Sarah D. Grant

In JC Penney v. Lane, J.C. Penney obtained a default judgment in Coconino County justice court, transferred it to Coconino County Superior Court, and later attempted to renew it by filing an affidavit of renewal in Maricopa County Superior Court due to a clerical error, missing the statutory deadline in the correct county. The trial court granted Penney's motion to enter the affidavit nunc pro tunc and later vacated and reentered its order under Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 60(c)(6) to permit an appeal after the clerk failed to provide notice of entry. On appeal, the Arizona Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in vacating and reentering the order to allow a timely appeal, but reversed the ruling on renewal, concluding that the judgment renewal statutes require strict filing in the superior court of the county where the judgment was docketed and that filing in the wrong county was not a correctable error. The court remanded with directions to deny the nunc pro tunc motion, emphasizing that the statutes demand strict compliance to provide proper notice to interested parties.

procedure

This case is a divorce appeal in which the wife challenged the successor trial judge's rulings on property division, debt allocation, spousal maintenance, and attorney's fees after the original judge declared a mistrial and recused himself upon receiving the wife's ex parte letter criticizing her own attorney and the proceedings. The Court of Appeals held that the successor judge erred by denying the wife's request for a trial de novo and instead deciding the case on the prior trial transcript over her objection. The core reasoning was that the mistrial stemmed from events that could have affected the fairness of the original trial, credibility of witnesses may have been at issue in the disputed matters, and proceeding on the transcript without consent did not adequately protect the parties' rights to a full hearing before an impartial decision-maker.

family lawprocedure

The case involved adoptive parents suing Catholic Family and Community Services (CFCS) and the Roman Catholic Diocese of Phoenix for failing to disclose full non-identifying medical and social information about their adopted daughter's biological mother at the time of the 1976 adoption and again in 1982 despite a court order, which they alleged prevented them from making an informed decision and obtaining timely care for the child's issues. The parents brought claims including fraud, negligent misrepresentation, negligence, breach of contract, and constructive fraud based on breach of fiduciary duty, along with vicarious liability against the Diocese. The trial court directed verdicts for the defendants on the contract, constructive fraud, and vicarious liability claims, and the jury found for CFCS on the remaining claims. The appeals court reversed the directed verdict on the constructive fraud claim, holding that the parents presented sufficient evidence of a confidential or fiduciary relationship with CFCS to submit the issue to a jury, and remanded for a new trial while affirming other rulings.

family lawtorts & liabilityprocedure

In Calik v. Superior Court, the petitioner, a first-time offender convicted of possessing methamphetamine, challenged the trial court's authority to impose county jail time as a condition of probation under Arizona's Proposition 200, which mandates probation and drug treatment for nonviolent first-time drug offenses. The court held that Proposition 200 does not prohibit such jail incarceration as a probation condition. The core reasoning was that the proposition's language addresses only prison sentences and related costs, without referencing jails, while Arizona's general probation statute (A.R.S. § 13-901(F)) expressly authorizes limited jail time; the initiative's focus on reducing prison overcrowding for violent offenders leaves other probation conditions intact. The decision turned on statutory interpretation distinguishing jails from prisons and finding no conflict with the proposition's text or purpose.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Ramon Escobar-Mendez, who was convicted by a jury of two counts of sexual conduct with a minor based on assaults against Y.T. that occurred between 1984 and 1987 when she was a child. The trial court imposed consecutive aggravated prison sentences of fourteen years on each count, and Escobar-Mendez appealed, arguing that the seven-year statute of limitations under A.R.S. section 13-107 barred the prosecution. The court of appeals affirmed the convictions and sentences, holding that Arizona's criminal statutes of limitations begin to run only when the state actually discovers or should have discovered the offense, that the state exercised reasonable diligence in investigating once a lead emerged in 1994, and that any delay resulted from the defendant's coercive threats and concealment rather than state inaction.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved an incarcerated felon who sought to file a civil complaint in superior court but was denied because he could not pay the $140 filing fee upfront, as required by A.R.S. § 12-302(L)(2) for non-domestic-relations cases filed by felons. The court accepted special-action jurisdiction to address whether the statute unconstitutionally barred access to the courts. It held that A.R.S. § 12-302(E) expressly permits deferral of fees for inmates confined in facilities operated by the Arizona Department of Corrections, allowing payment over time from prison accounts, and that subsection (L)(2) therefore did not apply to the petitioner. The court remanded with instructions to accept the complaint and collect fees pursuant to the deferral provisions, without reaching the constitutional question for inmates not covered by subsection (E).

criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure

This case concerned a personal injury lawsuit filed by Robyn Johnson against Robert Elson following a motor vehicle accident. After the parties stipulated to delay discovery, the trial court placed the matter on the inactive calendar and later dismissed it without prejudice for lack of prosecution. Upon the plaintiff's motion, the trial court vacated the dismissal and reinstated the action, which the appellate court affirmed. The court held that the reinstatement was a proper exercise of discretion under Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 60(c)(1) because the plaintiff demonstrated excusable neglect from failed notice of the dismissal, acted promptly by filing within thirty days, and presented a meritorious claim supported by a related settlement and the parties' stipulation.

proceduretorts & liability

In State v. Lefevre, defendant Elaine Lefevre was convicted of second-degree money laundering after she received payments funneled through a bank account in connection with her role on a city planning committee, where she allegedly conditioned her support for zoning changes on contributions to favored charities. She appealed solely on the ground that Arizona’s money laundering statute is unconstitutionally vague because it imposes liability on anyone who has “reason to know” the funds are proceeds of an offense. The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction and sentence. The court held that the “reason to know” standard provides fair notice and is comparable to the familiar reasonableness inquiry used in negligence determinations, which juries routinely apply without rendering a statute impermissibly vague.

criminal law

In Lind v. Superior Court, the defendant sought to suppress blood test results from vials drawn by hospital staff after a car accident but before his arrest or a showing of probable cause; the hospital had drawn extra blood per its protocol and later provided a portion to police upon their request and certification of probable cause under A.R.S. § 28-692(J). The trial court denied the motion to suppress, and the appellate court accepted special action jurisdiction to address the statutory interpretation issue. The court upheld the statute's constitutionality as applied, holding that the blood was initially drawn for medical purposes and that providing a portion to law enforcement after probable cause was established did not constitute an unreasonable search or violate the defendant's rights. It reasoned that the hospital retained control until the lawful request, no additional bodily intrusion occurred, and the statute's language permitting samples drawn 'for any reason' encompassed this scenario without requiring a second draw.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Leslie McDonald appealing her conviction for keeping a house of prostitution, a class 5 felony under Arizona law, after an undercover officer arranged a massage at her apartment during which she offered sexual services. The court affirmed the conviction and sentence. It reasoned that the statute's definitions of "house of prostitution" and "operate or maintain" do not require multiple prostitutes and plainly apply to a single individual managing such activities from her own apartment, rejecting claims that the law was limited to larger operations or unconstitutionally vague as applied.

criminal law

This case involved a dispute between Liberty Mutual and its insureds over underinsured motorist coverage following an accident in which the insureds' son was injured by a driver who settled for policy limits. The insureds submitted a UIM claim more than five years later, leading to arbitration that awarded the policy limit, which Liberty Mutual sought to appeal under a policy clause allowing de novo trial if the award met or exceeded Arizona's $15,000 financial responsibility minimum; the insureds argued the clause violated public policy favoring arbitration, while Liberty Mutual also contested the timeliness of notice. The court held that the arbitration appeal provision was enforceable and consistent with state policy, affirmed summary judgment for the insureds on the notice issue because the insurer showed no prejudice from the delay, and remanded for a new trial. The decision rested on the view that such appeal clauses support arbitration goals without undermining them, and on the absence of evidence that late notice harmed the insurer's position.

business & regulatoryproceduretorts & liability

This case is a special action by the State challenging city court and superior court rulings that found no probable cause to arrest Michael Daniel Seidel for DUI under Arizona statutes. The facts involved a citizen informant who personally observed Seidel driving erratically while intoxicated, drove him to a police station, and alerted officers, who then observed his intoxication and behavior but did not witness the driving themselves. The court held that the proper standard of review on appeal from the city court is de novo, that probable cause existed as a matter of law based on the informant's eyewitness account combined with the officers' observations, and that officers need not independently investigate or witness the conduct when relying on such a citizen-informant. The court remanded with directions to reverse the suppression order and proceed to trial.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a lawsuit by EnerGCorp against the Arizona State Compensation Fund alleging bad faith and negligence in the handling of workers' compensation insurance policies, resulting in higher premiums. The State Fund sought to dismiss the claims for failure to comply with the notice-of-claim statute and one-year statute of limitations applicable to public entities. The court held that the State Fund qualifies as a public entity under the relevant statutes because it was established by state law to provide workers' compensation insurance and its operations involve public funds and purposes. Consequently, the claims were barred due to the lack of timely notice, leading to remand for summary judgment in favor of the State Fund.

procedurelabor & employmentbusiness & regulatory

In State v. Virgo, the defendant was convicted by a jury of two counts of simple possession of marijuana as lesser-included offenses after being charged with possession and transportation for sale; the trial court used a party stipulation that 35 pounds were seized to classify both as class 4 felonies and imposed two sentences. The Arizona Court of Appeals held that convicting and sentencing the defendant twice for the same marijuana violated double jeopardy, requiring dismissal of one count. It further held that the trial court could not rely on the stipulation to establish the marijuana's weight for felony classification purposes because the jury instructions and verdict forms for the lesser-included offense did not require the jury to find the weight beyond a reasonable doubt, so the convictions must be treated as class 6 felonies. The court reasoned that only the jury may determine offense elements that increase the crime's classification or sentence, and a stipulation is not a substitute for an explicit jury finding on that element.

