulatorypropertyprocedure

The case concerned whether Wisconsin circuit courts could issue orders requiring the State Public Defender's office to represent individuals in civil commitment proceedings under sec. 51.20, Stats., regardless of the individuals' financial eligibility for such representation. The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that circuit courts lack authority to enter a standing order compelling the Public Defender's office to represent non-indigent parties in these proceedings. The court reasoned that statutes such as secs. 967.06, 977.05(4)(g), and 977.07(3) restrict the Public Defender's role to indigent clients, and while courts possess inherent and statutory power to appoint counsel to ensure representation, this power does not extend to overriding the Public Defender's statutory eligibility limits or shifting costs without legislative authorization.

procedurecivil rights

The case involved parents suing the City of Kenosha after their minor sons drowned at a city-operated public beach in 1987, alleging negligence in the city's hiring and training of lifeguards, failure to warn of a hazardous drop-off, and the lifeguards' inadequate response during the incident. The Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's grant of summary judgment to the city. The court held that Wisconsin's recreational use statute, sec. 895.52(2), immunizes the city as a governmental owner of property used for recreational activities like swimming from liability for ordinary negligence in hiring, training, or lifeguard performance. It further concluded that no genuine issues of material fact existed and that the city's conduct did not qualify as malicious under the statute's exception in sec. 895.52(4).

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case concerned whether a Wisconsin juvenile court retained jurisdiction over a delinquency petition and waiver petition filed against D.W.B. on September 30, 1988, one day before he turned eighteen, even though he did not appear in court until after his eighteenth birthday. The juvenile court dismissed the petitions for lack of jurisdiction, relying on prior precedent, but the court of appeals reversed, and the Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed that decision. The court held that under Wis. Stat. § 48.12(2), a juvenile proceeding commences upon the filing of the petition, so the court retains authority to dismiss with prejudice, waive jurisdiction, or enter a consent decree if the child turns eighteen before adjudication. It reasoned from the statute's plain language and rejected the State's argument that personal appearance before age eighteen was required, while overruling inconsistent language from State v. Black.

criminal lawprocedurefamily law