David Davis

The case concerned a dispute over title to mineral-bearing land in Nevada between a claimant under a state patent derived from the school land grant in the 1864 Enabling Act (sections 16 and 36) and a mining company that obtained a federal patent under the 1866 mining law. The Supreme Court held that the federal patent prevailed, affirming the judgment for the defendant. The Court reasoned that the Enabling Act's grant of school lands, though using words of present grant, was qualified by provisions allowing Congress to dispose of lands before survey and identification, and that the 1866 act validly authorized disposition of mineral lands to occupants like the defendant; it further noted that Nevada had accepted this construction of the grant by ratifying legislation in 1867. The decision turned on statutory interpretation of congressional intent regarding public lands and mineral development rather than an absolute grant to the state.

propertyfederal power

This case involved a suit by the United States against the trustees of the insolvent firm Bayne & Co. to recover $100,000 in government funds that had been misappropriated. A paymaster deposited a $200,000 Treasury draft in a national bank and then arranged for $100,000 to be transferred to Bayne & Co. in New York, even though the firm was not a government creditor. After Bayne & Co. failed and assigned its assets, the lower court granted the United States preferred-creditor status for that amount, to be paid ahead of other creditors. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the funds remained government property, that Bayne & Co. received them with knowledge of their origin and the illegal diversion, and that the firm therefore owed an implied obligation to repay the United States under the 1797 priority statute.

criminal lawbusiness & regulatoryfederal power

This case concerned the validity and extent of a land grant in New Mexico originally made under Mexican rule, specifically the Sangre de Cristo grant, and whether an 1860 act of Congress confirmed it to its full claimed boundaries. The Supreme Court decided that the congressional confirmation was absolute and unconditional, thereby validating the grant for the entire tract described in the petition. The core reasoning was that Congress, after review by the surveyor-general, had the authority to confirm such claims without limitation, and courts could not revisit the merits or apply Mexican colonization limits, as the final action by Congress was conclusive.

propertyfederal power

This was an ejectment action brought in 1872 by Kibbe for a quarter-section of land in Mercer County, Illinois. The plaintiff claimed title through a 1868 deed from Helen Harrel and her husband Abram, who had inherited the land through successive intestate successions from the original owner who died in 1821. The defendants had been in continuous possession under color of title since 1857, paying all taxes. The Supreme Court affirmed judgment for the defendants, holding that the husband's life estate jure uxoris was extinguished by the Illinois statute of limitations in 1864, that Helen's right of entry then vested, and that the 1861 Married Women's Property Act required her (or her grantee) to bring suit within seven years thereafter, which did not occur.

propertyfamily lawprocedure

In White v. Luning, a mortgagor who defaulted on a debt challenged a judicial sale of the mortgaged land, arguing that misdescriptions in the sheriff's deed prevented title from passing to the creditor who purchased the property at the sale. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's judgment in favor of the purchaser, holding that the deed sufficiently identified the land despite errors in certain boundary calls. The Court reasoned that the same rules of construction apply to sheriffs' deeds as to ordinary deeds, allowing false or repugnant calls for monuments to be rejected when doing so reconciles the remaining accurate descriptions, such as courses and distances, and permits the property to be located with certainty. It noted that the errors appeared inadvertent, did not mislead bidders or reduce the sale price, and that judicial sales should be upheld through reasonable intendments to effectuate their purpose.

property

The case concerned a life insurance policy containing a clause that voided coverage if the insured "shall die by suicide (sane or insane)." After the insured intentionally shot himself while in a state of insanity, the court ruled that the policy was unenforceable and the insurer had no liability. The core reasoning was that the policy's explicit qualifying language was intended to exclude all forms of intentional self-destruction, whether the insured could appreciate its moral or criminal nature or not, and that parties to an insurance contract are free to stipulate against such risks.