criminal lawprocedure

The case was a breach of contract action in which ABC Supply sought to recover amounts owed for roofing materials sold on credit to D&E Roofing, plus interest and contractual attorneys' fees. After an arbitrator and then the trial court initially awarded ABC substantial fees, the trial court reduced the fee award from $22,892 to $2,500 following D&E's objection and an evidentiary hearing. On appeal, ABC argued that res judicata and collateral estoppel barred reconsideration of the fee award and that the reduction was an abuse of discretion, but the court held those arguments waived because ABC had not raised them below and had itself sought to relitigate the fees; it affirmed the reduced award as reasonable and imposed sanctions on ABC's counsel under A.R.S. § 12-349 for needlessly extending the litigation.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

The case involved the State of Arizona, through its Department of Economic Security, seeking to establish paternity and child support obligations for a child born in 1989, based on blood test results showing a 99.78% probability of paternity and the respondent's admission. After summary judgment on paternity, the trial court held a support hearing without the incarcerated respondent's participation, despite allowing telephonic appearance, and entered support orders; the respondent's subsequent motions to reconsider and set aside the judgment under Rule 60(c) were denied. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, holding that while telephonic appearance satisfies due process, the trial court must issue an order to the Arizona Department of Corrections ensuring the respondent's access to a telephone at the hearing time, with costs for the call borne by the court if the respondent is indigent. The court clarified that the Department of Corrections must facilitate access and security but need not pay call costs, and jurisdiction was limited to issues in the post-judgment motions since direct appeal of the original orders was untimely.

family lawprocedurecivil rights

This case involved a forcible detainer action brought by RREEF Management Company, as agent for the property owner, against Camex Productions, Inc., seeking possession of industrial property in Tempe, Arizona, along with unpaid rent and related charges. The dispute centered on whether a valid landlord-tenant relationship existed, given that the lease was signed before Camex's incorporation by an individual who was not an officer of the company, though the company later occupied the premises and paid rent from its account. The court held that the trial court had jurisdiction to proceed under the forcible entry and detainer statutes because Camex was in possession and payments indicated a tenancy, but it erred by including a monetary award for rent in the judgment, which is not permitted in such summary proceedings. The court also affirmed the denial of attorney fees, noting they were unavailable under the applicable commercial lease statutes at the time. The judgment was modified to set aside the monetary award while upholding the writ of restitution.

propertyprocedure

This case involved a consolidated juvenile delinquency and dependency proceeding concerning a minor with significant behavioral, cognitive, and academic challenges who had been made a ward of the court. The juvenile court ordered the minor placed in a specialized residential program in Florida and required the Arizona Department of Economic Security (D.E.S.) to cover half the costs, after determining no suitable in-state options existed and D.E.S. divisions had not found the minor eligible for other services. D.E.S. appealed, arguing the court lacked authority for the out-of-state placement and cost allocation. The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the juvenile court acted within its discretion under state statutes governing delinquency dispositions and dependency care, that D.E.S. was obligated to assist with placements and share costs for institutional care of dependent children, and that the record supported the choice of the Florida program as meeting the minor's needs.

criminal lawfamily law

In Forino v. Arizona Department of Transportation, the case concerned whether the Arizona Department of Transportation lost jurisdiction to suspend a driver's license for refusing a breath test when it failed to hold the required implied consent hearing within the 30-day period specified by A.R.S. sections 28-691 and 28-446. The driver, arrested for suspected DUI in December 1995, requested a hearing in January 1996, but the hearing did not occur until April 1996, after which the one-year suspension was upheld. The superior court and court of appeals both affirmed the suspension. The core reasoning was that the statutory time limit is directory rather than mandatory, so the delay does not void ADOT's jurisdiction or the suspension order absent any demonstrated prejudice to the driver, whose license suspension was stayed during the proceedings.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a dispute over whether a homeowner's insurance policy covered damages from a sexual molestation incident. The insured, who pleaded guilty to attempted child molestation, claimed the act was unintentional due to voluntary intoxication, and the victim, as assignee of the insured's rights, sued the insurer for coverage after a stipulated judgment. The court decided that the policy's intentional acts exclusion applied, barring coverage. The reasoning centered on the guilty plea establishing intent to commit the act, which estops denial of intentional conduct, and Arizona law holding that voluntary intoxication does not negate the intent required for the exclusion to apply.

criminal lawbusiness & regulatorytorts & liability