The case concerned a dispute over title to mineral-bearing land in Nevada between a claimant under a state patent derived from the school land grant in the 1864 Enabling Act (sections 16 and 36) and a mining company that obtained a federal patent under the 1866 mining law. The Supreme Court held that the federal patent prevailed, affirming the judgment for the defendant. The Court reasoned that the Enabling Act's grant of school lands, though using words of present grant, was qualified by provisions allowing Congress to dispose of lands before survey and identification, and that the 1866 act validly authorized disposition of mineral lands to occupants like the defendant; it further noted that Nevada had accepted this construction of the grant by ratifying legislation in 1867. The decision turned on statutory interpretation of congressional intent regarding public lands and mineral development rather than an absolute grant to the state.
This case involved a suit by the United States against the trustees of the insolvent firm Bayne & Co. to recover $100,000 in government funds that had been misappropriated. A paymaster deposited a $200,000 Treasury draft in a national bank and then arranged for $100,000 to be transferred to Bayne & Co. in New York, even though the firm was not a government creditor. After Bayne & Co. failed and assigned its assets, the lower court granted the United States preferred-creditor status for that amount, to be paid ahead of other creditors. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the funds remained government property, that Bayne & Co. received them with knowledge of their origin and the illegal diversion, and that the firm therefore owed an implied obligation to repay the United States under the 1797 priority statute.
This case concerned the validity and extent of a land grant in New Mexico originally made under Mexican rule, specifically the Sangre de Cristo grant, and whether an 1860 act of Congress confirmed it to its full claimed boundaries. The Supreme Court decided that the congressional confirmation was absolute and unconditional, thereby validating the grant for the entire tract described in the petition. The core reasoning was that Congress, after review by the surveyor-general, had the authority to confirm such claims without limitation, and courts could not revisit the merits or apply Mexican colonization limits, as the final action by Congress was conclusive.
This was an ejectment action brought in 1872 by Kibbe for a quarter-section of land in Mercer County, Illinois. The plaintiff claimed title through a 1868 deed from Helen Harrel and her husband Abram, who had inherited the land through successive intestate successions from the original owner who died in 1821. The defendants had been in continuous possession under color of title since 1857, paying all taxes. The Supreme Court affirmed judgment for the defendants, holding that the husband's life estate jure uxoris was extinguished by the Illinois statute of limitations in 1864, that Helen's right of entry then vested, and that the 1861 Married Women's Property Act required her (or her grantee) to bring suit within seven years thereafter, which did not occur.
In White v. Luning, a mortgagor who defaulted on a debt challenged a judicial sale of the mortgaged land, arguing that misdescriptions in the sheriff's deed prevented title from passing to the creditor who purchased the property at the sale. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's judgment in favor of the purchaser, holding that the deed sufficiently identified the land despite errors in certain boundary calls. The Court reasoned that the same rules of construction apply to sheriffs' deeds as to ordinary deeds, allowing false or repugnant calls for monuments to be rejected when doing so reconciles the remaining accurate descriptions, such as courses and distances, and permits the property to be located with certainty. It noted that the errors appeared inadvertent, did not mislead bidders or reduce the sale price, and that judicial sales should be upheld through reasonable intendments to effectuate their purpose.
The case concerned a life insurance policy containing a clause that voided coverage if the insured "shall die by suicide (sane or insane)." After the insured intentionally shot himself while in a state of insanity, the court ruled that the policy was unenforceable and the insurer had no liability. The core reasoning was that the policy's explicit qualifying language was intended to exclude all forms of intentional self-destruction, whether the insured could appreciate its moral or criminal nature or not, and that parties to an insurance contract are free to stipulate against such risks.