Peter Vivian Daniel

This case was a patent infringement action in which Winsor sued Kendall and others for damages from their use of a machine for making harness that matched his patented invention. The defendants raised defenses of a license and a statutory right under the seventh section of the 1839 patent act to use machines they had built before Winsor's application, and they argued that his multi-year delay after the machine was operational amounted to abandonment of his rights. The Circuit Court instructed the jury that an inventor's delay to perfect the invention while maintaining secrecy does not forfeit rights unless there is clear evidence of intent to abandon, and submitted the factual questions of the parties' conduct and intent to the jury, which found for Winsor. The Supreme Court affirmed, ruling that the instructions properly reflected prior precedent on public versus secret use and that the jury's resolution of the facts was conclusive.

business & regulatoryproperty

This case involved a dispute over title to land in Missouri, where the plaintiff in ejectment sued based on a New Madrid certificate authorizing relocation of land damaged by earthquakes, originally stemming from a Spanish-era settlement claim. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court's judgment for the plaintiff, holding that an action of ejectment requires proof of legal title, which in federal land cases is only perfected by issuance of a patent from the government, not merely a warrant or certificate. The Court reasoned that until a patent issues, the legal title remains with the United States, and federal courts must distinguish between legal and equitable remedies, unlike some state practices. The decision emphasized that the plaintiff's incomplete chain of title from the land warrant was insufficient to establish possession rights at law.

propertyprocedurefederal power

This was an ejectment action brought in Virginia state court by plaintiffs holding title under a 1851 state patent for about 39 acres at the mouth of the Shenandoah River, which was removed to federal court because the defendant occupied the land as a U.S. officer. The defendant defended possession based on certified records showing an earlier 1750 survey and 1751 grant from Lord Fairfax to Robert Harper for 125 acres covering the same land. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's judgment for the defendant, holding that the 1851 patent was invalid because it purported to grant land that had already been appropriated under the prior grant. The Court reasoned that, under established rules for construing patents and surveys, calls for natural objects such as rivers control over courses and distances, confirming that the disputed tract fell within the boundaries of the elder grant.

property

This case was an ejectment action brought by the plaintiff, as sole heir of John Crow, against the heirs of James Lawson over a tract of land in Arkansas. Both parties traced their claims to a U.S. patent issued in 1821; the plaintiff relied on her inheritance, while the defendants relied on a 1846 sheriff's deed from a tax sale for unpaid 1824 taxes plus a later state-court decree confirming that sale. The Circuit Court ruled for the defendants after a second trial, and the Supreme Court affirmed. The Court held that the Arkansas confirmation decree was conclusive as to the regularity of the tax-sale proceedings and operated as a bar against collateral challenges to the title, consistent with prior Arkansas precedent and the in-rem nature of the proceeding.

propertytaxesprocedure

The case concerned the liability of a surety on an official bond given by a Mississippi sheriff, where the surety (Humphreys) had already paid the full penalty amount through executions on two state-court judgments obtained by a bank. After a prior Supreme Court reversal in a related federal suit brought by the appellants (Leggett et al.) for the sheriff's release of a judgment debtor, the Circuit Court initially entered judgment against the surety, but he then sought equitable relief claiming the penalty had been satisfied. The Supreme Court held that the surety's payment of the full bond penalty via the state proceedings fulfilled his obligation, as additional collections fell short of the penalty and no lien or priority restricted application of those funds. It affirmed the Circuit Court's decree granting the surety relief and barring further claims on the bond.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

The case involved a dispute over public lands purchased at a federal sale in Minnesota Territory, where plaintiff Irvine alleged that defendant Marshall, using funds from Irvine and co-defendant Barton, bought the land as their agent but refused to convey Irvine's half-share due to Barton's competing claim. Irvine filed a bill seeking to enjoin Marshall from conveying the full tract to Barton and to compel conveyance of an undivided half to Irvine based on an alleged trust. The District Court sustained the defendants' demurrer, finding the complaint failed to allege facts showing a trust under the relevant territorial statute, and the Supreme Court of the Territory affirmed. The U.S. Supreme Court upheld this outcome, reasoning that once federal title passed via the patent certificate, disputes over ownership and any resulting trusts were governed by local law rather than federal provisions, and the pleadings did not meet the statutory requirements for relief.

propertyfederal power

This case arose from a dispute in the Territory of New Mexico involving a creditor's use of attachment proceedings against a debtor under laws enacted by the provisional government established after U.S. conquest in 1846. The Supreme Court addressed whether those provisional laws remained valid after the end of active hostilities and whether a preliminary ruling on the attachment could be appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. The Court held that the provisional ordinances stayed in force because the United States retained permanent sovereignty over the territory rather than restoring it to Mexico. It further ruled that the attachment challenge was an interlocutory proceeding in abatement, not a final judgment on the merits, and therefore fell outside the appellate jurisdiction granted by the Judiciary Act of 1789. The Court affirmed the territorial supreme court's decision upholding the district court's judgment.

