William Perry Copple

In Zatterstrom v. Sullivan, the plaintiff sought attorney's fees and entry of final judgment following a favorable administrative decision on his Social Security disability claims under Titles II and XVI of the Act. The sole issue was whether the district court's July 29, 1991 remand order qualified as a sentence-four remand (affirming, modifying, or reversing the Secretary's decision with or without remand) or a sentence-six remand (for consideration of new evidence or before an answer is filed) under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The court determined that the order was a sentence-four remand because an answer had already been filed, no new evidence was involved, and the case was sent back at the Secretary's request merely to reconsider the existing record. As a result, the court held that the fee application was untimely and denied both the motion for entry of judgment and the application for fees, noting that the case had been administratively closed upon remand.

procedurefederal power

This case concerned whether a bank could reach the community property of married couples to satisfy obligations under a loan transaction with Camelback Canyon Investors, where one spouse had not joined in the original deal. Previously, the court had ruled that Arizona Revised Statutes § 25-214(C)(1) requires both spouses to join any encumbrance of community real property interests, granting partial summary judgment to the Chick defendants. The Arnolds, who had signed a joint personal financial statement in connection with a later loan modification, sought the same protection; the bank argued that their action amounted to ratification or estoppel. The court rejected those arguments, finding that signing the financial statement did not affirm a prior unauthorized act or bar the community-property defense, and therefore granted the Arnolds' motion for partial summary judgment while denying the bank's cross-motion.

family lawproperty

The case involved Meritor Savings Bank seeking a deficiency judgment against the general partners of Camelback Canyon Investors and their wives after a trustee's sale following default on a $1.85 million promissory note secured by a deed of trust on Arizona real property. The court denied a motion to dismiss a cross-claim between partners for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) applied because the cross-claim was related to the original action. On the merits, the court granted partial summary judgment to the Chicks, ruling that their community property could not be reached to satisfy the partnership debt because Mrs. Chick did not join in the transaction encumbering real property, as required by Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 25-214(C), and denied Meritor's cross-motion for summary judgment on the same issue.

propertyprocedurefamily lawbusiness & regulatory

The case involved the Resolution Trust Corporation, acting as conservator for a savings and loan, seeking a deficiency judgment against guarantors Kenneth and Valera Olson following a trustee's sale of property securing a defaulted loan. The Olsons moved for summary judgment, arguing the claim was time-barred under Arizona's three-month statute of repose for deficiency actions. The court granted the Olsons' motion, holding that the second amended complaint, filed after the deadline, did not relate back to the original filing because the time limit is a substantive statute of repose rather than a procedural statute of limitations, and federal entities like the RTC must comply with such substantive state deadlines.

business & regulatorypropertyprocedure

This case involves a dispute between Sun Village Farms and Bowery Savings Bank over a 1984 loan agreement for property development in Arizona, later modified in 1985, with Sun Village alleging breaches by the bank that excused its missed 1987 payment and seeking to prevent foreclosure. The court addressed Sun Village's motion for a preliminary injunction to halt the foreclosure sale. It decided to maintain the injunction, finding that serious legal questions existed regarding contract performance and breaches, that the balance of hardships favored Sun Village, and that foreclosure would cause irreparable harm not compensable by money damages. The ruling preserves the status quo pending a full trial on the merits of the agreements and obligations.

business & regulatorypropertyprocedure

In Felton v. Unisource Corp., the plaintiffs sued their former employer for breach of contract, wrongful termination, and violation of Arizona's civil rights statute, alleging that Don Felton was fired to prevent him from receiving medical benefits under an employee benefit plan. The defendants removed the case to federal court and moved for summary judgment, contending that the claims were preempted by ERISA and barred by the applicable statute of limitations. The court granted summary judgment, holding that the claims fell squarely within ERISA sections 502 and 510 because they concerned interference with rights under an employee benefit plan, which preempts related state laws under 29 U.S.C. § 1144. The court further reasoned that the most analogous limitations period for these economic-loss claims was the one-year period under A.R.S. § 12-541(3), making the suit filed after October 1987 untimely.

labor & employmentcivil rightsfederal power

This case involved multiple farming partnerships and their general partners challenging final determinations by the Secretary of Agriculture, through the ASCS, that denied them separate "person" status under the Agricultural Act of 1949 for purposes of receiving federal commodity program payments limited to $50,000 per person. The plaintiffs sought review after the agency found their farming agreements did not qualify partners as separate persons due to insufficient substantive changes and non-commensurate contributions. The court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs, reversed the Secretary's findings as arbitrary and capricious, and remanded the matter with instructions to recognize all thirty-three general partners as separate persons for the 1986 program year and to find that the farming agreements were not custom farming agreements. The decision rested on the agency's multiple procedural and substantive errors in evaluating the partners' contributions and operational changes, which the record showed entitled the plaintiffs to the requested determinations.

