Jon P. Wilcox

In this case, two girls who had been placed by Dane County in the same foster home sued the county and its officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after suffering physical and sexual abuse there, alleging violation of their constitutional right to safe placement. The Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals, holding that the officials were not entitled to qualified immunity, that the applicable standard for the constitutional duty was one of professional judgment rather than deliberate indifference, and that the county was not entitled to summary judgment. The court reasoned that the right to protection from harm in foster care was clearly established at the time, relying on precedents such as DeShaney and Seventh Circuit decisions that recognized liability when officials knowingly place children in dangerous environments without exercising professional judgment.

civil rightsfamily law

The case involved a personal injury lawsuit filed by Clinton Colby against Columbia County after a 1990 car accident that left him quadriplegic; Colby submitted a formal claim to the county in February 1993 but filed his initial complaint just two days later, before the required 120-day disallowance period under Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1)(b) had passed, leading to dismissal of that action without prejudice. The circuit court then dismissed Colby's second complaint, filed in August 1993, as untimely under the three-year statute of limitations in Wis. Stat. § 893.54, but the court of appeals reversed, holding that the initial filing tolled the limitations period. The Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, ruling that the premature complaint did not toll the statute because compliance with the statutory notice and waiting requirements is a condition precedent to commencing an action, consistent with prior precedent in Maynard v. De Vries. The court reconciled the relevant statutes by concluding that tolling under Wis. Stat. § 893.13 applies only to properly commenced actions and overruled conflicting portions of Fox v. Smith.

proceduretorts & liability

This case involved a dispute over liability on a consumer loan where Karen Fisher Duncan co-signed a note with her ex-husband that was later renewed by River Bank of De Soto without her signature; after the ex-husband defaulted and the collateral was lost, the bank sought to collect from Duncan under prior notes and a standard renewal clause. The circuit court found the bank's conduct unconscionable under the Wisconsin Consumer Act, relieving Duncan of liability and awarding her attorney fees, but the court of appeals reversed that finding. The Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, holding that Duncan was not liable on the 1992 renewal note because she never signed it and that the bank's mistaken but erroneous conduct throughout the transaction did not rise to the level of unconscionability under Wis. Stat. §425.107.

business & regulatory

The case concerned whether an insurer could file a separate declaratory judgment action against its insured to resolve questions of coverage and duty to defend in an underlying wrongful death lawsuit, rather than intervening in that suit. The Wisconsin Supreme Court ruled that a separate declaratory judgment action is an acceptable procedure when the insurer is not a named party to the underlying action, but that the plaintiffs from the underlying suit must be joined as interested parties under Wis. Stat. § 806.04(11). The court reasoned that intervention followed by bifurcation is not the exclusive method for coverage disputes, yet all interested parties must participate in the declaratory action, and consolidation of proceedings may be ordered where appropriate to prevent duplication.

proceduretorts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory

In State v. McCall, the defendant was convicted of second-degree reckless injury after shooting the victim during an altercation in his apartment. The court of appeals had reversed the conviction, holding that the trial court violated the defendant's confrontation rights by barring cross-examination of the victim about three dismissed charges pending against him at the time of trial. The Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed that decision and reinstated the conviction, ruling that the circuit court properly exercised its discretion to exclude the line of questioning because the proffered evidence was irrelevant and any limited probative value was substantially outweighed by risks of unfair prejudice, jury confusion, and waste of time under Wis. Stat. § 904.03.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Gary Lewis Petty, who pleaded guilty in October 1991 in Wisconsin state court to possession of cocaine with intent to deliver and was later sentenced on that charge, after which he entered a federal guilty plea to a conspiracy charge encompassing the same time period and incident. Petty sought post-conviction relief to vacate the state conviction under Wis. Stat. § 161.45 on the ground that it was barred by the subsequent federal conspiracy conviction, and he challenged the court of appeals' application of judicial estoppel to his claim. The Wisconsin Supreme Court concluded that judicial estoppel did not apply because Petty had not maintained inconsistent positions or manipulated the judicial process. The court further held that § 161.45 did not bar the state conviction, reasoning that the statute's prohibition turns on the timing of when guilt is determined and that the state court's determination of guilt preceded the federal proceedings, so the state conviction was affirmed on different grounds.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a dispute under the Wisconsin Fair Dealership Law regarding whether a gas station operator was entitled to 90 days' notice before the property owner undertook extensive renovations that disrupted business operations. The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the statute's notice requirement for substantial changes in competitive circumstances applies regardless of whether such changes are permitted by the dealership agreement, and that the seven-month construction period here constituted such a change. The court reasoned that interpreting the law to allow grantors to make disruptive changes without notice would undermine the legislature's intent to protect dealers with inferior bargaining power. Therefore, the court reversed the appellate decision and required compliance with the notice provision.

