Edward J. Gehl

The case concerned the estate of Albert Draheim, who left nearly all his property by will to his sister Paulina Hertzfeld. Heirs filed objections to probate, Paulina joined and then withdrew them while also executing and later repudiating a renunciation, and a separate agreement among family members to redistribute the estate was executed but withheld from the court until after the will was admitted to probate and affirmed on appeal. The Wisconsin Supreme Court refused to enforce the agreement, holding that its deliberate concealment during the probate proceedings amounted to fraud on the court and that Paulina, later adjudged incompetent, had been subjected to improper influence in signing it. The decision rested on the court's equitable authority to prevent deception of the judicial process and imposition on a vulnerable party, with the result that the will's terms controlled distribution.

propertyfamily lawprocedure

The case concerned a claim against a decedent's estate in county court, where an oral decision allowing the claim for $544.05 was announced on June 12, 1952, followed by an order more than a year later granting a new trial under Sec. 324.05, Stats. The court decided that the one-year period for reopening the case or allowing a delayed appeal began on the date of the oral decision, rendering the later retrial order invalid for lack of jurisdiction. It reasoned that the judicial act of allowing the claim was complete upon the pronouncement, with Sec. 313.06, Stats., merely directing how the decision should be recorded rather than affecting its validity or timing, and affirmed the order construing the record as a judgment for the claimant.

procedureproperty

The case involved a motor vehicle dealer who sold a used car after changing its speedometer reading from approximately 60,000 miles to 21,000 miles, violating a statute that required turning back speedometers to zero on used vehicles offered for sale and made such violation a misdemeanor. The buyer gave a judgment note for part of the price; after judgment was entered and then set aside, the buyer defended on the ground that the statutory violation rendered the sales contract wholly illegal and unenforceable. The trial court agreed and dismissed the complaint, but the supreme court reversed, holding that the statute's criminal penalty did not make the contract unenforceable or expand the buyer's remedies beyond those available for breach of warranty or fraudulent misrepresentation. Under those remedies the buyer could recoup only the proven difference in value ($645), so the seller was entitled to judgment on the note less that amount.

business & regulatorytorts & liability

The case concerned a dispute over whether a 1952 commercial lease between Bitker-Gerner Co. (lessee) and Green Investment Co. (lessor) became void after the premises were destroyed by fire in 1953, before the lessee's possession began on May 1, 1955. The lease referenced an existing tenant's option to extend its term in case of casualty and included a clause stating the lease would be null and void if the building was destroyed and needed rebuilding. The court decided that this voiding provision applied only during the lessee's actual occupancy term, so the lease remained valid and the lessor's refusal to accept rent was improper. The core reasoning was that contract language must be construed to produce a reasonable, harmonious result that gives effect to all terms, avoids conflicts with the prior lease, and aligns with surrounding provisions on insurance and repairs that clearly applied only after possession.

property

This case concerned the validity of service of a summons on a minor defendant in a personal injury lawsuit, where the defendant had a guardian for his estate but the summons was delivered only to him personally and not to the guardian. The Wisconsin Supreme Court determined that the initial service was ineffective to establish personal jurisdiction, as the governing statute clearly mandates delivery to both the guardian and the minor. The court further held that the minor's retainer of an attorney was voidable during minority but became ratified after he reached age 21, because he failed to disaffirm the attorney's appearance within a reasonable time despite knowing of the representation and the ongoing proceedings. Accordingly, the order setting aside the service was reversed.

procedure

This case involves a plaintiff's attempt to plead a cause of action for invasion of her right to privacy based on the defendant's alleged unauthorized use of her picture or likeness. The Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the claim, holding that no such right of action exists under state law. The court reasoned that its prior decisions had refused to recognize the right of privacy and that the legislature had twice rejected bills proposing even a limited version of it. The opinion concluded that creation of any such right is a matter for legislative action rather than judicial decision.

torts & liability

This case involves a passenger suing the driver of a car for injuries sustained in an accident on a snowy, slippery road. The plaintiff contended that the trial court should have changed the jury's finding that he had assumed the risk of the defendant's negligent speed. The court concluded that the defendant was driving at an unreasonable speed given the conditions, that this speed caused the accident, and that the plaintiff's failure to protest meant he assumed the risk of both the speed and the related issues of vehicle control. The judgment for the defendant was therefore affirmed.

