Ernest Ford Cochran

The case involved challenges by three electric power companies to a 1931 South Carolina statute imposing a five-tenths of one mill excise tax on the generation and sale of electric power within the state. The plaintiffs argued that the tax violated the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and the South Carolina Constitution, burdened interstate commerce, and could not apply to power plants built in navigable rivers under federal authority as those were immune federal agencies. A three-judge federal court denied the requests for interlocutory injunctions. The court reasoned that the tax was a valid excise on private business activity equivalent to a property tax, did not discriminate against or unduly burden interstate commerce, and that federally authorized dams used for private power generation remained subject to state taxation under established precedent distinguishing government privileges from taxable private operations.

taxesbusiness & regulatoryfederal power

The case involved a South Carolina manufacturing corporation seeking to enjoin the state tax commission from collecting documentary stamp taxes assessed on promissory notes the company had executed in favor of out-of-state banks. The court denied the application for an interlocutory injunction with respect to notes that were signed and mailed from within South Carolina. The court reasoned that the taxable event was the creation and signing of the documents within the state, which gave them a taxable situs there regardless of the banks' location or the possibility of later revocation or rejection. It further held that the tax did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment and was not a burden on interstate commerce because the notes were mere personal contracts rather than articles of commerce.

taxesbusiness & regulatory

This case is a maritime salvage action brought against the steamship Shreveport after explosions and fire on September 12, 1928, endangered the vessel and crew while en route from Philadelphia. The Strachan Shipping Company, as charterer of the Mariners Harbor, along with its owner, master, crew, and intervening life salvors from the Aldecoa, sought awards for services that included rescuing the Shreveport's surviving crew and standing by the burning ship. The court awarded a total of $60,000 in salvage to the Mariners Harbor interests, allocating roughly half to the owner and charterer and half to the crew (with special awards to the captain and boarding party), while recognizing the Aldecoa's intervention rights; it based the amounts on the value of the salved property, the degree of danger, the skill and risk of the salvors, and the time and effort expended, with costs assessed against the claimant.

propertyprocedure

The case involved a widow suing the Port Utilities Commission of Charleston and the City of Charleston under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act for the death of her husband, a railroad conductor killed due to negligence while shifting freight cars in interstate commerce. The defendants demurred, arguing that as municipal corporations they enjoyed immunity from tort liability under South Carolina law and that FELA did not override that immunity. The court overruled the demurrers, holding that the suit could proceed. It reasoned that Congress has authority to impose liability on entities engaged in interstate commerce and that FELA creates an independent federal cause of action that applies regardless of state-law immunities for municipalities.

federal powertorts & liabilitylabor & employment

The case involved a dispute where the plaintiff sued the defendant in state court for an amount below the federal jurisdictional threshold. The defendant responded with a counterclaim exceeding that amount, prompting the plaintiff to remove the case to federal court, which the defendant sought to remand. The court denied the motion to remand, holding that the defendant, by filing the counterclaim, effectively became the plaintiff with respect to that claim, allowing the original plaintiff to remove as the defendant to the counterclaim under the Removal Act. This interpretation aligns with both the letter and spirit of the law, preventing nonresidents from being forced to choose between pursuing small claims or waiving federal court access for larger counterclaims.

procedure

The case involved a claim of copyright infringement by the owners of the musical composition "Sleepy Time Gal" against the manager of a theater where the song was played on a piano player using a perforated roll during public performances. The defendants argued that they lacked notice of the copyright because it did not appear on the roll and they had no knowledge of the protected status. The court rejected this defense, holding that it was insufficient under the Copyright Act. It granted a permanent injunction prohibiting the defendants from publicly performing the composition for profit and awarded the plaintiffs $250 in damages, $50 in attorney's fees, and costs.

propertybusiness & regulatory

The case Buck v. Heretis involved a copyright infringement claim brought by the owners of the musical composition “I’ve Grown so Lonesome Thinking of You” against the operator of a restaurant who played the song on a phonograph for patrons without authorization. The defendant argued that he lacked notice of the copyright because it did not appear on the record. The court ruled that this did not constitute a valid defense under the Copyright Act and issued a permanent injunction against further public performances for profit, along with awarding $250 in damages, $50 in attorney’s fees, and costs to the plaintiffs.

propertybusiness & regulatory

This case involved a lawsuit to recover on a life insurance policy issued in 1924, where the insured died by suicide in 1926. The insurer moved for a directed verdict, arguing that the policy expressly excluded suicide as a covered risk within the first two years and that this defense remained available despite the passage of the incontestability period. The court granted the motion, holding that the suicide exclusion clause was separate from and consistent with the incontestability provision, which applied only to challenges to the policy's validity rather than to risks the company had never assumed. The court distinguished its own prior dictum on the issue and followed authorities that treated explicit risk exclusions as enforceable at any time.

business & regulatory

The case involved Southern Railway Company seeking to enjoin the South Carolina Tax Commission from collecting additional income taxes assessed on the company's interstate commerce earnings for the years 1921 through 1925. The court decided to grant an interlocutory injunction preventing the collection of the disputed taxes. The reasoning centered on the uncertainty and potential inadequacy of the legal remedies available to the taxpayer under South Carolina law, particularly following the enactment of the 1926 Tax Act, which limited remedies to suits against the commission rather than personal actions, thereby justifying the exercise of equity jurisdiction by the federal court. Additionally, there were disputes over the fairness of the tax commission's method of allocating interstate income to the state, which differed from the railway's approach based on mileage or ton-mileage.