business & regulatory

In State v. Sartin, the defendant was convicted after a jury trial of two counts of possession of controlled substances (cocaine base and cocaine) with intent to deliver within 1,000 feet of a pool, as party to a crime. The Wisconsin Supreme Court addressed whether the state must prove that the defendant knew the specific identity of the substances or only that they were controlled or illegal. The court held that the state need only prove the defendant's knowledge or belief that the possessed substances were illegal or controlled, without requiring proof of the exact chemical nature or name. It further concluded that the party-to-a-crime conspiracy instruction did not violate due process, as it aligned with this standard of knowledge. The court affirmed the conviction and the court of appeals decision.

criminal law

This case is a divorce proceeding between Michael Luciani and Dr. Angelina Montemurro-Luciani concerning child support, maintenance, and tax exemptions for their two minor children, who primarily reside with Dr. Montemurro. The circuit court applied Wisconsin's statutory percentage guidelines requiring Luciani to pay 24% of his income as child support, along with a three-year maintenance award to Luciani. The court of appeals reversed the child support determination, finding the guidelines unfair given the large income disparity. The Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals on child support, holding that the percentage standards presumptively apply even when the custodial parent has substantially higher income unless the payer demonstrates unfairness by the greater weight of credible evidence, and it affirmed the maintenance and tax exemption rulings.

family law

This case involved a defendant charged with armed burglary who was bound over for trial after a preliminary hearing where the court commissioner found probable cause for a different felony (theft of a firearm) but not for the specific charge alleged. The issues certified on appeal were whether Wisconsin's preliminary hearing statute created an equal protection violation by applying different probable cause standards to single-count versus multi-count complaints, and whether a prosecutor could reallege in the information the same charge for which no probable cause had been found. The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the statute treats single and multiple count complaints the same, requiring only probable cause as to each transactionally distinct count, and that prosecutors may charge any transactionally related felony in the information regardless of the commissioner's specific findings on individual charges. The core reasoning was that the bindover decision focuses on whether a felony occurred, after which the prosecutor retains broad discretion under the charging statute so long as the charge is not wholly unrelated to the evidence presented.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a dispute over whether the estate of Dorothy Cooney could recover federal and Wisconsin estate taxes paid on assets in a QTIP marital trust created by her late husband from the trust itself. The trust assets were included in her taxable estate under federal law due to a QTIP election, and her estate paid over $3 million in taxes attributable to those assets. The court held that a general pay-all-taxes clause in her will did not constitute an "otherwise direction" under 26 U.S.C. § 2207A(a)(2) to waive the estate's right to reimbursement of federal taxes from the trust, adopting a rule requiring clear expression of intent to shift such burdens. However, the court ruled that the estate had no right to reimbursement for Wisconsin estate taxes because state law lacks any analogous reimbursement provision. The decision affirmed the court of appeals in part and reversed in part on these tax recovery issues.

taxespropertyfamily law

This case concerned a claim by minor Anthony Rockweit that Ann Tynan was negligent for failing to extinguish embers in a campfire pit at a Wisconsin campground, into which Anthony fell and sustained injuries while camping with family and friends. The jury found Tynan seven percent causally negligent, but the trial court granted her a directed verdict on the ground that she owed no duty to warn or remedy the hazard. The court of appeals reversed, holding that Tynan owed a common-law duty of ordinary care and that sufficient evidence supported the negligence finding. The Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, concluding that while Tynan owed Anthony a duty of ordinary care that the jury found breached, public policy precluded imposing liability on a mere guest who did not create or maintain the fire.

torts & liability

The case concerned a challenge to Governor Tommy Thompson's partial veto of the 1993 Executive Budget Bill, in which he reduced an appropriation for the Public Service Commission's intervenor financing from $350,000 to $250,000 by striking the original figure and writing in a smaller one. Petitioners, including the Citizens Utility Board and legislative leaders, argued that the Wisconsin Constitution's grant of power to approve appropriation bills "in part" did not allow the governor to substitute a new numerical amount. The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that Article V, section 10 permits such action because the partial veto authority extends to any separable part of an appropriation bill, including the specific dollar figures, without creating new words by altering individual letters. The decision rested on the constitutional text, its 1930 amendment history, and precedents upholding creative exercises of the partial veto power as long as they operated on the bill's contents as presented.

