John Edwards Conway

The case involved a lawsuit by the daughter of a deceased nursing home resident against the facility for negligence, res ipsa loquitur, and unfair trade practices, alleging abuse and neglect leading to severe dehydration and renal failure. The defendant moved to dismiss and compel arbitration based on an arbitration clause in the admission agreement signed by the plaintiff's sister and the resident's wife. The court denied the motion, finding no valid enforceable arbitration agreement because the resident did not sign it, his representatives lacked authority at the time of signing, and he was not a third-party beneficiary of the arbitration provision.

proceduretorts & liability

In this case, plaintiff James Otero, a veteran employed by the New Mexico Department of Corrections and claiming PTSD as a disability, sued his employer and several supervisors alleging discrimination and retaliation based on his military service and disability, along with violations of the New Mexico Human Rights Act and creation of a hostile work environment, stemming primarily from a May 2008 training incident and subsequent administrative actions. The court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment in part, dismissing the USERRA discrimination and retaliation claims, the disability discrimination claim, the hostile work environment claim, and the NMHRA discrimination claim, while allowing the NMHRA retaliation claim to proceed. The core reasoning was that there were no genuine disputes of material fact and that the evidence, even when viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, failed to establish the required elements of the dismissed claims, such as sufficient severity or pervasiveness for a hostile work environment.

labor & employmentcivil rights

In New Mexico v. Gutierrez, Inga Gutierrez and Michael Gutierrez sought to remove two state criminal prosecutions from New Mexico courts to federal district court, alleging violations of their rights under the First, Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments related to neighbor disputes and property use. The court examined the removal petitions under 28 U.S.C. § 1443 and determined that the removals were improper. The court decided to remand both cases to state court, finding a lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the petitioners did not demonstrate they were denied equal civil rights due to race or invidious discrimination as required by the statute. Additionally, one petition was untimely under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(1).

criminal lawcivil rightsfederal powerprocedure

This case involved residents of subdivisions near a uranium milling facility in New Mexico who alleged that groundwater contamination from the facility's tailings caused personal injuries, deaths, and other damages; the plaintiffs asserted claims under the Price-Anderson Act as well as various state-law theories including negligence, fraud, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and strict liability. The court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss in part and denied it in part, ruling that the Price-Anderson Act preempts the state-law claims but incorporates consistent state theories of liability as sub-parts of the federal action. It dismissed the strict and absolute liability theory as inconsistent with the Act, while finding the remaining theories sufficiently pleaded under Rules 12(b)(6) and 9(b). The core reasoning was that the Act creates a complete preemption regime for nuclear incidents, converting state claims into a federal cause of action while preserving compatible state substantive standards.

environmenttorts & liabilityfederal power

This case concerned whether certain Grant County, New Mexico franchise ordinances regulating telecommunications providers like Qwest were preempted by Section 253 of the Federal Telecommunications Act of 1996. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the court previously held that specific ordinance provisions prohibiting or effectively prohibiting telecom services were invalid under federal law and not saved by the statute's safe-harbor provisions for public safety or rights-of-way management. Qwest then moved to amend the final order to invalidate additional ordinance sections imposing penalties, reporting requirements, and other conditions. The court granted the motion, finding that the additional provisions, in combination, also had the effect of prohibiting services under § 253(a) and did not qualify for safe-harbor protection under state-delegated authority or § 253(c), while clarifying the limited scope of county power to impose rights-of-way fees.

business & regulatoryfederal power

This case involved a dispute between two water service providers over whether Moongate Water Co. could legally serve customers within the territory of Butterfield Park Mutual Domestic Water Ass'n, which had received federal loans under the Consolidated Farm and Rural Development Act. Moongate sought a declaratory judgment that Butterfield was not entitled to protection from competition under 7 U.S.C. § 1926(b), after Butterfield terminated service to one customer who refused to grant an easement and Moongate began providing water to her. The court denied Moongate's motion for summary judgment and granted Butterfield's motion for partial summary judgment. It reasoned that Butterfield had an outstanding FmHA loan and had made service available on reasonable terms, entitling it to the statute's protections against curtailment of its service area. The court declared Moongate's sales unlawful, ordered termination of service to the disputed property, and enjoined further encroachment.

business & regulatoryfederal power

In Shorty v. Capital One Bank, the plaintiff claimed that Capital One violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), specifically 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A), by sending a debt validation notice for a time-barred debt without disclosing the statute of limitations had run, which allegedly misrepresented the debt's legal status. Capital One moved for judgment on the pleadings, contending that the notice fully complied with the disclosure requirements of 15 U.S.C. § 1692g and contained no threats of litigation or further collection efforts. The court granted the motion and dismissed the case with prejudice, holding that the legal status of a debt encompasses its time-barred nature but that the notice was not false, deceptive, or misleading because it tracked the statutory language, did not affect substantive rights, and New Mexico law treats statutes of limitations as procedural bars to remedies rather than extinguishing the underlying obligation.