taxesbusiness & regulatory

The case involved Philadelphia Life Insurance Company filing an equity bill to contest two life insurance policies on the life of Richard E. Wright, who died by suicide within the two-year contestable period, with one policy payable to his sister Sallie W. Burgess and the other changed to his estate. The company served the heirs and beneficiaries but later moved to add the newly appointed administrator as a party and to enjoin his separate lawsuit after the contestable period had expired. The court retained the action against Sallie Burgess individually on policy No. 80922 but dismissed the claims against the heirs on policy No. 80923, denied the motion to add the administrator nunc pro tunc, and refused to enjoin the administrator's action at law. The core reasoning was that contest must be brought against the proper parties within the incontestability period, and post-expiration amendments adding new parties are barred by principles analogous to statutes of limitations.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

This admiralty case concerned the distribution of proceeds from the judicial sale of the American steamship Trader after its owner, Coastwise Navigation Company, became insolvent. Seamen sought priority payment for unpaid wages plus statutory extra wages, passage money, and living expenses under Revised Statutes section 4529, while other creditors including the International Salt Company asserted competing claims and maritime liens. The court held that the seamen held a prior lien for their extra wages and related expenses because the owner's financial distress and failure to pay within the statutory period constituted insufficient cause for delay, and actual wages had already been disbursed by consent. It rejected the salt company's lien claim, however, because the salt was never delivered to or placed under the control of the vessel or master, so no reciprocal maritime contract relation arose. Remaining funds after costs were to be applied first to the seamen's living and passage expenses and then ratably among the other valid claimants.

labor & employmentbusiness & regulatoryprocedure

This bankruptcy case involved a debtor's petition seeking review of a referee's orders regarding exemptions claimed in a stock of goods and fixtures up to $500, as well as life insurance policies payable to the debtor's wife. The court affirmed both orders, holding that the debtor was bound by his election to have the goods sold as a whole and receive a proportional share of the proceeds (resulting in only $300 after the sale fell short of appraised value), and that the trustee was entitled to the surrender value of the insurance policies. The reasoning rested on U.S. Supreme Court precedent that exempt property title remains with the debtor but is subject to the bankruptcy court's control for proper allocation under state procedures, combined with analysis that the relevant South Carolina statutes either did not apply or conflicted with the state constitution's limits on exemptions. The debtor's waiver of in-kind allotment and the constitutional preemption of legislative additions to homestead rights were central to rejecting the claims for full exemptions.

propertyprocedure

The case involved a motion by the plaintiff, a New Jersey corporation, to remand its lawsuit against an insolvent national bank, its receiver, and a successor national bank back to state court after the defendants removed it to federal district court. The underlying claim was for less than $3,000 and concerned whether the plaintiff's demand against the insolvent bank qualified as a secured or preferred claim that the successor bank would have to pay under a court-approved asset sale. The court denied the motion to remand, holding that although the amount in controversy was below the usual $3,000 threshold for federal-question jurisdiction, the action qualified as a case for winding up the affairs of a national bank. Under paragraph 16 of section 24 of the Judicial Code, district courts have original jurisdiction over such cases without regard to the amount in controversy, and because the case also arose under federal law it was removable under section 28.

federal powerbusiness & regulatoryprocedure

In Ex Parte Moore, the receiver of the insolvent First National Bank of Florence petitioned the court under federal banking statutes for authority to sell the bank's assets to a newly formed purchasing bank under a detailed plan that divided assets into acceptable and unacceptable categories, provided for partial payments to creditors via certificates of deposit, and established a trust arrangement for collecting remaining assets with trustee oversight. The court refused the petition, finding that key elements of the plan—such as provisions affecting stockholder assessments and limiting certain creditor rights—violated positive statutory requirements governing national bank receiverships and could not be approved as mere terms of sale. The core reasoning was that while courts may authorize sales on appropriate terms, they lack authority to sanction reorganization plans that conflict with federal law or deprive creditors of vested statutory protections, even if the arrangement benefits most parties and has broad creditor and Comptroller approval.

business & regulatoryfederal power

The case concerned a South Carolina statute that nullified a 1921 Railroad Commission order increasing telephone rates and restored lower pre-1921 rates on file with the Commission. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co. sued to enjoin enforcement of the statute, arguing that the restored rates were unreasonably low, confiscatory, and violated due process by depriving the company of its property. After independently reviewing the record and evidence rather than deferring to the special master's findings, the court determined that the rates failed to provide fair remuneration. It therefore held the statute unconstitutional as applied to the company, issued a permanent injunction against its enforcement, and allowed for possible future modification if conditions changed. Costs were divided equally between the parties.

business & regulatoryproperty

This case involved a South Carolina state court action by S. B. McMaster, Inc. against the Chevrolet Motor Company, a New Jersey corporation, that was removed to federal district court. The plaintiff moved to remand, arguing that the removal petition's verification was defective under state law and that the petition was improperly verified by an attorney rather than a corporate officer. The defendant moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, claiming it was not doing business in South Carolina and that service on the Barrow-Chevrolet Company was invalid because that entity was not its agent but merely a buyer under a vendor-vendee contract. The court denied remand, holding that federal law governed the verification and that the petition was properly verified, and granted the motion to set aside service, concluding that the contract established a buyer-seller relationship rather than agency and that the defendant's limited inspection rights did not constitute doing business in the state.

procedurebusiness & regulatory