federal powerprocedure

The case concerned a Mississippi landowner who sued to block state commissioners from digging a canal to improve navigation on the Homochitto River, arguing that the project would divert waters away from his plantation on the old bed of the Mississippi River and destroy his access for navigation and agriculture. The plaintiff claimed the authorizing state statute violated the federal and state constitutions by taking his property without compensation and breached the 1817 federal act admitting Mississippi, which required that navigable rivers remain common highways forever free. The state high court dismissed the bill on demurrer. The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed, ruling that the Mississippi law was a legitimate exercise of state power to regulate and improve rivers and watercourses within its borders and did not violate the federal Constitution or the conditions of statehood.

propertyfederal powerbusiness & regulatory

The case concerned a suit in equity brought by Francis Surget to set aside as fraudulent a sheriff's sale of over 14,000 acres of land in Jackson County, Arkansas, that had been conveyed to Byers for $9.13 in satisfaction of a $39 judgment for costs. The underlying judgment arose from a post-dissolution partnership action against a third party, and the execution process involved irregularities including Byers's assumption of the clerk's role in taxing costs, his preparation of the levy description, his demand for seizure of the entire tract, and his refusal to accept a tender for redemption. The Circuit Court annulled the sale and ordered reconveyance; the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the extreme inadequacy of consideration together with the surrounding circumstances established fraudulent design that could not be sustained under principles of legal or moral justice.

propertyprocedure

The case involved the United States suing the City Bank of Columbus in assumpsit to recover $100,000 that the bank allegedly failed to transfer from New York to New Orleans and deposit in the federal treasury as promised. The Circuit Court certified a division-of-opinion question asking whether a letter from the bank's cashier (written without the board's knowledge) and a related contract document created a valid agreement binding the bank. The Supreme Court declined to answer the certified question, finding the record incomplete regarding the cashier's inherent or delegated authority and any possible ratification by the bank. It therefore remanded the case for trial so that all relevant evidence on those issues could be presented to the jury.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved a suit in federal circuit court by a Tennessee plaintiff against a Mississippi defendant on a bill of exchange, where the plaintiff sought recovery after the bill was protested for non-acceptance but before maturity. The circuit court had instructed the jury that recovery required proof of both non-acceptance and subsequent non-payment protests with notices, potentially influenced by a Mississippi statute. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that under general commercial law the holder has an immediate right to sue the drawer upon dishonor by non-acceptance and due notice, without needing later presentment for payment. The Court further ruled that federal courts apply uniform commercial principles rather than state laws that would impair those rights or alter federal jurisdiction and procedure in such cases.

business & regulatoryfederal powerprocedure

The case involved a dispute over a bill of exchange drawn by the defendant firm on a Liverpool merchant for a cotton shipment, which was endorsed to the plaintiffs; after the bill was protested for nonpayment, the plaintiffs sued the defendant as drawer, and the defendant sought to defend by claiming the plaintiffs had improperly surrendered the bill of lading that was meant to secure the shipment proceeds. The circuit court certified five questions to the Supreme Court arising from a division in opinion between the judges, primarily concerning whether the plaintiffs were obligated to hold the bill of lading as security, whether notice requirements were met, and whether facts about the surrender to a third party provided a defense, plus a question on Alabama damages statutes. The Supreme Court held that it lacked jurisdiction over the certified questions under the 1802 act governing divisions of opinion. It reasoned that the questions were not pure questions of law but instead required judgments on the weight of evidence and facts that belonged to the jury, were not presented as single specific legal points, and collectively sought review of the entire case before final judgment, contrary to prior precedents interpreting the certification statute.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

The case concerned heirs of John Goldsbury who obtained a Kentucky state court decree holding James Shields, his wife, their son, and son-in-law liable for mismanaging and fraudulently disposing of the decedent's estate, including slaves, after the widow remarried. Because the defendants resided outside Kentucky, the plaintiffs filed a bill in federal equity court in Iowa to enforce the decree. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's jurisdiction and relief, reasoning that equity courts possess inherent authority to enforce decrees from other courts via bill when common-law process cannot cross state lines, without implicating the Seventh Amendment jury right that applies only to legal remedies.