business & regulatoryfederal power

The case involved a trademark infringement and unfair competition lawsuit brought by International Comfort Products against Hanover House Industries in Arizona federal court. Hanover moved to dismiss for improper venue or alternatively to transfer the case, arguing its minimal contacts with Arizona made the forum inappropriate. The court denied dismissal but granted transfer to the Middle District of Pennsylvania, reasoning that Hanover's business in Arizona was too limited (under 3% of orders) to establish proper venue there under 28 U.S.C. § 1391, as it wasn't "doing business" sufficiently, and Pennsylvania was more convenient for the defendant, witnesses, and evidence.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

In Trowbridge v. Bowen, the plaintiff sought judicial review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) of the Secretary's decision setting November 28, 1986, as the onset date for his disability insurance benefits, arguing it should have been April 14, 1985, due to earlier seizure disorders, brain hemorrhage, and related conditions documented in medical records from 1984 onward. The court granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and denied the government's cross-motion, holding that the Secretary's chosen onset date lacked substantial evidentiary support. The core reasoning was that hospital admissions and testing from 1984 and 1985 demonstrated the plaintiff's disabling symptoms well before the selected date, and the Secretary did not properly apply the three factors in Social Security Ruling 83-20 for establishing the onset of nontraumatic disabilities.

healthcarefederal powerprocedure

The case involves a plaintiff seeking judicial review under the Social Security Act of the denial of disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income due to a heart condition after a myocardial infarction. In this order, the court addresses the plaintiff's application for attorney's fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act following the underlying benefits denial. The court granted fees at an enhanced hourly rate of $125, finding that the government's position was not substantially justified because the ALJ mischaracterized medical evidence, failed to apply Ninth Circuit legal standards on credibility and residual functional capacity, and the Appeals Council adopted the flawed decision. The reasoning applies the Supreme Court's Pierce v. Underwood standard equating 'substantially justified' to a reasonable basis in law and fact, and recognizes the limited availability of attorneys with specialized skills in Social Security cases.

federal powerhealthcareprocedure

This case involves wheat, barley, and cotton producers who challenged the Secretary of Agriculture's administrative ruling that combined multiple farming partnerships as a single 'person' for purposes of the 1986 cotton price support program administered by the ASCS, seeking a declaratory judgment under the Administrative Procedure Act that the decision was arbitrary and capricious. The defendant moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the Tucker Act, arguing the claim was effectively one for money damages exceeding $10,000 that belonged in the Claims Court; for improper service of process; and on grounds that 15 U.S.C. § 714 barred declaratory relief against the Commodity Credit Corporation. The court denied the motion, holding that it had jurisdiction because the action sought only non-monetary declaratory relief reviewing an agency decision under the APA, that the CCC provision did not apply since the suit targeted the Secretary rather than the CCC, and that service defects were excused under the Borzeka factors due to actual notice, lack of prejudice, justifiable excuse from office procedures, and potential harm to plaintiffs from dismissal. The court ordered proper service to be effected but allowed the case to proceed.

business & regulatoryprocedurefederal power

This case involved a lawsuit by Calvin Guy, a Black former Phoenix police officer, against the City of Phoenix and multiple supervisors and coworkers alleging racial discrimination under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and conspiracy, based on events during his assignment to the South Mountain Precinct burglary detail from 1979 until his 1983 retirement. The court found that Guy failed to prove any discriminatory intent or racial animus in employment actions, that no conduct met the threshold for outrageousness required for emotional distress, and that no underlying unlawful acts or agreement supported a conspiracy claim; it also noted that common-law claims were barred by Arizona's workers' compensation exclusivity provision. Accordingly, the court dismissed all claims against the city, supervisors, and coworkers. The core reasoning rested on the absence of credible evidence linking any actions to racial bias or meeting the elements of the tort claims, along with legal bars to coworker liability under § 1981 and to conspiracy without predicate acts.

civil rightslabor & employmenttorts & liability

The case concerned Folsom Investments' challenge to the City of Scottsdale's denial of a preliminary plat application for subdividing land that was zoned RL-43 at the time of purchase and application. The court granted Folsom's motion for partial summary judgment on Arizona zoning and subdivision regulation grounds, ordering the city to approve the preliminary plat, final plat, and related permits under the prior zoning and barring enforcement of the later down-zoning ordinance against the property. The core reasoning was that the denial improperly relied on proposed but unadopted zoning changes in violation of state enabling statutes, and that timely approval would have allowed Folsom to obtain permits, incur obligations, and begin construction before the zoning change, thereby vesting rights that estopped the city from applying the new restrictions.

