The case concerned the estate of Albert Draheim, who left nearly all his property by will to his sister Paulina Hertzfeld. Heirs filed objections to probate, Paulina joined and then withdrew them while also executing and later repudiating a renunciation, and a separate agreement among family members to redistribute the estate was executed but withheld from the court until after the will was admitted to probate and affirmed on appeal. The Wisconsin Supreme Court refused to enforce the agreement, holding that its deliberate concealment during the probate proceedings amounted to fraud on the court and that Paulina, later adjudged incompetent, had been subjected to improper influence in signing it. The decision rested on the court's equitable authority to prevent deception of the judicial process and imposition on a vulnerable party, with the result that the will's terms controlled distribution.
The case concerned a claim against a decedent's estate in county court, where an oral decision allowing the claim for $544.05 was announced on June 12, 1952, followed by an order more than a year later granting a new trial under Sec. 324.05, Stats. The court decided that the one-year period for reopening the case or allowing a delayed appeal began on the date of the oral decision, rendering the later retrial order invalid for lack of jurisdiction. It reasoned that the judicial act of allowing the claim was complete upon the pronouncement, with Sec. 313.06, Stats., merely directing how the decision should be recorded rather than affecting its validity or timing, and affirmed the order construing the record as a judgment for the claimant.
The case involved a motor vehicle dealer who sold a used car after changing its speedometer reading from approximately 60,000 miles to 21,000 miles, violating a statute that required turning back speedometers to zero on used vehicles offered for sale and made such violation a misdemeanor. The buyer gave a judgment note for part of the price; after judgment was entered and then set aside, the buyer defended on the ground that the statutory violation rendered the sales contract wholly illegal and unenforceable. The trial court agreed and dismissed the complaint, but the supreme court reversed, holding that the statute's criminal penalty did not make the contract unenforceable or expand the buyer's remedies beyond those available for breach of warranty or fraudulent misrepresentation. Under those remedies the buyer could recoup only the proven difference in value ($645), so the seller was entitled to judgment on the note less that amount.
The case concerned a dispute over whether a 1952 commercial lease between Bitker-Gerner Co. (lessee) and Green Investment Co. (lessor) became void after the premises were destroyed by fire in 1953, before the lessee's possession began on May 1, 1955. The lease referenced an existing tenant's option to extend its term in case of casualty and included a clause stating the lease would be null and void if the building was destroyed and needed rebuilding. The court decided that this voiding provision applied only during the lessee's actual occupancy term, so the lease remained valid and the lessor's refusal to accept rent was improper. The core reasoning was that contract language must be construed to produce a reasonable, harmonious result that gives effect to all terms, avoids conflicts with the prior lease, and aligns with surrounding provisions on insurance and repairs that clearly applied only after possession.
This case concerned the validity of service of a summons on a minor defendant in a personal injury lawsuit, where the defendant had a guardian for his estate but the summons was delivered only to him personally and not to the guardian. The Wisconsin Supreme Court determined that the initial service was ineffective to establish personal jurisdiction, as the governing statute clearly mandates delivery to both the guardian and the minor. The court further held that the minor's retainer of an attorney was voidable during minority but became ratified after he reached age 21, because he failed to disaffirm the attorney's appearance within a reasonable time despite knowing of the representation and the ongoing proceedings. Accordingly, the order setting aside the service was reversed.
This case involves a plaintiff's attempt to plead a cause of action for invasion of her right to privacy based on the defendant's alleged unauthorized use of her picture or likeness. The Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the claim, holding that no such right of action exists under state law. The court reasoned that its prior decisions had refused to recognize the right of privacy and that the legislature had twice rejected bills proposing even a limited version of it. The opinion concluded that creation of any such right is a matter for legislative action rather than judicial decision.