procedurepropertyfamily law

The case involved a criminal prosecution of Adam Ham for waste and trespass on a specific parcel of land in Missouri (section sixteen of a congressional township) that the state claimed as school lands granted by Congress. Ham defended on the ground that he held a lease under a federal patent issued in 1839, which confirmed an earlier Spanish land claim to the Mine la Motte tract encompassing the disputed section. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that Congress had granted the specific section to Missouri in 1820 under the Missouri enabling act, before the 1828 confirmation act; that confirmation only relinquished whatever title the United States still held at that later date and expressly preserved prior grants, so the 1820 school-land grant remained valid and superior. The Court therefore concluded that the land belonged to the state and that the state courts had correctly rejected Ham's title defense.

propertyfederal powercriminal law

This case involved an ejectment action in which the plaintiff sought to recover land based on a patent from the United States and deeds from the patentee's heirs, while the defendant claimed protection under Illinois statutes of 1835 and 1839 that bar actions against persons who have possessed land for seven years under color of title made in good faith and paid all assessed taxes. The circuit court excluded evidence of the defendant's tax deeds and possession, ruled that good faith was lacking as a matter of law, and directed a verdict for the plaintiff. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the question of good faith is one of fact for the jury to decide rather than the court, and that a tax deed obtained after a sale for unpaid taxes qualifies as color of title that may be submitted to the jury under the 1839 statute when coupled with seven years of possession and tax payments. The Court remanded the case for a new trial consistent with these principles of statutory construction.

propertyproceduretaxes

This case involved the condemnation as prize of war of the ship Admittance and its cargo, which were seized during wartime for trading with the enemy and sold in California rather than brought to a U.S. port. Claimants Jecker, Torre & Co. and others appealed from a circuit court decree in admiralty that condemned the vessel and cargo as lawful prize. The Supreme Court affirmed the decree, ruling that trading with the enemy is unlawful under the law of nations and subjects such property to confiscation, that the facts supported liability for condemnation, and that the captors' reasons for the sale were justified without resulting in forfeiture of their rights. The Court also upheld the deposit of sale proceeds in the U.S. Treasury pursuant to statute.

criminal lawpropertyfederal power

In Henshaw v. Miller, the plaintiff brought a fraud action in federal circuit court against the defendant for falsely recommending a buyer as creditworthy, which caused the plaintiff to sell goods on credit and suffer a total loss when the buyer defaulted. After the defendant died during the proceedings, the question arose whether the action could be revived against his executor via scire facias. The Supreme Court, applying the common-law maxim that personal actions die with the person and reviewing Virginia statutes and precedents, held that the action did not survive because the fraud caused only general pecuniary loss rather than damage to specific personal property. The Court therefore ruled that the suit abated upon the original defendant's death and certified that conclusion back to the circuit court.

proceduretorts & liability

The case involved a dispute over enforcement of a judgment on a promissory note originally held by the firm of Fisher and Johnson; after Fisher’s death, his administrator Hinkle sought to enjoin collection efforts by Hunter, who claimed rights to the judgment as a surety or creditor of Fisher. The attorneys who had received the note for collection had been directed to apply the resulting judgment and other assets for Hunter’s indemnity, and Hunter had exercised control over the judgment through writs of execution. The circuit court dismissed Hinkle’s bill, and the Supreme Court affirmed that decision. The Court reasoned that the deposit of the note and funds with the attorneys, combined with instructions from Fisher and notice to Hunter, created an equitable assignment of the chose in action to Hunter that the attorneys were bound to honor, allowing Hunter to proceed with collection despite Hinkle’s claims of prior payment or lack of assignment.

business & regulatorypropertyprocedure

This case involved a petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the Secretary of the Treasury to pay Aaron Goodrich his salary as chief justice of the Minnesota Territory after President Taylor removed him from office before the end of his four-year term and appointed a successor. Goodrich had been commissioned for a fixed term with an annual salary, but the Treasury officials rejected his claim for unpaid compensation following the removal, and the circuit court denied the mandamus request. The Supreme Court affirmed that denial, holding that the judiciary lacks authority under the federal government's structure to order the withdrawal of funds from the Treasury to satisfy disputed claims against the United States, as this would improperly extend beyond ministerial duties into contested questions of executive action. The Court limited its review to this procedural question and did not reach broader issues of judicial tenure or presidential removal powers.

federal powerprocedure

This case involved a dispute over compensation for a federal official who served simultaneously as collector of revenue for the district of Michilimackinac and as inspector of customs. The official claimed additional pay beyond the statutory limit for his inspector duties after 1822, but the Treasury disallowed amounts exceeding $400 per year under section 18 of the 1822 revenue act. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's judgment against the collector, reasoning that the statute capped compensation for any additional services performed by a collector and that inspector duties were not inherently part of the collector's office or eligible for separate higher pay without specific legal authorization.

business & regulatory