Sarah D. Grant

In JC Penney v. Lane, J.C. Penney obtained a default judgment in Coconino County justice court, transferred it to Coconino County Superior Court, and later attempted to renew it by filing an affidavit of renewal in Maricopa County Superior Court due to a clerical error, missing the statutory deadline in the correct county. The trial court granted Penney's motion to enter the affidavit nunc pro tunc and later vacated and reentered its order under Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 60(c)(6) to permit an appeal after the clerk failed to provide notice of entry. On appeal, the Arizona Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in vacating and reentering the order to allow a timely appeal, but reversed the ruling on renewal, concluding that the judgment renewal statutes require strict filing in the superior court of the county where the judgment was docketed and that filing in the wrong county was not a correctable error. The court remanded with directions to deny the nunc pro tunc motion, emphasizing that the statutes demand strict compliance to provide proper notice to interested parties.

procedure

This case is a divorce appeal in which the wife challenged the successor trial judge's rulings on property division, debt allocation, spousal maintenance, and attorney's fees after the original judge declared a mistrial and recused himself upon receiving the wife's ex parte letter criticizing her own attorney and the proceedings. The Court of Appeals held that the successor judge erred by denying the wife's request for a trial de novo and instead deciding the case on the prior trial transcript over her objection. The core reasoning was that the mistrial stemmed from events that could have affected the fairness of the original trial, credibility of witnesses may have been at issue in the disputed matters, and proceeding on the transcript without consent did not adequately protect the parties' rights to a full hearing before an impartial decision-maker.

family lawprocedure

The case involved adoptive parents suing Catholic Family and Community Services (CFCS) and the Roman Catholic Diocese of Phoenix for failing to disclose full non-identifying medical and social information about their adopted daughter's biological mother at the time of the 1976 adoption and again in 1982 despite a court order, which they alleged prevented them from making an informed decision and obtaining timely care for the child's issues. The parents brought claims including fraud, negligent misrepresentation, negligence, breach of contract, and constructive fraud based on breach of fiduciary duty, along with vicarious liability against the Diocese. The trial court directed verdicts for the defendants on the contract, constructive fraud, and vicarious liability claims, and the jury found for CFCS on the remaining claims. The appeals court reversed the directed verdict on the constructive fraud claim, holding that the parents presented sufficient evidence of a confidential or fiduciary relationship with CFCS to submit the issue to a jury, and remanded for a new trial while affirming other rulings.

family lawtorts & liabilityprocedure

In Calik v. Superior Court, the petitioner, a first-time offender convicted of possessing methamphetamine, challenged the trial court's authority to impose county jail time as a condition of probation under Arizona's Proposition 200, which mandates probation and drug treatment for nonviolent first-time drug offenses. The court held that Proposition 200 does not prohibit such jail incarceration as a probation condition. The core reasoning was that the proposition's language addresses only prison sentences and related costs, without referencing jails, while Arizona's general probation statute (A.R.S. § 13-901(F)) expressly authorizes limited jail time; the initiative's focus on reducing prison overcrowding for violent offenders leaves other probation conditions intact. The decision turned on statutory interpretation distinguishing jails from prisons and finding no conflict with the proposition's text or purpose.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Ramon Escobar-Mendez, who was convicted by a jury of two counts of sexual conduct with a minor based on assaults against Y.T. that occurred between 1984 and 1987 when she was a child. The trial court imposed consecutive aggravated prison sentences of fourteen years on each count, and Escobar-Mendez appealed, arguing that the seven-year statute of limitations under A.R.S. section 13-107 barred the prosecution. The court of appeals affirmed the convictions and sentences, holding that Arizona's criminal statutes of limitations begin to run only when the state actually discovers or should have discovered the offense, that the state exercised reasonable diligence in investigating once a lead emerged in 1994, and that any delay resulted from the defendant's coercive threats and concealment rather than state inaction.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved an incarcerated felon who sought to file a civil complaint in superior court but was denied because he could not pay the $140 filing fee upfront, as required by A.R.S. § 12-302(L)(2) for non-domestic-relations cases filed by felons. The court accepted special-action jurisdiction to address whether the statute unconstitutionally barred access to the courts. It held that A.R.S. § 12-302(E) expressly permits deferral of fees for inmates confined in facilities operated by the Arizona Department of Corrections, allowing payment over time from prison accounts, and that subsection (L)(2) therefore did not apply to the petitioner. The court remanded with instructions to accept the complaint and collect fees pursuant to the deferral provisions, without reaching the constitutional question for inmates not covered by subsection (E).

criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure