The case involved challenges by three electric power companies to a 1931 South Carolina statute imposing a five-tenths of one mill excise tax on the generation and sale of electric power within the state. The plaintiffs argued that the tax violated the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and the South Carolina Constitution, burdened interstate commerce, and could not apply to power plants built in navigable rivers under federal authority as those were immune federal agencies. A three-judge federal court denied the requests for interlocutory injunctions. The court reasoned that the tax was a valid excise on private business activity equivalent to a property tax, did not discriminate against or unduly burden interstate commerce, and that federally authorized dams used for private power generation remained subject to state taxation under established precedent distinguishing government privileges from taxable private operations.
The case involved a South Carolina manufacturing corporation seeking to enjoin the state tax commission from collecting documentary stamp taxes assessed on promissory notes the company had executed in favor of out-of-state banks. The court denied the application for an interlocutory injunction with respect to notes that were signed and mailed from within South Carolina. The court reasoned that the taxable event was the creation and signing of the documents within the state, which gave them a taxable situs there regardless of the banks' location or the possibility of later revocation or rejection. It further held that the tax did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment and was not a burden on interstate commerce because the notes were mere personal contracts rather than articles of commerce.
This case is a maritime salvage action brought against the steamship Shreveport after explosions and fire on September 12, 1928, endangered the vessel and crew while en route from Philadelphia. The Strachan Shipping Company, as charterer of the Mariners Harbor, along with its owner, master, crew, and intervening life salvors from the Aldecoa, sought awards for services that included rescuing the Shreveport's surviving crew and standing by the burning ship. The court awarded a total of $60,000 in salvage to the Mariners Harbor interests, allocating roughly half to the owner and charterer and half to the crew (with special awards to the captain and boarding party), while recognizing the Aldecoa's intervention rights; it based the amounts on the value of the salved property, the degree of danger, the skill and risk of the salvors, and the time and effort expended, with costs assessed against the claimant.
The case involved a widow suing the Port Utilities Commission of Charleston and the City of Charleston under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act for the death of her husband, a railroad conductor killed due to negligence while shifting freight cars in interstate commerce. The defendants demurred, arguing that as municipal corporations they enjoyed immunity from tort liability under South Carolina law and that FELA did not override that immunity. The court overruled the demurrers, holding that the suit could proceed. It reasoned that Congress has authority to impose liability on entities engaged in interstate commerce and that FELA creates an independent federal cause of action that applies regardless of state-law immunities for municipalities.
The case involved a dispute where the plaintiff sued the defendant in state court for an amount below the federal jurisdictional threshold. The defendant responded with a counterclaim exceeding that amount, prompting the plaintiff to remove the case to federal court, which the defendant sought to remand. The court denied the motion to remand, holding that the defendant, by filing the counterclaim, effectively became the plaintiff with respect to that claim, allowing the original plaintiff to remove as the defendant to the counterclaim under the Removal Act. This interpretation aligns with both the letter and spirit of the law, preventing nonresidents from being forced to choose between pursuing small claims or waiving federal court access for larger counterclaims.
The case involved a claim of copyright infringement by the owners of the musical composition "Sleepy Time Gal" against the manager of a theater where the song was played on a piano player using a perforated roll during public performances. The defendants argued that they lacked notice of the copyright because it did not appear on the roll and they had no knowledge of the protected status. The court rejected this defense, holding that it was insufficient under the Copyright Act. It granted a permanent injunction prohibiting the defendants from publicly performing the composition for profit and awarded the plaintiffs $250 in damages, $50 in attorney's fees, and costs.