torts & liability

The case concerned a collision at a blind intersection and the resulting negligence claims against drivers Evans and Neumann, focusing on issues of speed, lookout, management and control, and yielding the right of way. The court held that Evans was negligent as to speed and lookout based on witness testimony and his own admissions, while exonerating Neumann as a matter of law on speed, management and control, and finding insufficient evidence of causal negligence. It determined that the jury verdict questions were improperly framed regarding Neumann's duty to yield when Evans may have forfeited the right of way through unlawful speed, which affected the comparison of negligence and required new trials in most of the consolidated cases. The core reasoning centered on the lack of supporting evidence for certain negligence findings against Neumann and the need for correct verdict submission to allow proper jury apportionment.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved a property owner suing the City of Milwaukee for a declaratory judgment regarding the city's authority under its 1854 charter to re-establish a dock line along the Milwaukee River that would extend onto the plaintiff's dry land used for parking, potentially affecting its riparian rights. The plaintiff alleged the proposed line was arbitrary, unrelated to navigation, and aimed at depriving it of rights to build docks or wharves, while seeking to enjoin the ordinance's passage. The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the complaint stated a cause of action for declaratory relief because the city's committee actions created a definite, substantial, and justiciable controversy over the scope of the charter powers, even though injunctive relief against legislative action was unavailable. The court reasoned that the issue was ripe given the city's threatened enforcement of a right disputed by the plaintiff, distinguishing it from abstract or hypothetical questions, and affirmed the order overruling the demurrer.

propertyprocedure

The case centered on a dispute between Center Street Fuel Co. and Hanover Fire Insurance over coverage under a fire insurance policy for a fuel tank and related equipment, including whether the policy could be reformed to include items not explicitly listed. The plaintiff argued that a telephone conversation with the insurer's agent resulted in an agreement for $2,000 coverage on the tank and contents, but the amending endorsement failed to cover the pump house as intended. The trial court had ruled in favor of the plaintiff, but the appellate court reversed the judgment, directing dismissal of the complaint on grounds that the evidence showed no mutual mistake—the plaintiff received exactly the coverage requested in the amendment, and the insurer's representatives were not shown to have intended otherwise or known of any connection to the pump.

business & regulatoryproperty

The case involved a dispute over a mechanic's lien claimed by plaintiff Callaway against defendants Evanson for labor and materials used to improve land under a contract. The defendants argued they lacked any ownership interest in the property when the contract was made, that acceptance of a deed estopped or waived the lien claim, and that certain charges for supervision, overhead, and labor were improper or unitemized. The court affirmed the judgment in favor of the plaintiff, holding that a mechanic's lien may attach to an after-acquired interest in the property under Wis. Stat. sec. 289.12, that no estoppel or waiver was shown by the deed, and that the defendants failed to prove or preserve their other defenses regarding fees, expenses, and itemization. The opinion relied on prior case law establishing that the lien enforces whatever interest the owner holds at enforcement, including subsequently acquired title.

propertyprocedure

This case involves a defendant convicted of receiving stolen property, specifically an automobile. The prosecution relied on circumstantial evidence of the defendant's possession and inconsistent testimony, but provided no direct proof that the car had been stolen by another person or that the defendant knew it was stolen. The court held that such evidence was insufficient to support the essential elements of the crime under the relevant statute. The conviction was therefore reversed, with directions to discharge the defendant rather than ordering a retrial.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned a company's attempt to enjoin peaceful union picketing intended to organize its employees, where the picketing occurred without any defined labor dispute under Wisconsin statutes because it did not involve a controversy with a majority of the employees. The trial court concluded that the picketing violated sec. 103.535, Stats., which bars picketing when no labor dispute exists. On appeal, the Wisconsin Supreme Court determined that the picketing involved only peaceful persuasion for the lawful objective of union organization and did not involve coercion or other unlawful conduct under sec. 111.06(2). Drawing on U.S. Supreme Court precedent such as American Federation of Labor v. Swing, the court reasoned that enjoining such picketing solely because of the lack of a qualifying labor dispute would infringe on constitutional free speech protections, and it declined to address whether the picketing could be enjoined on alternative grounds not properly raised below.

