William J. Lavery

In this juvenile delinquency case, the trial court found Jeffrey M. delinquent pursuant to a plea to robbery in the second degree and ordered him committed to the Department of Children and Families with direct placement in an out-of-state residential facility. The department moved to intervene, arguing that the direct out-of-state placement order violated interstate compacts and exceeded the court's authority under General Statutes § 46b-140, but the trial court denied the motion. On appeal, the appellate court reversed the denial of intervention and the placement order, ruling that the department was entitled to intervene as of right because it had a direct interest in the custody and placement of the juvenile. The court further held that § 46b-140(j) authorizes out-of-state placements only when the court commits the juvenile to the commissioner for discretionary placement, not when the court orders direct placement in a specific facility.

criminal lawfamily lawprocedure

This case involves multiple consolidated appeals from post-dissolution proceedings in the divorce of Maria F. McKeon and William P. Lennon, including motions to open the judgment, modify child support orders, hold the other party in contempt over division of a beach house and CUTMA accounts, and related requests for attorney's fees. The Appellate Court dismissed the appeal from the denial of the motion to open, reversed the denials of the child support modification motions and the associated attorney's fees award, affirmed the trial court's clarification of the property and account orders during the contempt hearing, dismissed one contempt-related appeal, and reversed the award of attorney's fees in the remaining contempt matter. The core reasoning addressed procedural bars such as res judicata on unappealed original orders, the need for a substantial change in circumstances to modify support (rather than a claimed deviation from guidelines), and the proper scope of contempt hearings and fee awards.

family lawpropertyprocedure

This case involved a negligence lawsuit brought by an employee injured after tripping on a sunken concrete cap in a factory floor, which resulted from backfilling done during soil contamination testing performed by the defendant engineering firm under contract with the employer. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant, ruling that the action was time-barred under the three-year statute of limitations in General Statutes § 52-584. On appeal, the court reversed that judgment, holding that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the defendant's services constituted work in connection with an improvement to real property under the seven-year statute of limitations in § 52-584a. The appellate court reasoned that the installation of monitoring wells and related alterations to the property could qualify as an improvement based on the definition and precedent from a similar environmental testing case, requiring further proceedings to resolve the factual dispute.

torts & liabilityprocedureproperty

This case concerns a dispute over title to a 29-acre parcel of land in Griswold, Connecticut, known as 166 Colonel Brown Road. The plaintiffs claimed ownership through a 1939 administrator's deed from their father’s estate, while the defendant sought to reform that deed on grounds of mutual mistake, arguing the disputed parcel was never intended to be conveyed and remained with his predecessor in interest. The trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs after finding the defendant had not proven mutual mistake by clear and convincing evidence. On appeal, the Appellate Court affirmed, holding that the record, including mortgage deeds and expert testimony, supported the conclusion that title to the parcel had passed to the plaintiffs’ father. The core reasoning centered on the failure to meet the high evidentiary burden required for deed reformation.

property

The plaintiff sued a Hartford police officer and the city after a 2005 traffic accident, claiming intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress plus abuse of process based on the officer's investigation, issuance of a citation for an improper U-turn, follow-up conduct at the hospital and plaintiff's home, and submission of the citation despite a supervisor destroying one copy; the charge was later nolled. The trial court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment on all six counts. On appeal, the Appellate Court affirmed the summary judgment as to the first count of intentional infliction of emotional distress by the officer, finding no genuine issue of material fact, and dismissed the remainder of the appeal as moot. The decision rested on the absence of evidence that the officer's actions met the legal threshold for the tort claims and on principles of governmental immunity under General Statutes § 52-557n.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case involves an appeal by Howard C. Fritz from the trial court's judgment dissolving his marriage to Julianna M. Fritz, challenging the financial orders including a nonmodifiable, time-limited alimony award of $1000 per month for two years and findings regarding contributions to a home equity line of credit. The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's decision. The trial court had considered the statutory factors under General Statutes § 46b-82, determined the plaintiff's earning capacity to be at least $40,000 per year based on his post-accident activities and management of property, and made specific findings that the defendant was primarily responsible for mortgage payments while crediting the plaintiff's limited $5000 payment on the line of credit.

family law