business & regulatorytaxes

The case involved Gorton Farms' claims against American Cyanamid for damage to its corn crops caused by carryover effects from the herbicide SCEPTER, which had been applied to prior soybean crops; the claims included negligent misrepresentation, breach of warranty, and failure to warn, with the jury awarding compensatory and punitive damages plus attorney fees. The Wisconsin Supreme Court addressed whether the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) preempts such state common law tort claims against a registered pesticide manufacturer. The court held that FIFRA does not preempt Gorton Farms' negligent misrepresentation claim and that attorney fees under Wis. Stat. § 100.18 were properly awarded. Its reasoning centered on the U.S. Supreme Court's Cipollone decision, which limits FIFRA's express preemption of state labeling requirements to not encompass all common law damage actions, particularly those based on misrepresentation rather than inadequate warnings.

environmentfederal powertorts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory

This case concerns whether one co-guarantor of corporate promissory notes may bring an action for contribution against another co-guarantor after paying more than his share of the debt, even though each signed a separate guaranty instrument secured by individual mortgages. The circuit court granted summary judgment to the defendant, holding that separate contracts precluded a contribution claim and that no unjust enrichment supported subrogation. The court of appeals reversed on the contribution issue, and the Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that contribution is an equitable remedy founded on principles of natural justice rather than contract, allowing recovery when co-guarantors are liable for the same underlying debt. The court further held that a material factual dispute existed regarding whether the plaintiff had paid an unfair share, warranting remand for further proceedings.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved investors who sued their financial advisor and related company for alleged securities law violations and misrepresentations in the sale of limited partnerships and mutual funds. The dispute proceeded to NASD arbitration, where the panel granted a directed verdict for the defendants, but the investors moved to vacate the award on grounds that one arbitrator was evidently partial under Wis. Stat. sec. 788.10(1)(b) due to undisclosed campaign contributions from attorneys at the defendants' law firm. The circuit court and court of appeals agreed that evident partiality existed and vacated the award, but the Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed, concluding the arbitrator was not evidently partial. The court's reasoning was that the contributions were small amounts from non-participating attorneys in an unsuccessful prior campaign, the NASD disclosure forms did not require reporting them, and the applicable standard requires a direct and demonstrable bias rather than a mere appearance of partiality.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case concerned whether a juvenile detained in secure custody before a delinquency adjudication is entitled to credit for time served toward a subsequent disposition order, similar to the credit adults receive under sentencing statutes. The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that no such credit is available to juveniles under the Children's Code. The court reasoned that the absence of a parallel statutory provision does not violate due process or equal protection because juvenile proceedings focus on rehabilitation rather than punishment and follow distinct procedures that need not mirror adult criminal processes. It further concluded that the Children's Code does not implicitly authorize circuit courts to grant such credit.

criminal lawcivil rightsfamily law

This case involved a plumber injured when a cast iron pipe fell from ceiling rafters during a construction project at UW-Stevens Point; he sued the roofing subcontractor Fobe's Roofing, Inc. for negligence, alleging its employees or equipment caused the pipe to dislodge. The jury returned a verdict finding no negligence by either party, and the circuit court had denied the plaintiff's requests for a res ipsa loquitur instruction as well as specific instructions on lookout, management and control, and contractor duties to a subcontractor's employee. The Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals decision upholding the verdict and the denial of those instructions. The court clarified that the standard of review for refusing a res ipsa loquitur instruction is whether the evidence is so substantial that it precludes the inference of negligence from circumstantial evidence alone, and it held that the specific evidence of a possible act by the defendant (use of a cart on the roof) and the general negligence instructions given made the requested instructions unnecessary or improper.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case involved a negligence claim by William Swatek against Dane County and its sheriff, alleging failure to provide adequate medical care while he was in custody on an arrest warrant. Swatek had complained of abdominal pain, was examined by a jail nurse who determined he could wait for treatment, and later underwent surgery for appendicitis after transfer to another jail. The circuit court granted summary judgment dismissing the claim, finding the defendants had fulfilled their duties under Wis. Stat. sec. 302.38(1). The court of appeals reversed on that issue, but the Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, holding that the statute unambiguously requires appropriate medical care for prisoners but grants jail keepers discretion in how to provide it. The Court concluded that the undisputed facts showed the defendants had discharged this duty as a matter of law through the nurse's examination and assessment.

criminal lawhealthcaretorts & liability

The case concerned the validity of an ordinance by which the City of Madison annexed 187.5 acres from the Town of Blooming Grove, creating an area of the town that was bordered on some sides by Madison but also adjoined by other towns and villages. The circuit court and court of appeals held the ordinance invalid under Wis. Stat. § 66.021(15), relying on prior precedent that interpreted the statute to bar creation of a "functional town island." The Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the statute's final sentence is unambiguous and prohibits only annexations that result in a town area completely surrounded by the annexing city or village. Because the annexed area here was not fully encircled by Madison alone, the ordinance did not violate the statute.

business & regulatory