William J. Lavery

In this juvenile delinquency case, the trial court found Jeffrey M. delinquent pursuant to a plea to robbery in the second degree and ordered him committed to the Department of Children and Families with direct placement in an out-of-state residential facility. The department moved to intervene, arguing that the direct out-of-state placement order violated interstate compacts and exceeded the court's authority under General Statutes § 46b-140, but the trial court denied the motion. On appeal, the appellate court reversed the denial of intervention and the placement order, ruling that the department was entitled to intervene as of right because it had a direct interest in the custody and placement of the juvenile. The court further held that § 46b-140(j) authorizes out-of-state placements only when the court commits the juvenile to the commissioner for discretionary placement, not when the court orders direct placement in a specific facility.

criminal lawfamily lawprocedure

This case involves multiple consolidated appeals from post-dissolution proceedings in the divorce of Maria F. McKeon and William P. Lennon, including motions to open the judgment, modify child support orders, hold the other party in contempt over division of a beach house and CUTMA accounts, and related requests for attorney's fees. The Appellate Court dismissed the appeal from the denial of the motion to open, reversed the denials of the child support modification motions and the associated attorney's fees award, affirmed the trial court's clarification of the property and account orders during the contempt hearing, dismissed one contempt-related appeal, and reversed the award of attorney's fees in the remaining contempt matter. The core reasoning addressed procedural bars such as res judicata on unappealed original orders, the need for a substantial change in circumstances to modify support (rather than a claimed deviation from guidelines), and the proper scope of contempt hearings and fee awards.

family lawpropertyprocedure

This case involved a negligence lawsuit brought by an employee injured after tripping on a sunken concrete cap in a factory floor, which resulted from backfilling done during soil contamination testing performed by the defendant engineering firm under contract with the employer. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant, ruling that the action was time-barred under the three-year statute of limitations in General Statutes § 52-584. On appeal, the court reversed that judgment, holding that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the defendant's services constituted work in connection with an improvement to real property under the seven-year statute of limitations in § 52-584a. The appellate court reasoned that the installation of monitoring wells and related alterations to the property could qualify as an improvement based on the definition and precedent from a similar environmental testing case, requiring further proceedings to resolve the factual dispute.

torts & liabilityprocedureproperty

This case concerns a dispute over title to a 29-acre parcel of land in Griswold, Connecticut, known as 166 Colonel Brown Road. The plaintiffs claimed ownership through a 1939 administrator's deed from their father’s estate, while the defendant sought to reform that deed on grounds of mutual mistake, arguing the disputed parcel was never intended to be conveyed and remained with his predecessor in interest. The trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs after finding the defendant had not proven mutual mistake by clear and convincing evidence. On appeal, the Appellate Court affirmed, holding that the record, including mortgage deeds and expert testimony, supported the conclusion that title to the parcel had passed to the plaintiffs’ father. The core reasoning centered on the failure to meet the high evidentiary burden required for deed reformation.

property

The plaintiff sued a Hartford police officer and the city after a 2005 traffic accident, claiming intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress plus abuse of process based on the officer's investigation, issuance of a citation for an improper U-turn, follow-up conduct at the hospital and plaintiff's home, and submission of the citation despite a supervisor destroying one copy; the charge was later nolled. The trial court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment on all six counts. On appeal, the Appellate Court affirmed the summary judgment as to the first count of intentional infliction of emotional distress by the officer, finding no genuine issue of material fact, and dismissed the remainder of the appeal as moot. The decision rested on the absence of evidence that the officer's actions met the legal threshold for the tort claims and on principles of governmental immunity under General Statutes § 52-557n.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case involves an appeal by Howard C. Fritz from the trial court's judgment dissolving his marriage to Julianna M. Fritz, challenging the financial orders including a nonmodifiable, time-limited alimony award of $1000 per month for two years and findings regarding contributions to a home equity line of credit. The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's decision. The trial court had considered the statutory factors under General Statutes § 46b-82, determined the plaintiff's earning capacity to be at least $40,000 per year based on his post-accident activities and management of property, and made specific findings that the defendant was primarily responsible for mortgage payments while crediting the plaintiff's limited $5000 payment on the line of credit.