propertyprocedure

This case involved consolidated lawsuits by uranium miners and their families against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act, claiming government agencies negligently failed to warn about or mitigate radon radiation hazards in mines despite known European precedents and domestic studies dating back decades. The court dismissed the claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. It reasoned that the challenged actions, including the Public Health Service epidemiological study and related decisions on mine operations and safety, resulted from protected discretionary policy decisions made at high government levels on national security and feasibility grounds, which are exempt under 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a).

torts & liabilityfederal powerprocedureenvironment

Francis E. Simmons sued under the Social Security Act to obtain review of the Secretary of Health and Human Services' denial of disability insurance benefits, which was based on a finding that he could perform sedentary work despite hypertension, arteriosclerosis, and coronary artery disease. The court considered cross-motions for summary judgment after an ALJ determined that Simmons was not disabled within the meaning of the Act and that suitable jobs existed in the economy, with the Appeals Council declining to consider additional psychological evidence from after the relevant period. The court granted the Secretary's motion for summary judgment and denied Simmons', holding that the ALJ applied proper legal standards and that the decision was supported by substantial evidence including medical reports and vocational testimony.

healthcareprocedure

In this case, the Larsons sought a preliminary injunction to prevent First Interstate Bank from honoring a $55,000 letter of credit called by the FDIC as successor to Penn Square Bank, which had been issued as collateral for loans to an oil and gas partnership in which the Larsons invested. The court granted the injunction after finding that serious questions existed about potential fraud in the underlying transaction and the FDIC's conduct in calling the letter of credit, and that the balance of hardships tipped sharply in the plaintiffs' favor. The core reasoning applied the alternative test for injunctive relief, emphasizing that payment could cause the Larsons irreparable loss given the bank's insolvency while a delay would not significantly harm the FDIC, and noting the public interest in preventing fraud under the fraud-in-the-transaction exception to letters of credit.

business & regulatoryprocedure

Plaintiff Meyerson, a deaf psychology professor at Arizona State University hired in 1962, sued the state alleging handicap discrimination in various employment-related ways under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. The court reaffirmed that § 1983 is purely remedial and requires an independent federal right, which in this case depended on establishing a valid § 504 claim. It granted summary judgment to defendants because the alleged discrimination lacked the required connection to federal funds received by the psychology department and because employment was not a primary objective of those instructional and research grants. The court therefore denied the plaintiff's motions for reconsideration and summary judgment and dismissed all claims.

civil rightslabor & employmentfederal power

Dr. Lee Meyerson, a professor at Arizona State University, sued the State of Arizona alleging handicap discrimination under §§ 503 and 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the Revenue Sharing Act, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The court granted summary judgment on the § 503 claim, concluding that the statute creates no private right of action because its language merely requires inclusion of affirmative-action clauses in certain federal contracts and because recent Supreme Court precedent requires clear congressional intent to imply such a remedy. The Revenue Sharing Act claim was dismissed without prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies under 31 U.S.C. § 1244, while the motions concerning § 504 and § 1983 were denied without prejudice pending a determination whether Meyerson is a protected beneficiary of any federally funded program.

civil rightsfederal powerprocedure

In this FDA enforcement action under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, the United States sought an injunction against Western Serum Company and its officers for marketing animal drugs alleged to be adulterated because they were not produced in compliance with current good manufacturing practice (CGMP) regulations and because eleven of the products were unapproved new animal drugs. The district court granted the government's motion for summary judgment on both issues while denying the defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The court held that, in an enforcement proceeding, it could determine new-drug status to the limited extent of deciding whether the government had shown probable cause that the products were new drugs, and it found the inspection reports established CGMP violations with no genuine issue of material fact. It further ruled that the company's stated intent to comply in the future did not preclude injunctive relief.

business & regulatoryfederal powerhealthcare

This case involved numerous Navajo plaintiffs, including surviving spouses and family members of deceased uranium miners, who brought tort claims against Kerr-McGee Corp. for occupational diseases allegedly caused by exposure to radon gas and its decay products in Arizona mines. The court held that the claims were covered by Arizona's Occupational Disease Disablement Act (ODDA) as it existed before and after 1969 amendments, making ODDA the exclusive remedy barring tort suits unless the employer failed to provide required notices under that statute. The core reasoning rested on statutory interpretation, finding that the pre-1969 term 'radium emanations' unambiguously encompassed radon gas based on scientific literature, that workers' compensation statutes must be liberally construed to effectuate their compensatory purpose, and that the absence of a willful misconduct exception under ODDA precluded tort recovery. The complaint was dismissed with leave to amend solely to allege noncompliance with ODDA notice requirements.

labor & employmenttorts & liability