business & regulatoryprocedure

In United States v. Wen Ho Lee, defendant Dr. Wen Ho Lee filed a motion seeking a declaration that Sections 5 and 6 of the Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA) are unconstitutional as applied to him, claiming violations of his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, right to remain silent, and due process, as well as his Sixth Amendment rights to testify and cross-examine witnesses. The court denied the motion without oral argument after reviewing the filings and authorities. The reasoning centered on the conclusion that CIPA requires only general pretrial disclosure of classified information the defense expects to use at trial, akin to alibi or insanity defense notices, without compelling the defendant to reveal whether or when he will testify or the full substance of his testimony. The court noted that other federal courts have uniformly upheld CIPA against similar constitutional challenges and that the statute provides procedural safeguards, such as potential sanctions against the government if classified evidence is excluded.

criminal lawprocedure

In Kaspar v. City of Hobbs, plaintiff Virginia Kaspar sued police officers Durham and Lamb under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that their warrantless search of her home on March 13, 1997, violated her Fourth Amendment rights; the officers had entered without a warrant while searching for a suspect named George, relying on consent from Pete Losoya, a friend who sometimes assisted with household chores. The court considered plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment on the claims against the individual officers and defendants' motion to bifurcate trial issues. It granted summary judgment against Defendant Durham on the claim involving the search of plaintiff's bedroom, finding that Losoya lacked actual or apparent authority to consent to that area, but denied summary judgment on the claims regarding the search of the living room and kitchen, concluding that factual issues remained as to the validity of consent for those common areas. The motion to bifurcate was denied as moot.

civil rightscriminal lawprocedure

This case involved a dispute over an automobile lease agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant, where the plaintiff alleged that the defendant inaccurately disclosed the trade-in of her Corvette as a cash payment and undervalued the vehicle, violating the federal Consumer Leasing Act and the New Mexico Unfair Trade Practices Act. The court granted partial summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff, finding that the trade-in disclosure was inaccurate and that the defendant engaged in unfair or deceptive trade practices under state law. It also granted partial summary judgment to the defendant, determining that the sales tax disclosures were accurate and that there were no unconscionable trade practices. The decision was based on the requirements for clear disclosures under the CLA and the specific provisions of the UPA regarding deceptive practices and value disparities. The case will proceed to trial solely on the issue of damages.

business & regulatory

This case involved federal criminal charges against Defendant Velarde for aggravated sexual abuse of a child under the Indian Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153, which grants exclusive federal jurisdiction over specified serious crimes committed by Indians on Indian land. The United States and the defendant issued subpoenas to Jicarilla Apache Tribe officials, including mental health, police, and census personnel, seeking documents and testimony, prompting the Tribe to move to quash them on grounds of sovereign immunity. The court denied the motion to quash, holding that the Act necessarily incorporates federal criminal procedures that limit tribal sovereignty and that federal interests in enforcing the law and protecting constitutional rights outweigh any residual tribal immunity. The court further found that the Tribe had waived immunity as to certain police and census records by voluntarily disclosing related information to federal authorities.

criminal lawfederal powerprocedure

The case involved a challenge by IMC Kalium Carlsbad to an IBLA decision that would have required the BLM to issue a competitive potassium (potash) lease on 5,280 acres of federal land in Eddy County, New Mexico, to high bidders Pogo Producing Company and Yates Petroleum Corporation. The BLM had rejected the bid after finding it was made in bad faith to obstruct potash recovery and facilitate the bidders' separate oil-and-gas drilling permits in the same area, consistent with the 1986 Interior Department order protecting potash deposits from undue interference. The court reversed the IBLA, holding that the administrative record supplied a rational basis for the BLM's rejection because the bidders' evident motive was to limit potash development rather than to recover potassium. The opinion recounts the long-standing conflict between potash mining and oil-and-gas interests, the denial of the companies' drilling permits, and the competitive lease auction, concluding that awarding the lease under these circumstances would not serve the statutory goal of potassium recovery.

business & regulatoryenvironmentfederal power

The case involves insurance companies' potential liability for refusing to defend or indemnify an attorney, Frank Westerfield, against a 1992 lawsuit by Charles Hempel alleging fraud, malpractice, and other claims related to the administration of a testamentary trust from 1964 to 1991. In the underlying state court action, Westerfield and Hempel reached a settlement that included a covenant not to execute against Westerfield personally, an assignment of insurance recovery rights to Hempel, and a stipulated judgment of approximately $29.46 million, followed by a one-sided hearing with no contested evidence from Westerfield. The federal court granted partial summary judgment to the defendant insurers, finding the settlement and judgment were the product of collusion as a matter of law because they involved bad-faith maneuvering, such as altered findings to shift damages to non-settling insurers' policy periods and a sham proceeding designed to create an appearance of legitimacy without adversarial process. The court concluded that the insurers are not bound by the state court judgment due to these circumstances, though further proceedings would address the duties to defend and indemnify.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involves plaintiff John W. Eason's appeal under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) challenging the Social Security Commissioner's denial of disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income, based on claims of inability to work due to musculoskeletal issues and seizures since 1987. The district court adopted the magistrate judge's analysis and recommended disposition after no objections were filed. The court granted Eason's motion to remand the matter to the Commissioner for further administrative proceedings. The core reasoning was that judicial review requires determining whether the agency's findings are supported by substantial evidence and whether correct legal standards were applied, and the magistrate identified deficiencies warranting remand rather than affirming the denial.

healthcarefederal power

This case involved a qui tam action under the False Claims Act brought by relator Harold R. Fine, a former employee of the Department of Energy's Office of Inspector General, against Advanced Sciences, Inc. for allegedly submitting false claims for reimbursement on government contracts. The court converted the defendant's motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment and granted it, dismissing the case. The court held that IG employees are barred from bringing such actions due to a conflict between the FCA and the Inspector General Act. It further ruled that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the allegations had been publicly disclosed through administrative reports and communications, and Fine did not qualify as an original source since his knowledge derived solely from his official duties rather than independent information.

criminal lawprocedurefederal power

This case involved a dispute over a lease agreement for a county office building between former Rio Arriba County Manager Emilio Naranjo and the County of Rio Arriba, including claims that the County improperly terminated the lease after political changes and failed to provide procedural due process. Naranjo sued in state court, and the case was removed to federal court. The court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss Naranjo's claims, finding that he failed to demonstrate a protected property interest in the lease. It denied Naranjo's motion to dismiss the county's counterclaims, granted dismissal of a third-party claim for lack of jurisdiction, and retained supplemental jurisdiction over the compulsory counterclaims arising from the lease.

civil rightspropertyprocedure

The case was a declaratory judgment action brought by the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC), as receiver for a failed bank, against Bogle Farms, Inc., seeking a ruling that RTC had never been the general partner of Ocotillo West Joint Venture and thus could avoid related liabilities in an underlying bankruptcy proceeding. The court granted Bogle Farms' motion for summary judgment and denied RTC's cross-motion, holding that RTC/ABQ had become the managing general partner of Ocotillo through the January 1990 transactions and that its partnership claims were subordinate to Bogle's claims as an outside unsecured creditor under Arizona and New Mexico law. The court further reasoned that RTC could not repudiate its prior representations and actions as general partner by invoking federal regulatory powers such as those under D'Oench, Duhme and 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e).

business & regulatoryfederal power

In Russey v. Rankin, plaintiff sued defendants including TCA Collections, Inc., a California debt collection company, alleging that demand letters sent to him in New Mexico violated the Federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, the New Mexico Unfair Practices Act, and state common law on unreasonable debt collection. TCA moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction or alternatively to transfer venue to the Northern District of California. The court denied the motion, holding that New Mexico's long-arm statute permitted jurisdiction because the letters constituted the transaction of business or a tortious act in the state and satisfied due process minimum contacts requirements, as the correspondence formed the core of the alleged violations. The court also ruled venue proper in New Mexico under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2) since receipt of the letters was a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claims.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

The case involved the United States, through the EPA, seeking to recover cleanup costs under CERCLA from United Nuclear Corporation for hazardous seepage from uranium mill tailings ponds at the Church Rock mine site into subterranean aquifers, including portions of the Gallup aquifer. The court granted the government's motion for partial summary judgment on liability and denied the company's cross-motion for summary judgment. It reasoned that the four elements of CERCLA strict liability were satisfied based on the release of hazardous substances from a facility, that no statutory defenses applied including the federally permitted release defense because the state-issued license did not authorize unlimited seepage, and that the statute of limitations did not bar the action.

environmentfederal powerbusiness & regulatory

This case arose when a debt collection agency repossessed the plaintiff's car on behalf of a bank, also taking personal property inside the vehicle without consent. The plaintiff sued under the Federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) for improper dispossession and under New Mexico law for the tort of conversion. On reconsideration, the court denied partial summary judgment on the FDCPA claim, holding that the statute's prohibition applies only to property claimed as collateral via an enforceable security interest, not incidental personal items. The court granted partial summary judgment on the conversion claim, determining that the agency exercised unauthorized dominion over the plaintiff's chattels in violation of state law. The decision rested on statutory text interpretation for the FDCPA and New Mexico precedents defining conversion.

business & regulatorytorts & liability