The case involved a lawsuit by the daughter of a deceased nursing home resident against the facility for negligence, res ipsa loquitur, and unfair trade practices, alleging abuse and neglect leading to severe dehydration and renal failure. The defendant moved to dismiss and compel arbitration based on an arbitration clause in the admission agreement signed by the plaintiff's sister and the resident's wife. The court denied the motion, finding no valid enforceable arbitration agreement because the resident did not sign it, his representatives lacked authority at the time of signing, and he was not a third-party beneficiary of the arbitration provision.
In this case, plaintiff James Otero, a veteran employed by the New Mexico Department of Corrections and claiming PTSD as a disability, sued his employer and several supervisors alleging discrimination and retaliation based on his military service and disability, along with violations of the New Mexico Human Rights Act and creation of a hostile work environment, stemming primarily from a May 2008 training incident and subsequent administrative actions. The court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment in part, dismissing the USERRA discrimination and retaliation claims, the disability discrimination claim, the hostile work environment claim, and the NMHRA discrimination claim, while allowing the NMHRA retaliation claim to proceed. The core reasoning was that there were no genuine disputes of material fact and that the evidence, even when viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, failed to establish the required elements of the dismissed claims, such as sufficient severity or pervasiveness for a hostile work environment.
In New Mexico v. Gutierrez, Inga Gutierrez and Michael Gutierrez sought to remove two state criminal prosecutions from New Mexico courts to federal district court, alleging violations of their rights under the First, Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments related to neighbor disputes and property use. The court examined the removal petitions under 28 U.S.C. § 1443 and determined that the removals were improper. The court decided to remand both cases to state court, finding a lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the petitioners did not demonstrate they were denied equal civil rights due to race or invidious discrimination as required by the statute. Additionally, one petition was untimely under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(1).
This case involved residents of subdivisions near a uranium milling facility in New Mexico who alleged that groundwater contamination from the facility's tailings caused personal injuries, deaths, and other damages; the plaintiffs asserted claims under the Price-Anderson Act as well as various state-law theories including negligence, fraud, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and strict liability. The court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss in part and denied it in part, ruling that the Price-Anderson Act preempts the state-law claims but incorporates consistent state theories of liability as sub-parts of the federal action. It dismissed the strict and absolute liability theory as inconsistent with the Act, while finding the remaining theories sufficiently pleaded under Rules 12(b)(6) and 9(b). The core reasoning was that the Act creates a complete preemption regime for nuclear incidents, converting state claims into a federal cause of action while preserving compatible state substantive standards.
This case concerned whether certain Grant County, New Mexico franchise ordinances regulating telecommunications providers like Qwest were preempted by Section 253 of the Federal Telecommunications Act of 1996. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the court previously held that specific ordinance provisions prohibiting or effectively prohibiting telecom services were invalid under federal law and not saved by the statute's safe-harbor provisions for public safety or rights-of-way management. Qwest then moved to amend the final order to invalidate additional ordinance sections imposing penalties, reporting requirements, and other conditions. The court granted the motion, finding that the additional provisions, in combination, also had the effect of prohibiting services under § 253(a) and did not qualify for safe-harbor protection under state-delegated authority or § 253(c), while clarifying the limited scope of county power to impose rights-of-way fees.
This case involved a dispute between two water service providers over whether Moongate Water Co. could legally serve customers within the territory of Butterfield Park Mutual Domestic Water Ass'n, which had received federal loans under the Consolidated Farm and Rural Development Act. Moongate sought a declaratory judgment that Butterfield was not entitled to protection from competition under 7 U.S.C. § 1926(b), after Butterfield terminated service to one customer who refused to grant an easement and Moongate began providing water to her. The court denied Moongate's motion for summary judgment and granted Butterfield's motion for partial summary judgment. It reasoned that Butterfield had an outstanding FmHA loan and had made service available on reasonable terms, entitling it to the statute's protections against curtailment of its service area. The court declared Moongate's sales unlawful, ordered termination of service to the disputed property, and enjoined further encroachment.