Jon P. Wilcox

In this case, two girls who had been placed by Dane County in the same foster home sued the county and its officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after suffering physical and sexual abuse there, alleging violation of their constitutional right to safe placement. The Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals, holding that the officials were not entitled to qualified immunity, that the applicable standard for the constitutional duty was one of professional judgment rather than deliberate indifference, and that the county was not entitled to summary judgment. The court reasoned that the right to protection from harm in foster care was clearly established at the time, relying on precedents such as DeShaney and Seventh Circuit decisions that recognized liability when officials knowingly place children in dangerous environments without exercising professional judgment.

civil rightsfamily law

The case involved a personal injury lawsuit filed by Clinton Colby against Columbia County after a 1990 car accident that left him quadriplegic; Colby submitted a formal claim to the county in February 1993 but filed his initial complaint just two days later, before the required 120-day disallowance period under Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1)(b) had passed, leading to dismissal of that action without prejudice. The circuit court then dismissed Colby's second complaint, filed in August 1993, as untimely under the three-year statute of limitations in Wis. Stat. § 893.54, but the court of appeals reversed, holding that the initial filing tolled the limitations period. The Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, ruling that the premature complaint did not toll the statute because compliance with the statutory notice and waiting requirements is a condition precedent to commencing an action, consistent with prior precedent in Maynard v. De Vries. The court reconciled the relevant statutes by concluding that tolling under Wis. Stat. § 893.13 applies only to properly commenced actions and overruled conflicting portions of Fox v. Smith.

proceduretorts & liability

This case involved a dispute over liability on a consumer loan where Karen Fisher Duncan co-signed a note with her ex-husband that was later renewed by River Bank of De Soto without her signature; after the ex-husband defaulted and the collateral was lost, the bank sought to collect from Duncan under prior notes and a standard renewal clause. The circuit court found the bank's conduct unconscionable under the Wisconsin Consumer Act, relieving Duncan of liability and awarding her attorney fees, but the court of appeals reversed that finding. The Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, holding that Duncan was not liable on the 1992 renewal note because she never signed it and that the bank's mistaken but erroneous conduct throughout the transaction did not rise to the level of unconscionability under Wis. Stat. §425.107.

business & regulatory

The case concerned whether an insurer could file a separate declaratory judgment action against its insured to resolve questions of coverage and duty to defend in an underlying wrongful death lawsuit, rather than intervening in that suit. The Wisconsin Supreme Court ruled that a separate declaratory judgment action is an acceptable procedure when the insurer is not a named party to the underlying action, but that the plaintiffs from the underlying suit must be joined as interested parties under Wis. Stat. § 806.04(11). The court reasoned that intervention followed by bifurcation is not the exclusive method for coverage disputes, yet all interested parties must participate in the declaratory action, and consolidation of proceedings may be ordered where appropriate to prevent duplication.

proceduretorts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory

In State v. McCall, the defendant was convicted of second-degree reckless injury after shooting the victim during an altercation in his apartment. The court of appeals had reversed the conviction, holding that the trial court violated the defendant's confrontation rights by barring cross-examination of the victim about three dismissed charges pending against him at the time of trial. The Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed that decision and reinstated the conviction, ruling that the circuit court properly exercised its discretion to exclude the line of questioning because the proffered evidence was irrelevant and any limited probative value was substantially outweighed by risks of unfair prejudice, jury confusion, and waste of time under Wis. Stat. § 904.03.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Gary Lewis Petty, who pleaded guilty in October 1991 in Wisconsin state court to possession of cocaine with intent to deliver and was later sentenced on that charge, after which he entered a federal guilty plea to a conspiracy charge encompassing the same time period and incident. Petty sought post-conviction relief to vacate the state conviction under Wis. Stat. § 161.45 on the ground that it was barred by the subsequent federal conspiracy conviction, and he challenged the court of appeals' application of judicial estoppel to his claim. The Wisconsin Supreme Court concluded that judicial estoppel did not apply because Petty had not maintained inconsistent positions or manipulated the judicial process. The court further held that § 161.45 did not bar the state conviction, reasoning that the statute's prohibition turns on the timing of when guilt is determined and that the state court's determination of guilt preceded the federal proceedings, so the state conviction was affirmed on different grounds.

criminal lawprocedure