business & regulatory

This case involved a life insurance policy issued on the life of Monroe Snyder for the benefit of his wife, with the insurer refusing payment after his death on the ground that the policy was void due to a false answer in the application about not having been attended by a physician within twenty years. The disputed answer concerned a 1867 physician visit for a head injury, and the insurer requested a jury instruction that this fact alone voided the policies as a matter of law. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment for the widow, ruling that whether the injury was severe enough to make the answer untrue presented a factual question that had to be left to the jury rather than resolved by the court. The Court further held that the insurer had not properly preserved objections to additional jury instructions for appellate review.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case concerned whether Lindsay and Mansfield could enforce Hendrick's promise to provide indemnity for signing a supersedeas bond to stay a judgment against an insurance company. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's directed verdict for the plaintiffs. The court reasoned that Hendrick's correspondence, read in light of the parties' positions and the circumstances, requested procurement of a sufficient bond and promised indemnity to the sureties who would sign it; that the plaintiffs' execution of the bond supplied consideration through the damage they incurred; and that a beneficiary may sue in assumpsit on a non-sealed promise made for his benefit.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case concerned the seizure of forty-three gallons of whiskey introduced for sale in territory ceded by the Red Lake and Pembina band of Chippewa Indians under an 1863 treaty that extended federal laws prohibiting liquor in Indian country to the ceded lands, which had become part of an organized county in Minnesota. The United States sought to enforce the treaty and related intercourse acts against the introduction of the liquor. The Supreme Court held that the treaty provision was a valid exercise of federal authority and that the seizure proceedings were proper, reversing the lower court's judgment and remanding for trial. The Court reasoned that Congress possesses exclusive and plenary power under the Constitution to regulate commerce with Indian tribes, a power broad enough to support treaty stipulations protecting Indians from liquor even within state boundaries, without violating principles of state equality because the authority is uniform and based solely on federal subject-matter jurisdiction over Indian affairs.

federal powercriminal law

This case concerned a dispute over ownership of land in St. Louis known as Survey 422, originally confirmed to Auguste Dodier in 1810 by a federal board but later patented by the United States in 1878. The plaintiffs, claiming under the later patent, argued that the statute of limitations did not begin to run until 1878 because only equitable title had passed earlier, while the defendants, who had possessed the land adversely for over 35 years, contended that the 1812 federal statute vested full legal title directly. The Court held that the defendants prevailed because the Act of June 13, 1812, confirmed the claim proprio vigore as a complete grant, the proviso protecting other confirmed claims did not apply here, and the statute of limitations therefore barred recovery. It further ruled that the special findings of fact by the trial court were conclusive and that a partition suit did not alter the outcome under the controlling deed. The judgment of the circuit court in favor of the defendants was affirmed.

propertyfederal powerprocedure

The case concerned the validity of bonds issued by an Illinois township to subscribe for railroad company stock, where the initial vote and notice failed to comply with the company's charter limits and procedures. The court held the bonds invalid, following prior Illinois Supreme Court decisions in Marshall v. Silliman and Wiley v. Silliman that struck down the same bonds. It reasoned that the March 9, 1869 statute did not authorize the subscription because proper notice was not given, and the April 17 curative act violated the 1848 Illinois Constitution by attempting to grant corporate taxing authority to non-corporate officials like the supervisor and clerk while compelling the township to incur debt without its consent. The court distinguished cases allowing voluntary legislative grants to true corporate authorities and noted that the supervisor and clerk lacked independent power to bind the township or impose taxes.

taxesbusiness & regulatory

This case concerned ownership of a quarter-section of land in California claimed by the Western Pacific Railroad Company under patents issued pursuant to the Pacific Railroad Acts of 1862 and 1864, versus a later patent derived from a settler whose title traced to a rejected Mexican land grant called Moquelamos. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court's decree in favor of the railroad's successor, holding that the land never passed to the company because it was not "public land" at the time of the grant or the required withdrawal from sale. The Court reasoned that lands within the boundaries of a Spanish or Mexican grant pending adjudication before the commission established by the Act of 1851 remained reserved and outside the scope of the railroad grant, which applied only to lands subject to general disposal under federal law; the subsequent rejection of the Mexican claim could not retroactively validate the earlier patent. The Court rejected arguments that the withdrawal order or doctrines of relation back could overcome this status.

propertyfederal power

The case concerned a partnership formed by Stewart, Porter, and Wallace under the name Stewart, Porter & Co. to deal in agricultural implements. Wallace, acting with authority, contracted with Bucyrus Machine Works to purchase machines, representing that the three-person firm was solvent; the corporation delivered the machines and later received proceeds from some sales and returned unsold units after the partnership applied them to the debt. Stewart and Porter later entered bankruptcy, and their assignee sued the corporation to recover those proceeds. The court held that the corporation was not liable, reasoning that Wallace's false statements constituted fraud entitling the corporation to rescind and reclaim its property or proceeds, that the equitable settlement did not violate the bankruptcy laws because the firm owed no other creditors and the corporation had always dealt with the three partners, and that the machines retained their identity rather than becoming part of the bankrupts' permanent stock.

business & regulatory

The case involved a dispute over title to certain tracts of land in Kansas within the Osage ceded lands, which the United States had conveyed to the Leavenworth, Lawrence, & Galveston Railroad via certified lists acting as patents. The Supreme Court held that these lands were not included in the railroad's 1863 federal land grant because the grant applied only to public lands owned absolutely by the United States and expressly excepted or reserved the Osage lands. Applying settled rules of strict construction for such legislative grants, the Court reasoned that nothing passes unless conveyed in clear and explicit language, and the act's terms did not reach lands subject to Indian title or otherwise appropriated. The decree confirming United States title and enjoining the railroad's claims was therefore affirmed.

propertyfederal power

This case was an action by the United States on a bond guaranteeing the official duties of Haldeman as surveyor of customs and depositary of public moneys. The defendants pleaded prior judgments from identical suits, including nonsuits and a "dismissed agreed" entry, as bars to recovery. The Court affirmed the lower court's rulings sustaining demurrers to those pleas. It held that a former judgment bars a new suit only if it decided the merits or released the underlying claim, and the prior dismissals here contained no such adjudication or settlement.

procedure

The case involved a passenger injured in a minor train collision who sought both compensatory and exemplary damages from the railroad company. The Supreme Court held that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that exemplary damages could be awarded based on the collision alone or on gross negligence, and reversed the judgment. The core reasoning was that exemplary damages require proof of willful misconduct, malice, or reckless indifference to others' rights equivalent to intent, rather than ordinary or even gross negligence; the mere fact of a collision at low speed, without evidence of such aggravating circumstances, only supported compensatory damages. The Court also rejected attempts to create precise legal definitions for degrees of negligence as impractical and unhelpful to juries.

torts & liability

The case involved a dispute between the United States and the Union Pacific Railroad Company over whether the government could withhold half of the compensation owed to the railroad for transporting mails, troops, and supplies in order to offset interest the government had paid on bonds issued to aid the railroad's construction. The Court held that the railroad was entitled to receive the withheld payments. The reasoning centered on the language and purpose of the 1862 and 1864 congressional acts chartering the railroad, which provided the bonds as non-recourse aid for a national project without imposing any repayment obligation on the company for interest; the Court rejected application of ordinary set-off rules and found that later statutes preserved the company's right to litigate and recover the amounts earned.

business & regulatoryfederal power

The case involved a plaintiff who had pledged promissory notes as collateral to a bank for loans; after the bank failed to repay the loans and the notes remained with the bank, military authorities during the Civil War seized the bank in 1863, sold the pledged notes at a loss, and later returned control to the bank in 1866. The plaintiff sued the bank to recover for the loss of the securities, arguing they were improperly disposed of. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's judgment for the bank, holding that the bank was not liable because the seizure and sale occurred due to superior military force without any fault or omission by the bank, which had protested the takeover. The Court reasoned that both common and civil law discharge a pledgee's duty when collateral is taken by such unavoidable superior force, as the bank had retained the notes until dispossessed and acted as a prudent owner would.

business & regulatorypropertyfederal power

The case concerned whether the Pacific Railroad Company was exempt under section 12 of Missouri's 1852 act from county, school, and municipal taxes levied by St. Louis County on its completed road property, or whether the statute limited the company to only state taxes assessed in a specific manner. The Supreme Court held that the act created only a temporary exemption from all taxes until the road was completed and operating for two years, after which the property was subject to general taxation like other real and personal property, including local levies; the 1852 act's valuation method applied only to state taxes until the legislature changed it. The Court reasoned that tax exemptions must be expressed clearly with no reasonable doubt, that the statutory language "subject to taxation" without limiting words meant ordinary taxation to satisfy equality requirements, and that the state did not intend perpetual immunity from local taxes. It therefore reversed in part to enjoin improper state tax collection but upheld the local taxes.

taxesbusiness & regulatory

The case concerned whether certain lands in Nebraska containing known salt springs or salines could be entered, preempted, or patented under federal land laws, or whether they remained reserved for the United States. The Supreme Court held that the lands were reserved from sale or entry by longstanding federal statutes dating back to 1796 and extended by the 1854 act governing the Kansas and Nebraska territories, rendering any certificates of entry and patents void. The core reasoning traced a uniform congressional policy of reserving salt springs and contiguous lands across multiple territories and states to preserve them for future state grants, noting that the salines here were visible and noted in survey field books; the Court further ruled that executive officers lacked authority to issue patents for reserved lands, which could be challenged in court.

propertyfederal power