labor & employmentfree speech

The case involved defendant Earl Goodchild Jr. appealing his conviction for murdering his father and Everett Becker after a night of drinking, with challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, admissibility of multiple confessions and statements obtained at the crime lab and elsewhere, delay in arraignment, introduction of a condensed confession at the preliminary hearing, receipt of exhibits, and lack of jurisdiction. The Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and judgment. It reasoned that the evidence supported the verdict, all statements were shown to be voluntary after the defendant was advised of his rights, any potential errors in exhibits were waived by lack of objection, and the lower court had jurisdiction with no procedural violations.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a dispute over the sale and installation of an ice-making machine, in which the buyer (defendant) alleged breach of warranty after the machine failed to operate properly and sought remedies including rescission of the contract or damages via counterclaim. The trial court dismissed the counterclaim and entered judgment for the seller (plaintiff), apparently treating the dismissal as barring further relief under Wis. Stat. § 121.69(2). The Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding that the buyer had not been granted any remedy by the dismissal, that factual questions of whether the buyer accepted the goods and gave timely notice of breach under §§ 121.48 and 121.49 were for the jury, and that the buyer should have been allowed to elect between inconsistent remedies of rescission and damages rather than having both foreclosed. The court also noted that the buyer's July 1953 letter constituted adequate notice of intent to claim damages.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case concerned whether a document labeled an interlocutory judgment in a negligence dispute between a bus company and a truck driver was appealable. The court held that it lacked jurisdiction because the document was not appealable. It reasoned that under the statutes, an interlocutory judgment must constitute a final determination of the parties' rights or a substantial disposition of the merits, whereas this ruling was merely an intermediate legal conclusion on an issue that would arise at trial and left multiple factual questions open, leaving neither party aggrieved.

procedure

The case concerned a fire insurance policy provision excluding liability for losses occurring while the hazard was increased by any means within the insured's control or knowledge, specifically whether the insured's execution of a second mortgage on the property constituted such an increase. The plaintiff argued that only physical changes to the property could increase the hazard, while the insurer contended that the mortgage triggered the exclusion. Relying on precedents from Iowa and South Dakota, the court held that whether a subsequent mortgage increases the hazard is a question of fact for the jury, not a matter of law, because it depends on circumstances such as the mortgage's size relative to the property's value and its effect on the insured's incentive to protect the property. The court explained that such incumbrances can affect the 'moral hazard'—the risk that the insured might destroy the property to collect insurance—but emphasized that this requires factual determination based on the specific situation, as a material increase must be viewed by a person of ordinary intelligence. The court affirmed the order, leaving the issue for jury resolution.

propertyprocedure

The case centered on a complaint filed by a corporation and individual plaintiffs against defendants, alleging interference with the corporation's mail and wrongful withholding of assets that the plaintiffs claimed belonged to the corporation as successor to certain voluntary associations. The trial court sustained a demurrer, finding improper joinder of causes of action because the individual plaintiffs had no personal interest in the mail interference claim. The Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed the order, ruling that the complaint asserted only one primary right—the corporation's right to recover its property—with any other relief sought being merely incidental, and that the joinder of legal and equitable claims did not make the complaint demurrable under the applicable statute.

procedureproperty

The case involved Dan Smith suing the Journal Co. for libel over a newspaper article describing his arrest on a disorderly conduct charge for carrying a sign with anti-Nazi and anti-Communist statements, along with a photo of him behind bars. Smith alleged the article created false and defamatory inferences that he was untrustworthy, mentally incompetent, a vagrant, and repentant for a crime. The court held that none of the statements were libelous, as they were either substantially true based on the facts pleaded in the complaint or did not carry the strained defamatory meanings alleged when read in their ordinary sense. The judgment dismissing the complaint was affirmed.

torts & liabilitycriminal law

The case involved a dispute over whether an automobile liability insurance policy issued to an employer covered injuries to an employee plaintiff caused by a co-employee driver during work activities, in a third-party tort action under Wisconsin's workmen's compensation statutes. The insurer argued that policy exclusions for bodily injury to employees and obligations under workmen's compensation laws barred coverage. The court affirmed the order requiring coverage, holding that the exclusions conflicted with and were ineffective against the statutory mandate in sec. 204.30(3) extending coverage to permissive operators of the insured vehicle. It further reasoned that the claim was a common-law tort action against a third party, independent of any master-servant liability or workmen's compensation obligations.

labor & employmenttorts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory