In Zatterstrom v. Sullivan, the plaintiff sought attorney's fees and entry of final judgment following a favorable administrative decision on his Social Security disability claims under Titles II and XVI of the Act. The sole issue was whether the district court's July 29, 1991 remand order qualified as a sentence-four remand (affirming, modifying, or reversing the Secretary's decision with or without remand) or a sentence-six remand (for consideration of new evidence or before an answer is filed) under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The court determined that the order was a sentence-four remand because an answer had already been filed, no new evidence was involved, and the case was sent back at the Secretary's request merely to reconsider the existing record. As a result, the court held that the fee application was untimely and denied both the motion for entry of judgment and the application for fees, noting that the case had been administratively closed upon remand.
This case concerned whether a bank could reach the community property of married couples to satisfy obligations under a loan transaction with Camelback Canyon Investors, where one spouse had not joined in the original deal. Previously, the court had ruled that Arizona Revised Statutes § 25-214(C)(1) requires both spouses to join any encumbrance of community real property interests, granting partial summary judgment to the Chick defendants. The Arnolds, who had signed a joint personal financial statement in connection with a later loan modification, sought the same protection; the bank argued that their action amounted to ratification or estoppel. The court rejected those arguments, finding that signing the financial statement did not affirm a prior unauthorized act or bar the community-property defense, and therefore granted the Arnolds' motion for partial summary judgment while denying the bank's cross-motion.
The case involved Meritor Savings Bank seeking a deficiency judgment against the general partners of Camelback Canyon Investors and their wives after a trustee's sale following default on a $1.85 million promissory note secured by a deed of trust on Arizona real property. The court denied a motion to dismiss a cross-claim between partners for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) applied because the cross-claim was related to the original action. On the merits, the court granted partial summary judgment to the Chicks, ruling that their community property could not be reached to satisfy the partnership debt because Mrs. Chick did not join in the transaction encumbering real property, as required by Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 25-214(C), and denied Meritor's cross-motion for summary judgment on the same issue.
The case involved the Resolution Trust Corporation, acting as conservator for a savings and loan, seeking a deficiency judgment against guarantors Kenneth and Valera Olson following a trustee's sale of property securing a defaulted loan. The Olsons moved for summary judgment, arguing the claim was time-barred under Arizona's three-month statute of repose for deficiency actions. The court granted the Olsons' motion, holding that the second amended complaint, filed after the deadline, did not relate back to the original filing because the time limit is a substantive statute of repose rather than a procedural statute of limitations, and federal entities like the RTC must comply with such substantive state deadlines.
This case involves a dispute between Sun Village Farms and Bowery Savings Bank over a 1984 loan agreement for property development in Arizona, later modified in 1985, with Sun Village alleging breaches by the bank that excused its missed 1987 payment and seeking to prevent foreclosure. The court addressed Sun Village's motion for a preliminary injunction to halt the foreclosure sale. It decided to maintain the injunction, finding that serious legal questions existed regarding contract performance and breaches, that the balance of hardships favored Sun Village, and that foreclosure would cause irreparable harm not compensable by money damages. The ruling preserves the status quo pending a full trial on the merits of the agreements and obligations.
In Felton v. Unisource Corp., the plaintiffs sued their former employer for breach of contract, wrongful termination, and violation of Arizona's civil rights statute, alleging that Don Felton was fired to prevent him from receiving medical benefits under an employee benefit plan. The defendants removed the case to federal court and moved for summary judgment, contending that the claims were preempted by ERISA and barred by the applicable statute of limitations. The court granted summary judgment, holding that the claims fell squarely within ERISA sections 502 and 510 because they concerned interference with rights under an employee benefit plan, which preempts related state laws under 29 U.S.C. § 1144. The court further reasoned that the most analogous limitations period for these economic-loss claims was the one-year period under A.R.S. § 12-541(3), making the suit filed after October 1987 untimely.