This case was a patent infringement action in which Winsor sued Kendall and others for damages from their use of a machine for making harness that matched his patented invention. The defendants raised defenses of a license and a statutory right under the seventh section of the 1839 patent act to use machines they had built before Winsor's application, and they argued that his multi-year delay after the machine was operational amounted to abandonment of his rights. The Circuit Court instructed the jury that an inventor's delay to perfect the invention while maintaining secrecy does not forfeit rights unless there is clear evidence of intent to abandon, and submitted the factual questions of the parties' conduct and intent to the jury, which found for Winsor. The Supreme Court affirmed, ruling that the instructions properly reflected prior precedent on public versus secret use and that the jury's resolution of the facts was conclusive.
This case involved a dispute over title to land in Missouri, where the plaintiff in ejectment sued based on a New Madrid certificate authorizing relocation of land damaged by earthquakes, originally stemming from a Spanish-era settlement claim. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court's judgment for the plaintiff, holding that an action of ejectment requires proof of legal title, which in federal land cases is only perfected by issuance of a patent from the government, not merely a warrant or certificate. The Court reasoned that until a patent issues, the legal title remains with the United States, and federal courts must distinguish between legal and equitable remedies, unlike some state practices. The decision emphasized that the plaintiff's incomplete chain of title from the land warrant was insufficient to establish possession rights at law.
This was an ejectment action brought in Virginia state court by plaintiffs holding title under a 1851 state patent for about 39 acres at the mouth of the Shenandoah River, which was removed to federal court because the defendant occupied the land as a U.S. officer. The defendant defended possession based on certified records showing an earlier 1750 survey and 1751 grant from Lord Fairfax to Robert Harper for 125 acres covering the same land. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's judgment for the defendant, holding that the 1851 patent was invalid because it purported to grant land that had already been appropriated under the prior grant. The Court reasoned that, under established rules for construing patents and surveys, calls for natural objects such as rivers control over courses and distances, confirming that the disputed tract fell within the boundaries of the elder grant.
This case was an ejectment action brought by the plaintiff, as sole heir of John Crow, against the heirs of James Lawson over a tract of land in Arkansas. Both parties traced their claims to a U.S. patent issued in 1821; the plaintiff relied on her inheritance, while the defendants relied on a 1846 sheriff's deed from a tax sale for unpaid 1824 taxes plus a later state-court decree confirming that sale. The Circuit Court ruled for the defendants after a second trial, and the Supreme Court affirmed. The Court held that the Arkansas confirmation decree was conclusive as to the regularity of the tax-sale proceedings and operated as a bar against collateral challenges to the title, consistent with prior Arkansas precedent and the in-rem nature of the proceeding.
The case concerned the liability of a surety on an official bond given by a Mississippi sheriff, where the surety (Humphreys) had already paid the full penalty amount through executions on two state-court judgments obtained by a bank. After a prior Supreme Court reversal in a related federal suit brought by the appellants (Leggett et al.) for the sheriff's release of a judgment debtor, the Circuit Court initially entered judgment against the surety, but he then sought equitable relief claiming the penalty had been satisfied. The Supreme Court held that the surety's payment of the full bond penalty via the state proceedings fulfilled his obligation, as additional collections fell short of the penalty and no lien or priority restricted application of those funds. It affirmed the Circuit Court's decree granting the surety relief and barring further claims on the bond.
The case involved a dispute over public lands purchased at a federal sale in Minnesota Territory, where plaintiff Irvine alleged that defendant Marshall, using funds from Irvine and co-defendant Barton, bought the land as their agent but refused to convey Irvine's half-share due to Barton's competing claim. Irvine filed a bill seeking to enjoin Marshall from conveying the full tract to Barton and to compel conveyance of an undivided half to Irvine based on an alleged trust. The District Court sustained the defendants' demurrer, finding the complaint failed to allege facts showing a trust under the relevant territorial statute, and the Supreme Court of the Territory affirmed. The U.S. Supreme Court upheld this outcome, reasoning that once federal title passed via the patent certificate, disputes over ownership and any resulting trusts were governed by local law rather than federal provisions, and the pleadings did not meet the statutory requirements for relief.