family law

In State v. Osuch, the defendant appealed the trial court's dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal sentence, arguing that the court had jurisdiction and should have corrected his 2001 burglary sentences because they were based on inaccuracies in the presentence investigation report. The Appellate Court agreed that the trial court had jurisdiction under Practice Book § 43-22 but held that res judicata barred review of the claim on the merits. The same allegations of report inaccuracies, lack of review by counsel, and improper sentencing reliance had already been litigated and rejected in the defendant's prior habeas corpus proceeding and by the sentence review division, which upheld the sentence as appropriate given his criminal history. The court therefore affirmed the dismissal of the motion.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a plaintiff who refiled an excessive force claim against a police officer after his original action was nonsuited when neither he nor his attorney appeared at a scheduled pretrial conference. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant, ruling that the plaintiff could not rely on the accidental failure of suit statute to revive the claim because the attorney's absence did not qualify as mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect. The appellate court reversed, concluding that evidence from the motion to open the nonsuit created a genuine issue of material fact regarding the circumstances of the nonattendance, such as the attorney's simultaneous trial in the same courthouse and her failure to request a recess.

procedurecivil rights

In State v. Serrano, the defendant was convicted after a jury trial of assault in the first degree for striking the victim multiple times on the head with a blunt object during an argument, causing serious injuries that required surgery. The defendant appealed, claiming that the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment confrontation rights by admitting certain hearsay statements, including statements made by a witness before the attack and the victim's description of events to a doctor, and that there was insufficient evidence to prove he intended to cause serious physical injury. The appellate court affirmed the conviction, holding that the challenged statements were not testimonial in nature under Crawford v. Washington or were otherwise properly admitted, and that the evidence of the defendant's actions and the resulting injuries was sufficient for the jury to infer the required intent. The court rejected the defendant's arguments after reviewing the facts and applicable legal standards for hearsay and sufficiency of evidence.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Lynda Hogberg, an institutionalized spouse in a nursing home, and her husband Richard Hogberg, the community spouse, who appealed the Department of Social Services' denial of Medicaid benefits. The department determined that the couple's assets exceeded eligibility limits, and the plaintiffs sought an increase in Richard's minimum monthly needs allowance based on his medical conditions, claiming they constituted exceptional circumstances causing significant financial duress. The court affirmed the trial court's judgment upholding the department's decision, ruling that Richard's conditions, such as heart valve replacement, diabetes, and glaucoma, did not qualify as exceptional under the Uniform Policy Manual because they represented normal frailties of old age and his expenses were either already accounted for or did not prevent him from daily activities or remaining in the community.

healthcare

The case involved a property owner suing a school board, town, and contractors for sediment and pollution runoff from nearby school construction that damaged his pond, alleging violations of environmental laws like CEPA and the Wetlands Act, as well as negligence and nuisance. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants, ruling that the plaintiff lacked sufficient expert testimony to prove the standard of care and causation in this technical environmental matter. On appeal, the court reversed in part, holding that evidence of regulatory violations and expert reports created genuine issues of material fact regarding breach and causation, particularly under a negligence per se theory based on the permits and statutes.

environmentpropertytorts & liability

The case involved a property owner's appeal from a planning and zoning commission's decisions regarding zone boundaries and subdivision rules on abutting land. The plaintiff sought to challenge a 2000 commission action clarifying a commercial zone boundary, claiming lack of proper notice and procedure, in addition to a 2005 decision allowing division of the property. The court affirmed the dismissal of the appeal, holding that the statutory time limitation under General Statutes § 8-8(r) barred any challenge to the 2000 decision regardless of notice issues. This time bar was dispositive, preventing the plaintiff from overturning the earlier decision that affected the validity of the later one.

propertyprocedure

The case involved plaintiff Christine Cimino's appeal from the denial of zoning variances by the Woodbridge Zoning Board of Appeals to develop her 5.06-acre undeveloped parcel in a Residence A district, which contained significant wetlands and failed to meet minimum lot size, shape, and non-wetland area requirements under the town's regulations. The trial court upheld the board's decision, and the appellate court affirmed, finding that the parcel was not a preexisting nonconforming use because prior subdivision attempts in the 1970s had been withdrawn or denied and it was never approved as a buildable lot. The court reasoned that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate the unusual hardship required for variances under state law, that the property retained value without the variances, and that granting them would conflict with the town's master plan of development.

propertyenvironment

The case concerned a dispute in which the plaintiff, a plumbing company operating under a limited plumbing and piping license, performed sewer line installation and related repairs on the defendant's home pursuant to an oral contract and then sued for breach of contract, quantum meruit, and unjust enrichment after the defendant refused to pay the $6,707.77 bill. The defendant moved to strike the complaint, asserting that the work was governed by the Home Improvement Act, which requires a written contract. The trial court granted the motion on the grounds that the work fell within the Act and that the statutory exemption for licensed plumbers did not apply. On appeal, the Appellate Court reversed, concluding that the activities were subject to the Act but were exempt because the plaintiff performed only work within the scope of its plumbing license.

business & regulatorypropertyprocedure

In State v. Fernandes, a fifteen-year-old defendant charged with conspiracy to commit assault had his case transferred from the juvenile docket to the regular criminal docket of the Superior Court under General Statutes § 46b-127 (b), after which he was convicted of assault in the second degree as an accessory. The Appellate Court reversed the conviction and remanded the case for a juvenile transfer hearing. The court reasoned that the statute creates a liberty interest in juvenile status that requires due process protections, including notice and a hearing prior to transfer, and that the automatic transfer here did not satisfy those requirements or the statute's procedural mandates.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a pro se plaintiff who sued his former attorney for legal malpractice and breach of contract, alleging negligence in handling the direct appeal from the plaintiff's criminal convictions for attempted murder and assault. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant after the plaintiff failed to disclose an expert witness on the applicable standard of care. The appellate court affirmed, holding that expert testimony is generally required to establish both the standard of care and causation in legal malpractice claims, including those framed as breach of contract, and that the alleged errors here did not fall within the narrow exception for conduct so obviously negligent that it would be clear to a layperson. The court reviewed the claims de novo and found the trial court's application of precedent, such as Dixon v. Bromson & Reiner, to be correct.

criminal lawproceduretorts & liability

This case concerned an appeal by neighboring property owners challenging a town zoning and planning commission's approval of a site plan for a large retail development on a 72-acre parcel in Colchester, Connecticut. The developer sought approval including a footprint-only authorization for the main anchor store and a drainage plan, despite lacking several required permits from other agencies. The trial court upheld the commission's decision, but the appellate court reversed, holding that the commission failed to adhere to mandatory zoning regulations specifying drain pipe materials and requiring all necessary permits prior to approval. The court reasoned that zoning commissions act in an administrative capacity and may approve site plans only if they strictly comply with existing regulations, without authority to waive or condition compliance on future permits. The matter was remanded with directions to sustain the plaintiffs' appeal.

propertyprocedurebusiness & regulatory

The case involved Lee & Lamont Realty appealing the Vernon Planning and Zoning Commission's amendments to the town's zoning regulations and map, which eliminated a planned mixed-use development zone on the plaintiff's property and replaced it with new planned development zones that included graduated setback requirements up to 200 feet along an interstate highway. The plaintiff claimed the commission improperly considered a post-hearing memorandum from one member summarizing her notes and that the buffer zone lacked justification. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the appeal, concluding that the memorandum reflected only the member's personal knowledge from the public hearing and did not constitute new evidence, and that the commission's legislative zoning decision was supported by the record, aligned with the comprehensive plan, and fell within its broad discretion under zoning statutes without being arbitrary or illegal.

business & regulatorypropertyprocedure

This case involved Eric Amado's appeal from a habeas court's denial of certification to appeal the dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Amado had been convicted of murder and felony murder after claiming self-defense at trial; his habeas petition alleged due process violations from the state's failure to disclose a victim's criminal history, ineffective assistance by trial counsel, and actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence. The habeas court found that the prosecution did not suppress evidence, that counsel conducted a thorough investigation and provided effective representation without causing prejudice, and that the new evidence would not have affected the jury's verdict. The Appellate Court held that the habeas court did not abuse its discretion in denying certification to appeal, as the issues were not debatable among jurists of reason and no injustice appeared.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

The case concerned the defendant's conviction for sexual assault in the third degree after he engaged in sexual intercourse with his seventeen-year-old stepdaughter, the daughter of his wife. On remand, the appellate court affirmed the trial court's judgment, rejecting the defendant's claims that the jury instructions improperly removed an essential element of the offense by referencing his admission of being the victim's stepfather and that he was the target of selective prosecution. The court reasoned that the jury charge as a whole fairly presented the required elements and that the selective prosecution claim could not be reviewed due to the absence of an evidentiary hearing or adequate record showing invidious discrimination.

criminal lawfamily law